Tag: Dr Noelle Quenivet

Nuremberg Principles and Ukraine: Contemporary Challenges to Peace, Security and Justice

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On 5 November 2025, the Bristol Law School’s Research in Public International Law (RIPIL) group hosted a hybrid workshop and roundtable discussion exploring the continuing relevance of the Nuremberg Principles in the context of the war in Ukraine and other conflicts. Professor Gerhard Kemp, group lead for RIPIL, welcomed the local and international audience and noted that it is the second RIPIL event (and book discussion) for the new academic year, with more to come.

More than 40 international law scholars and academics joined the discussion, both in person and online, representing universities and research centres from the UK, Europe, Africa, Asia and North America, highlighting the global relevance of the Nuremberg Principles today.

As the Russian invasion continues to raise urgent questions of justice and accountability, the principles established at Nuremberg 80 years ago remain a cornerstone of international law. This workshop centred on the recently published volume Nuremberg Principles and Ukraine: The Contemporary Challenges to Peace, Security and Justice (Bloomsbury 2025), edited by Marshall J. Breger and Herbert R. Reginbogin. The book brings together leading international law scholars to examine themes including accountability for the crime of aggression, genocide, the abduction of Ukrainian children, the destruction of cultural heritage and the ongoing evolution of international criminal justice.

Keynote reflections

The keynote was delivered by Professor Herbert R. Reginbogin, Collegiate Law Fellow at The Catholic University of America and co-editor of Nuremberg Principles and Ukraine: The Contemporary Challenges to Peace, Security and Justice. He opened by paying tribute to a late colleague and co-editor of the book whose dedication to justice continues to inspire current efforts in international law.

Professor Reginbogin spoke about the determination of Ukrainian lawyers and researchers working tirelessly to uphold the rule of law prevails and ensure that accountability mechanisms are (set up) and used. He emphasised that the Nuremberg Principles, rejecting impunity for international crimes and immunity for officials,  remain as relevant today as ever, particularly as a new mechanism for prosecuting aggression is being developed in The Hague. He also reminded us of the importance of maintaining the credibility of international courts and of ensuring that they continue to operate in a transparent manner. He also addressed the challenges of corruption and governance within Ukraine, framing the pursuit of accountability as “a commitment to the future” and a necessary step in confronting the difficult questions that accompany war and occupation.

Panel discussion

  • Dr Viviane Dittrich (Deputy Director, International Nuremberg Principles Academy, Germany) reflected on the lasting legacy of the Nuremberg Trials and their ongoing relevance in international law. She emphasised the importance of holding instigators of war accountable, citing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a reminder of the need for justice. She closed by paying tribute to Benjamin B. Ferencz, whose motto “Law not War” continues to inspire new generations of legal scholars and practitioners.
  • Professor Stefanie Bock (Philipps University of Marburg, Germany) reflected on the ongoing importance of holding perpetrators of war crimes to account. After emphasising that the Nuremberg Principles have been fully embraced by the German Code of Crimes against International Law, she explained that Germany is currently undertaking structural investigations into international crimes committed in the conflict in Ukraine but has yet to charge anyone..
  • Dr Saeed Bagheri (University of Reading) examined the often-overlooked ‘ecocide’ and environmental dimensions of armed conflict, highlighting the severe ecological damage caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine – from polluted rivers and destroyed soil to the collapse of critical infrastructure. He argued that such harm raises urgent questions about how international law defines and prosecutes environmental crimes in wartime.
  • Professor Noëlle Quénivet (UWE Bristol) explored the Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, highlighting the rigorous legal thinking underpinning its development and addressing misconceptions about its structure and purpose. In particular, she discussed some of the most controversial elements, i.e. its legitimacy, especially as it is set in a European context, and selectivity as well as the immunity given to some officials.
  • Dr Caleb Wheeler (Cardiff University) discussed the complexities of the right to a fair trial when the accused is absent. He noted that while defendants can voluntarily waive their presence, holding a trial entirely in their absence is controversial. Drawing on Nuremberg precedents, he emphasised the need for proper notice and legal representation, warning that without these safeguards, trials risk producing further injustices.

Discussion and closing remarks

The workshop concluded with a roundtable that brought together these diverse perspectives, highlighting the complexities of accountability, justice and human rights in times of conflict. Speakers examined the design and rigour of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, the environmental dimensions of war, and the safeguards required to ensure fair trials.

Reflecting on the challenges discussed, Professor Herbert Reginbogin remarked:

“What happens to human rights when war begins? This is the question we, as academics and practitioners, must confront.”

The discussion underscored the ongoing relevance of the Nuremberg Principles and the vital role of scholarship in navigating the evolving landscape of international law. Dr Luke Eda, Senior Lecturer in Law at UWE Bristol, closed the workshop by thanking participants for their contributions to a timely and engaging dialogue. The event demonstrated RIPIL’s commitment to fostering informed debate and research on the legal and moral challenges of contemporary conflict.

To learn more about research and future events, visit Research in Public International Law (RIPIL).

Visiting scholar from the University of the Western Cape in South Africa shares his reflections after visiting UWE Bristol

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In December 2018, visiting scholar  Dr Windell Nortje from the University of the Western Cape in South Africa spent two weeks at the Bristol Law School. Below he shares his reflections of the visit: 

Guest blog by Dr Windell Nortje

I visited UWE between 4 and 18 December 2018. My home institution, the University of the Western Cape (UWC), in Cape Town, South Africa, granted me funding for a two-week international visit at a university abroad. I am truly grateful for the UWC Deputy Vice-Chancellor’s Research and Innovation Office for giving me the opportunity to visit UWE.

In October 2017 I started collaborating with Dr Noëlle Quénivet with a view to writing a journal article. This project turned into a book (Child Soldiers and the Defence of Duress in International Criminal Law) that has been accepted for publication by Palgrave. The manuscript is due to be submitted in March 2019. I approached Dr Quénivet in October 2018 and enquired whether UWE would be willing to host me as a visiting scholar. UWE graciously agreed. In my time at UWE I felt part of the Bristol Law School. I was warmly welcomed by Dr Quénivet, Dr Sarah Grabham, the Head of the Department of Law as well as all the academics and students.

This made my experience at UWE very fulfilling and rewarding.

The initial aim of the two-week visit was to work on the book and to collaborate with some of the academics at UWE. As it turned out, I held two guest lectures and presented my research to UWE academics. In addition, I collaborated with a number of academics with the view to writing journal articles, attended the first annual Criminal Justice Research Unit (CJRU) Lecture and importantly, also discussed the possibility of establishing a new LLM Programme between UWC and UWE. Finally, I also drafted a funding application with Dr Noëlle Quénivet for a potential writing workshop to be held in Cape Town in July 2019. I will be sharing some of the highlights of the activities above.

We are in the final stages of writing the book. Most of the chapters are completed. We are still finalising the conclusions and recommendations. Dr Quénivet had a few new books on child soldiers which I had not yet read and so I was able to incorporate some of the views of these authors in our book. Dr Quénivet and I also discussed the footnoting and referencing of the book as well as a follow-up article to be published in 2020. Dr Quénivet, being a leading expert in the field of international law, has been influential in turning the article into a book. I am grateful for her continuous support and guidance throughout the project. I would also like to thank Ms Shilan Shah-Davis and Dr Suwita Hani Randhawa for their invaluable comments when I discussed the book with them.

In a first for me, Dr Quénivet and I had the opportunity to present a public lunchtime lecture at the Bristol Central Library. This was a unique experience as we presented the lecture in the reception area of the Library and anyone was welcome to attend. The lecture entitled: “Child soldiers: Busting The Myth of their Victimhood to Better Understand who they are”, centred around the myth that child soldiers are victims only and that they should not be held accountable for their crimes. The audience found it fascinating to note that so many girls are also child soldiers since the perception is that the iconic child soldier is that of a boy. However, in some conflicts, the girls outnumber the boys. The audience, who consisted of about 20 people, had an opportunity to ask questions. I was grateful for this opportunity to discuss our work with the public as this is not an opportunity that comes by too often.

At UWE, I was invited by Mrs Evadne Grant to present a guest lecture on the International Law and Institutions module offered on the LLM progamme. The lecture, entitled: “The Fragmentation of International Law: An African Perspective” focused on the fragmentation of international law and how this has resulted in a conflict between African States and the International Criminal Court (ICC). There is no homogenous system of international law as different regulations are applied in different situations, thus a fragmented system. To explain this to the students I used the example of the concept head of state immunity within the context of Africa. The incumbent President of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, is wanted by the ICC for the commission of war crimes and genocide. He attended the African Union Summit in South Africa in 2015. During the Summit a South African Court issued an arrest warrant for his arrest. However, he was able to return safely to Sudan and is still wanted by the ICC. As a result, the ICC ruled that South Africa had a duty under the ICC Statute to arrest Al-Bashir. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa. In the case of head of state immunity, there are various regulations that could be applied in this case hence alluding to the fragmentation of international law. After presenting the lecture, the students had an opportunity to discuss several question posed to them by Mrs Grant. This included whether fragmentation should be regarded as a positive or negative aspect of international law. The students provided constructive feedback on the questions. In South Africa we are not used to this style of interactive lectures, even at LLM level. This was a refreshing experience for me and something that I will be considering at my institution as well.

I was also given the opportunity to present my research at the final Criminal Justice Research Unit/International Law and Human Rights Unit end of semester talk. My research article entitled “The Protection of the Identities of Minors upon Reaching the Age of Majority: Centre for Child Law and Others v Media 24 Limited and Others (871/2017) [2018] ZASCA 140 (28 September 2018)” dealt with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment concerning the ongoing protection of the identities of minors involved in criminal proceedings. The identity of child witnesses, victims and perpetrators when they reach the age of 18 is not protected and it is argued that this could have a damaging effect on the development of the child, depending on whether the case receives wide publicity or not. I received valuable feedback from Dr Tom Smith and Mr Ed Johnston.

I was invited by Dr Smith and Mr Johnston to attend the first annual CJRU lecture which dealt with the disclosure of evidence by the police in the Liam Allan case. It was a fascinating experience for me as this was the first time for myself, and many others, where we could hear the experiences of a former accused, his defence lawyer and the state prosecutor all in one lecture. It was clear from the speakers that the current situation in the UK needs proper reform, and hopefully initiatives such as those of the CJRU will encourage policy change. This event also inspired me to ask questions about the South African law regarding the disclosure of evidence and what lessons could be learned from the UK criminal justice system.

Regarding collaboration, Mrs Grant and I talked about the idea of creating a joint LLM between UWC and UWE in the future. We exchanged ideas and will be looking at funding opportunities to launch a new LLM between our institutions.

Lastly, Dr Quénivet and I embarked on a funding proposal to be submitted to the British Academy which would enable us to hold a writing workshop in Cape Town in July 2019. This workshop will potentially bring together leading international journal editors, UK based scholars and young and emerging African PhD students/scholars and give the emerging PhD students/scholars the opportunity to present an article to the specialist panel and receive constructive feedback on how to publish in international journals. The workshop aims not only to remedy the lack of quality publications by African scholars but also to support them more generally in their career.

In sum, my visit at UWE was an unforgettable experience which has left a lasting impact on my own emerging research profile and my development as a scholar in the field of international criminal law. I hope to see you again in the future!

 

Professor Anthony Arnull’s Distinguished Professorial Address – UWE, 24 October 2017

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‘Should we trust the EU?’ was the controversial title of Professor Anthony Arnull’s Distinguished Professorial Address held on 24 October 2018 at the Bristol Law School, UWE. Prof Arnull who holds the Chair of European Union Law at the University of Birmingham and is the author and editor of a wide range of well-known scholarly works in the field (eg The European Union and its Court of Justice (OUP, 2nd ed, 2006), European Union Law: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, 2017), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (OUP, 2015)) started his Address by asking the question ‘What does trust have to do with the EU?’. He pointed out that the concept of trust is increasingly invoked by the CJEU in its jurisprudence. The view of the CJEU is that because Member States share the same values they should trust each other to respect them and thus cannot insist on evidence to show that they are being complied with.

Prof Arnull’s first task was to define the notion of ‘trust’. First, he noted that in an article published in 2004 Lenaerts identified a number of principles that should enhance the trust of individuals in the EU: transparency, equality of arms, legal certainty and predictability, and sound administration. (‘In the Union We Trust’: Trust-Enhancing Principles of Community Law’ (2004) 41 CMLRev 317-343). Writing on the same issue in 2017 Lenaerts explained that the CJEU was expecting the constitutional courts of all Member States to monitor the lower courts. (‘La vie après l’avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (yet not Blind) Trust’ (2017) 54 CMLRev 805-840).

Looking at the concept in a more general way Prof Arnull explained that Baier understands trust as ‘reliance on others’ competence and willingness to look after, rather than harm, things one cares about which are entrusted to their care’ but that it might be possible to add another dimension to trust, that of risk, a notion introduced by Niklas Luhmann in his extensive writings on the subject. In this context, both parties expect things to go smoothly for the benefit of both (eg hiring a babysitter). So, the question boils down to asking how can someone draw the conclusion that another person is trustworthy? After all, it is about good judgment and usually one relies on evidence to establish such trustworthiness. In other words, the question is: ‘does the person have a good track record?’ Sometimes as it is not easy to gather evidence one needs to use proxy indicators. This is particularly the case in decentralised systems when it is often difficult to find whether trust is met. Trust can indeed be misplaced and so there might be a lack of trust.

Going back to the European Union Prof Arnull asked whether it is rational to trust the EU. He observed that a high degree of trust had been displayed by the European States between the 1950 Schuman declaration and the 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community. Yet, the States also seemed not to trust each other, considering the possibility that a State might not live up to its treaty commitments. The Commission was tasked with ensuring that the treaty be applied, and an enforcement procedure was established under Article 169. Prof Arnull also went back to the enforcement procedure under the European Coal and Steel Community to prove his point. After all, the idea of policing States tends to show a lack of trust. Such an argument is supported by the introduction in the Treaty of Maastricht of the possibility for the Commission to start a second set of proceedings against States with a view to obliging them to pay financial penalties if they did not comply with the initial CJEU judgment. The Lisbon Treaty went a step further allowing the Commission to ask for financial penalties to be applied without having to seise the CJEU again, though that is only allowed in limited circumstances (Article 260(3) TFEU). Prof Arnull argued that there is trust in the Commission to enforce EU law but it was much higher in the past, especially under the European Coal and Steel Community. The Amsterdam Treaty also introduced in Article 7 TEU the possibility to check on States failing to comply with the key values of the European Union. Now such a procedure is being used against Poland and Hungary.

Prof Arnull then provided a myriad of examples of trust and lack thereof towards both Member States and the institutions of the European Union. As he pointed out in the Q&A session the permutation of trust relations in the EU does not permit a structured analysis of how trust works in the EU. He also explained that mutual trust is the basis of EU law as well as an assumption. That being said, if there is a lack of trust it does not mean that there will be no trust anymore; rather, it means that trust must be re-established at a later stage.

The application of the European Arrest Warrant is an example of the trust or lack thereof between EU Member States as the recent preliminary reference to the CJEU on a case brought by an Irish court shows (Case C-216/18 PPU). Indeed, the Irish court questioned whether the right to fair trial would be guaranteed should Ireland extradite the individual to Poland.

With regard to individuals and how much they can trust the EU, Prof Arnull highlighted that originally, under the ECSC treaty, legal and natural persons had a relatively easy access to judicial review but the Treaty of Rome severely curtailed that right. The reason for this was that such judicial review was viewed as detrimental to the good functioning of the then European Economic Community.

To ensure though that individuals benefitted from EU law, the Court established the principles of direct effect and supremacy. If it had thought the Member States could be trusted to comply with EU law it would have probably not created these principles. The CJEU also works on the basis of trust in the sense that it assumes that the highest national courts comply with EU law as well as monitor lower courts. Unfortunately, this was recently put to the test as the Danish Supreme Court refused to follow a preliminary reference in 2016 (Ajos Case). So, if a constitutional court does not comply with EU law such monitoring disappears or, at least, becomes more difficult. Some academics claim that the Danish court’s reaction was because it views the CJEU as too activist and this does not work well with the Danish legal culture. The question however is why such an issue is raised after Denmark has been for so many years in the European Union.

The European Commission is viewed as one of the most powerful institutions and so trust in it is paramount. Unfortunately, a number of events have permitted us to doubt the trust we put in it. For example, in 1999 the Santer Commission resigned. In 2006 Edith Cresson, a Commissioner, was found guilty of misconduct (Case C-432/04). More recently in 2018 the Ombudsman has had to deal with two cases of maladministration against the Commission, the first one relating to Barroso, the former President of the EU Commission taking up a job as advisor with Goldmans Sachs and, the second one relating to the appointment of Selmayr as Secretary-General. It should however be noted that in the latter case the Ombudsman did not attack the individual, rather it was the process that led to his appointment that was put in question. This all does not look good when the Commission is, according to the treaties, the guardian of the treaties and yet seems to contain a number of individuals who cannot be trusted.

The history of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is another point in case. Italy wanted to play a strong role in the EU and thus had to show that it fulfilled the convergence requirements to be part of the EMU. The criteria were flexibly interpreted in 1998 and so Italy became part of it. Later, Italy and Greece became the victims of the 2008 financial crisis. This led to asking the question why Greece had been accepted in the Eurozone in the first place. The criteria, so it seemed, did not appear to have been rightly applied or, possibly, there was a deliberate attempt by Greece to mislead other EU Member States. In any case the issue of trust was raised in this context. The problem was that the Council is the only body that can oblige a State to correct the deficit within a certain timeframe. Yet, the Council, notably due to its composition is unwilling to do so. As a result we end up in a situation whereby commitments are made but not upheld and then the breach is not rectified because of collusion between Member States. All this reveals that the actors at stake cannot be deemed trustworthy, at least in the field of monetary policies.

Another good illustration of the issue of trust in the EU is the enlargement process. At the Copenhagen European Council it was agreed that Cyprus could become a Member of the EU and that accession by a united Cyprus was encouraged. Consequently, the process launched by Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, was supported by the EU. Yet, the EU did not attach any conditionality and so, despite the rejection by the Greek Cypriots of the unification of the island in a referendum organised by the United Nations, the EU allowed Cyprus to join the EU but on the understanding that the acquis was suspended in the northern part.

In conclusion, Prof Arnull explained that first the EU treaties have express provisions showing the lack of trust in the Member States. Second, practice also reveals that at times neither the Member States nor the EU institutions can be trusted. In other words, there are many reasons for not trusting the EU and the Member States. Does that mean that there is a crisis? No, according to Prof Arnull. Rather, all institutions must show that they are trustworthy and this can be done by setting practical guidelines and examples of good governance.

Student blog post: On the basis of the Article ‘Port of Rotterdam Reveals Scale of Brexit Challenge’ discuss the legal issues relating to non-tariff barriers and trading standards imposed on imported goods.

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This post (edited for publication) is contributed to our blog as part of a series of work produced by students for assessment within the module ‘Public International Law’. Following from last year’s blogging success, we decided to publish our students’ excellent work in this area again in this way. The module is an option in the second year of Bristol Law School’s LLB programme. It continues to be led by Associate Professor Dr Noelle Quenivet. Learning and teaching on the module was developed by Noelle to include the use of online portfolios within a partly student led curriculum. The posts in this series show the outstanding research and analytical abilities of students on our programmes. Views expressed in this blog post are those of the author only who consents to the publication.

Guest author: Victoria Meller

One of the most discussed phenomena of recent times is the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, i.e. Brexit. While the exact implications of Brexit will only become apparent once the UK officially leaves in 2019, the departure will undoubtedly have consequences on the economic relations of the UK with the EU as well as with the rest of the world.

The focus of this blog post is on the effect of Brexit on trading standards, i.e. tariffs and non-tariff barriers on imported and exported goods. I will examine the challenges that UK businesses and consumers might face.

Tariff and Non-tariff Barriers

Tariffs are external taxes paid on imported and exported goods as they cross the border whereas non-tariff barriers are trading requirements on goods, such as certain quality certificates which need to be shown at the border, or quantitative measures such as quotas. States usually prefer to pay tariffs to abiding by non-tariff barriers as the latter can limit or prevent a certain type of product from entering a State.

One fundamental principle of international economic law is the principle of non-discrimination. It is imposed by the World Trade Organization on all its members and consists of two components: the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment (Article I GATT 1994) which states that each trading partner must be treated equally and the national treatment (Article III GATT 94) which stipulates that foreign goods shall be treated in the same way as national goods. Exceptions to the principle (Article XIV) include preferential treatment towards developing nations (which goes against MFN but is for the greater good of disadvantaged nations) and being part of a regional free trade agreement. The UK, as a member state of the EU, is part of the single market and customs union, which operates as a tariff-free trade zone and applies the national treatment principle within its borders though it does discriminate against non-EU goods but is allowed to do so as it is a regional trade agreement.

In light of the article by Acton (Financial Times, 28 December 2017) this blog post highlights specific issues relating to the import of agricultural goods into the UK as it is claimed that 70% of imported food comes from the EU.

Price Rises

If the UK is unable to negotiate a free trade deal with the EU, then Brexit will result in the UK adopting the universal WTO tariffs as well as having the EU common external tariff of 2.3%  being imposed on it. This may result in price rises on foods such as fruits, vegetables, and wine which cannot be produced in the UK and are primarily imported from other EU States. As demonstrated in the table below, tariffs on e.g. dairy produce might rise to 39.9% on EU exports and 39.4% on UK exports. The higher prices would be caused by not only higher tariffs being placed on imports from the EU but also international imports entering the EU before reaching the UK. As the article explains, the latter situation is likely to happen since the UK does not have sufficiently large ports in comparison to EU ports such as Rotterdam.

 

Source: J Protts, ‘Potential Post-Brexit Tariff Costs for EU-UK Trade’, Civitas, October 2016, available here.

Double Control

Goods imported from outside the EU will go through a double border control which will inevitably cause delays. This will have the greatest impact on goods which rely on the just-in-time production system, such as food manufacturers (e.g. Kellogg’s). The just-in-time inventory system relies on manufacturers producing enough to meet demand, and only storing a limited amount of excess goods in inventory. Hence quick delivery onto shelves is essential. Double border control will mean double tariffs and non-tariff barriers such as certifications. This will affect the time they reach consumers and thus create costs for businesses.

As for non-tariff barriers, these will have huge implications on agricultural goods, as they are subject to stricter regulations and sanitary standards because of their public health consequences and fragile nature.

Non-tariffs 

Non-tariff barriers are believed to be 2-3 times the cost of tariffs on goods. With that in mind, sanitary standards and rules of origin (see Article IX GATT) of exported goods should remain strict for the UK post-Brexit. This will be to prevent the UK from acting as a ‘back door route for goods into Europe’. Since the UK will no longer be an EU member it may decide to relax trading standards, e.g. allow imports of chlorinated chicken which is banned across the EU. However, I think that the UK will nonetheless uphold most of the EU trading regulations and replicate them into its domestic law. This is because the majority of those regulations were voluntarily upheld by EU member states, as opposed to being imposed on them. In addition, as aforementioned, the UK does not possess sufficient ports for trading and so will likely continue to rely on EU ports. 

Source: Michael Acton ‘Port of Rotterdam Reveals Scale of Brexit Challenge’, Financial Times, 28 December 2017, available here.

Uncertain Future

Regardless of the many challenges that may initially arise due to Brexit, I think the UK could possibly benefit in the long run from withdrawing from the EU as it will no longer be restrained by the EU in terms of product standards and consequently be able to negotiate free trade deals on its own terms with any State and freely decide which tariffs and trading requirements to impose. I believe the UK will learn to adapt to this new set of circumstances, but only time will tell.

Student blog post: On the basis of the article ‘Can the ICC Probe End Duterte’s Deadly War on Drugs?’ (by Richard Javad Heydarian in Al Jazeera, 14 February 2018) critically discuss the legal issues relating to the involvement of the International Criminal Court in the Philippines.

Author Faculty of Business and Law | Posted on

This post (edited for publication) is contributed to our blog as part of a series of work produced by students for assessment within the module ‘Public International Law’. Following from last year’s blogging success, we decided to publish our students’ excellent work in this area again in this way. The module is an option in the second year of Bristol Law School’s LLB programme. It continues to be led by Associate Professor Dr Noelle Quenivet. Learning and teaching on the module was developed by Noelle to include the use of online portfolios within a partly student led curriculum. The posts in this series show the outstanding research and analytical abilities of students on our programmes. Views expressed in this blog post are those of the author only who consents to the publication.

Guest blog by: Baharan Shabani

Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’ is a controversial issue that has been going on and is still happening in the Philippines. According to Human Rights Watch (see relevant section on the Philippines in World Report 2017) it has brought the country to its worst human rights crisis since the dictatorship in the 1970s under Ferdinand Marcos. Phelim Kine describes the situation in this article. Since June 2016, under Duterte’s presidency, more than 7,000 deaths were caused in suspicious ways; masked, civilian-clothed men or even the police took alleged drug takers into detention and then reported of their deaths in an inaccurate way by stating that the individuals had been killed in self-defence (see here). Although responsibility was accepted for 2,615 of these killings, there seems to be great reluctance to admit responsibility for the other killings.

Duterte is of the opinion that leaving the Rome Statute will make it impossible for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to continue its investigations into these acts. However, theoretically, this will not be the case. Indeed, even after the withdrawal, the ICC will legally be able to bring this case forward.

In his article Richard Javad Heydarian questions the ICC’s ability to end Duterte’s killings. On 17 March 2018 the Philippines withdrew from the Rome Statute as Duterte was convinced that, as a result, the ICC could in no way interfere with his political actions anymore. To determine whether this is true the ICC’s jurisdiction needs to be examined. It is based on four criteria: the person in question (ratione personae), the substance of the case (ratione materiae), the location of the crime (ratione loci) and the time of the act (ratione temporis).

Based on Article 25 (3)(b) of the Rome Statute which deals with individual criminal responsibility Duterte can be prosecuted as natural persons pursuant to this Statute are individually responsible for committing a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC by ordering, soliciting or inducing such crimes, as it is the case with Duterte. The fact, that he is a Head of State is, according to Article 27 ICC Statute, irrelevant.

The crime that he is being accused of is a ‘crime against humanity’ under Article 5(b) ICC Statute which is further explained in Article 7. All elements of Article 7 ICC Statute must be fulfilled. The act is ‘murder’ under Article 7(a) ICC Statute. It can be said with confidence that, because of Duterte, a large number of individuals have been killed. Second, the killings have been carried out in a widespread and systematic way. Third, such killings were an intended conduct as he often confidently defends his actions (Cyril Arnesto, ‘Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearance in the Philippines as Crimes against Humanity under the Rome Statute’ (2008-2011) 4 Asia-Pacific Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 305-331).

If a crime takes place on the territory of a state that is a party to the Statute (Article 12(2)(a) ICC Statute) then the ICC can carry out its investigations. At the time the investigations started, this requirement was fulfilled because the extra-judicial killings only took place in the Philippines.

That being said, the problematic issue is time. Indeed, will the ICC still be able to investigate Duterte’s crimes? Article 127 ICC Statute states that the withdrawal is effective one year after the declaration of withdrawal. For the Philippines that would be March 2019. This is certainly a spark of hope for the ICC. For example, the investigations into acts committed in Burundi, the first State that withdrew from the Statute in 2016, continued for another year. These investigations are still taking place and can be found on the ICC’s website under the current situations. The timeframe in which Burundi was part of the Statute gives the court jurisdiction over it for that particular time (Situation in the Republic of Burundi).

According to the ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, her office will investigate the crimes committed by Duterte after the start of his presidency in July 2016 and will include all the killings until March 2019. However, it should be noted that to initiate official investigations the Prosecutor will need, according to Rule 50(5) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, to seek authorisation from a pre-trial chamber.

Panel on Concept of Solidarity held by UWE Staff at UACES Conference in Bath

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Guest blog post by Noelle Quenivet:

A few months ago under the leadership of Dr Francesco Tava (HSS, HAS) a group of UWE scholars from the Department of Health and Social Sciences (Philosophy and Politics) and the Bristol Law School met to consider how best to engage in interdisciplinary research on the concept of solidarity in the European Union. After some discussions around the possibility to organise a workshop and engage with the wider public on the issue, we agreed that we should first test our ideas at an academic conference. With this view, the group sent a panel proposal to the call for papers for the annual conference of UACES, an academic association for Contemporary European Studies, which was going to be held in Bath in September 2018. We were all very pleased that our panel proposal was accepted and that we would be able to present our views.

The three papers we had suggested were ‘On the Borders of Solidarity: Europe and the Refugee Convention’ by Dr Phil Cole (HSS, HAS), ‘Digitising Solidarity?’ by Dr Darian Meacham (a former colleague of Francesco at the University of Maastricht, The Netherlands) and ‘Solidarity: A General Principle of EU Law?’ by Dr Eglė Dagilytė (Anglia Ruskin University) who had been contacted by Christian Dadomo and Dr Noëlle Quénivet (FBL, Law). It was agreed that Francesco would act as chair and Christian as discussant. On the day, the speakers were joined by Trineke Palm (Utrecht University, The Netherlands) who presented a paper on ‘Emotional Beliefs and the Institutional Set-up of European Integration’ and Noelle stepped in for Christian who was on a UWE business trip. Under the chairmanship of Francesco excellent questions were fielded from the audience which no doubt thoroughly enjoyed this interdisciplinary approach. We all very much look forward to continuing this initiative on the concept of solidarity and to developing further contacts.

The text below is the commentary by Noelle who acted as a discussant. It goes without saying that her reflections might not fully represent the views and arguments of the speakers and thus do not engage the responsibility of the speakers.

As a French national I am used to the motto ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’ which is anchored in Article 2 of the French Constitution. And so I have the tendency to understand ‘solidarity’ as a concept not too dissimilar from ‘fraternity’. It is interesting that a couple of months ago the case of Cédric Herrou, a French national, who had been fined for helping thousands of asylum seekers cross the border to France made the headlines. Seized of the matter, the Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Court) declared that ‘[t]he concept of fraternity confers the freedom to help others, for humanitarian purposes, without consideration for the legality of their stay on national territory’ (as per translation here). The Court further explained that the principle of fraternity was a constitutional principle. For those of you interested to learn more about the case, Christian Dadomo has written a good blog post here. So, until then it was much more a rallying cry than a tangible, legal principle that could be invoked in a court. The parallel with the principle of solidarity – or is it the moral value of the concept of solidarity? – can be easily drawn here. As Egle cogently argues in her paper, whilst being a principle expressly stipulated in the treaty the principle of solidarity in the European Union is devoid of legal value. It cannot be invoked in court. At least not at the moment. Maybe the Court of Justice of the European Union will one day have its Herrou moment and consecrate the principle of solidarity that is found in a variety of treaty articles as a general principle of EU law.

So, what is the principle of solidarity? This interdisciplinary panel attempts to shed some light on it from a variety of angles: law, philosophy, politics, history and international relations. The aim is to provide depth to a concept that is often used but not necessarily well understood. Solidarity in the context of the European Union can be understood at two levels: at the micro-level it is more about the interpersonal solidarity and at the macro-level it is solidarity between the EU institutions and is probably better known under the concept of ‘sincere cooperation’. In my comments I will focus on the first one.

First, all speakers agree that the concept or the principle of solidarity is good in the sense that it is worth having and keeping. Darian also makes the point that solidarity is ‘offensive’ but in a positive sense of the term as it aims to improve the social, political and economic framework. In fact he argues that it is a political desideratum. Trineke also mentions that originally the need for EU integration was argued on the basis of a solidarity of self-interest and it later turned (or might turn) into a solidarity of heart. It is a force for good. Phil, in contrast, appears a bit more sceptical of the benefits of the application of the principle of solidarity and not only in the specific context of the refugee crisis.

Interpersonal solidarity is built on relations between individuals but it does not mean that individuals know each other personally. Rather, they are part of what Darian calls ‘a social object’ such as a nation-state, a linguistic community, a labour union. The question however is whether the social object exists before the formation of the group and is thus the basis of the group or whether the social object is created by individuals. That specific question features in all papers. In this regard, Egle speaks of top-down and bottom-up solidarity. Trineke illustrates the former by showing that solidarity as an emotional belief was used to create European integration whilst Egle mentioned the 3 million campaign as an example of the latter. So, my first question to the panel is: is it a chicken and egg situation? Is it important to understand this process to use the concept of solidarity? Does it matter or shall we only focus on what such solidarity actually produces rather than on its roots or sources?

All speakers also explain that solidarity involves first some form of community and second individuals identifying themselves as belonging to one of these communities. Phil also stresses the importance of loyalty in this context. Egle mentions that ‘all theories on solidarity imply some sort of inclusiveness’. Darian in his paper refers to a community and this ultimately means that there are inclusions and exclusions, membership even, and thus potentially the creation of a ‘we and the others’ culture. So my second question is: Is this demarcation potentially a problem? Put crudely, how could one distinguish between solidarity and nationalism for example? Applied to the EU, does this mean that in fact the principle of solidarity is supporting the building of ‘fortress Europe’ with a view to ensuring stability within the group? This is one of the key points made by Phil in relation to the refugee crisis.

The concept of reciprocity is also another common feature of the papers presented today. More than reciprocity, the discussion seems to focus on an expectation of reciprocity as Darian points out. One might however be disappointed that there is no reciprocity but it does not detract from the point that there is some form of expectation. This is also mentioned in Trineke’s paper who stresses that a number of European politicians have pointed out that solidarity is in reality a discourse about responsibility. So, my third question is: what is the link between solidarity, reciprocity and responsibility? Must members of the group feel or be responsible for what happens to others in that group? What is their relationship with those outside the group?

My last point is about practical solidarity. In other words, when do we recognise that the concept of solidarity must be engaged, must be practiced? When is such solidarity triggered? Egle mentions a number of cases relating to ‘social solidarity’ which are situations whereby an EU national seeks social assistance in another State. Phil refers to the migrant situation in the Mediterranean Sea. So, my last question for this panel is: can we define solidarity by looking at its triggers? In other words, what drives the concept of solidarity into action and what is the reaction created by the trigger?

Guest blog: My Day at Clarke Willmott as Part of the Faculty Advisory Board Mentoring Scheme

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Guest blog by Noëlle Quénivet: 

The Bristol Business School and Bristol Law School launched at the inception of the 2017/2018 academic year a pilot Faculty Advisory Board Mentoring Scheme, the chief aim being to contribute to UWE staff’s personal and career development and provide further, external feedback on the 360 review that all senior academic staff had undergone in the past few years. Among, the wider purposes of this scheme are to create a culture of positive employee engagement and develop a broader understanding of external organisations and the dynamics within an external business so as to be in a position to engage at the right level in target organisations.

As someone who had never worked in a private company and teaches subjects that lead to careers in the public and charity sector as well as in international organisations the opportunity to meet with someone completely outside my world was incongruous, albeit intriguing. I signed up to the scheme and was allocated Karl Brown, a Senior Associate in the Commercial Property team of Clarke Willmott in Bristol, as my mentor. That was no doubt a full immersion into the private and commercial world! We arranged for our first meeting to be over the phone and used the 360 degree feedback as a guide to help kick off the discussions and identify some specific areas for discussion. Designed to be relatively informal this kind of mentorship works well. Whilst overall as well as specific expectations and objectives are set for such meetings, there is plenty of leeway to broach new issues, topics and challenges I am facing in the Bristol Law School, both as a researcher and a lecturer. It also gives Mr Brown, a member of our Advisory Board, the opportunity to get a glance into the academic world. Furthermore, such meetings are an occasion to exchange ideas and discuss the potential involvement of the private sector in academic life. In other words, it is a two-way street, not just a mentoring scheme.

At one of these meetings Mr Brown suggested I spend a day at Clarke Willmott to gain insights into the way a law firm works. He arranged for me to be placed with Richard Moore, a partner at Clarke Willmott working in its Commercial and Private Client Litigation team which focuses on commercial litigation and dispute resolution. The date was set for Wednesday 11 July, at a time when teaching/marking is off the table. Upon my arrival I was met by Mr Brown who gave me a brief tour of the law firm. I quickly realised the size of the firm and the breadth of the legal issues its employees covered. And this was only the Bristol office as Clarke Willmott has also offices in Birmingham, Cardiff, London, Manchester, Taunton and Southampton! I was then introduced to Mr Moore who presented me to his team and explained the type of work the team undertakes. I was then whisked to attend the compulsory introductory health and safety training.

When I came back from the training three folders had been placed on my desk. Mr Moore explained that it was probably the best way to give me an idea of the type of work carried out by his team. Looking at these folders very much reminded me of my internship at UNHCR London when solicitors would send by post huge folders accompanied by a letter seeking our assistance. I remember staring at my first folder in horror, wondering how I could possibly read this folder in a couple of hours. Indeed, some solicitors would inform us that their client would be deported within days and unless we promptly intervened on their behalf the client would be returned to their country of origin. I quickly learned which documents needed to be read first (or at all) and which sections were the most relevant and thus had to be read in full and with a keen eye for details. All this had to be done in light of UNHCR guidelines and the relevant legal framework. Here, at Clarke Willmott, the case I was given related to a company that had threatened another (and a large number of its customers) with patent litigation if it continued to use a particularly product for which it claimed it had a patent. My knowledge on the subject-matter being pretty much that of a laywoman I decided to focus on the procedure and the practical aspects of the case, eg how can a solicitor know whether a patent claim and counter-claim are genuine, why does a solicitor recommend their client one procedure over another (in this case the shorter trial scheme), how are experts chosen, how is information collected, is it standard practice to reply to a claim paragraph by paragraph (ie point by point), why are there track changes in some of the official documents, etc.? As Mr Moore came back from a meeting I had the opportunity to ask him some of these questions. My next opportunity to understand better the work of a commercial law solicitor was to attend a conference call with a client who had instructed Mr Moore on a variety of litigation matters at Clarke Willmott and his previous firm. Interestingly, he explained to me that some clients even follow solicitors who change law firms. Clearly, this must be an indication of the importance of trust and confidence between a client and a specific solicitor. That being said, Mr Moore also stressed that a hugely positive aspect of being employed by a large law firm is that clients can use the wide range of services offered by the firm and thus all their legal dealings stay ‘in-house’. The conversation indubitably showed this established trust relationship between Mr Moore and his client. The issue at stake was the misuse of a franchise and, sadly for the client, it was not the first time the client was faced with this problem. Mr Moore explained in a very honest manner the advantages and disadvantages of the range of courses of action available to the client. In particular, he pointed out that a change in the law meant that using a previously favoured course of action might not yield the results expected and might be more costly. He expounded his preferred solution which was to send a robust letter to the company in question and to avoid court litigation if at all possible. At first I was a bit bemused by Mr Moore’s attitude as it gave the impression that he was simply saying to the client that they did not need his help. Yet, this would be a flawed understanding of this conversation: capacity-building is part of building a trust relationship between a solicitor and the client. He was advising his client to undertake a course of action which would save them money on legal fees and was putting his client’s interests above those of his own law firm; principle over profit.

Another folder appeared on my desk: it was a pending case relating to fraud in a company. The information was of a different type from the previous case: company reports, interviews, accounting reports, etc. Having previously taught on the module Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility that is offered on the LLM programme at UWE (see eg LLM in Commercial Law) I was flabbergasted by this example of poor practice of corporate governance. In fact, I wondered whether similar documents could be used as the basis for a student assignment. After all it would neatly fit with the Faculty’s strategic priority to offer practice-led modules and programmes. And so, on my ‘to do’ list appeared the item: ‘need to talk to relevant module leaders and suggest this type of document to form the basis of scenario to be looked at in workshops or set for assignment’.

My last insight into the work of a commercial solicitor was fast-paced: it was a conference call from a known client who was wondering whether they could challenge a procurement decision. In a less than ten minute conversation Mr Moore first tried to get an idea of the relevant legal issues and the time-frame and then asked the client to send him the materials as soon as possible. As he put down the phone he informed his colleague who had attended the call to find out as quickly as possible whether suitable barristers were available for such a case (bearing in mind it looked like a week-end job) and to start the paperwork as soon as the client would send formal instructions to Mr Moore. It was interesting to see the beginning of a case with a team working against the clock and without any prior knowledge of the claim.

Overall I very much enjoyed my day at Clarke Willmott. It gave me the opportunity to reflect on the modules we offer and more specifically the design and assessment of these modules. Whereas an academic law degree centres upon the acquisition of relevant legal knowledge and skills procedural issues are hardly ever looked at. They are definitely more the focus on the LPC and BPTC, the professional courses we offer at UWE and prepare law graduates to become solicitors and barristers. The tasks Mr Moore undertook on that day were those taught on these courses, yet without a rigorous knowledge of company law and the law relating to copyright, patent and procurement he would not be able to deal with these cases. It is really a matter of building students’ knowledge step by step whilst giving them an insight into the next step. In fact, students who are taking part in the vast range of pro bono activities offered by the Bristol Law School benefit, like me on my day at Clarke Willmott, from a better insight into the procedural aspects of legal action; one might say, a better insight into the real world.

Visiting Scholar Dr Philippe Karpe at the Bristol Law School

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Written by Dr Noelle Quenivet

Between 10 February and 10 March 2018 the Centre for Applied Legal Research hosted Dr Philippe Karpe as Visiting Scholar. Dr Philippe Karpe is a senior legal researcher and international expert working for CIRAD, a French agricultural research and international cooperation state organization working for the sustainable development of tropical and Mediterranean regions. Worldwide there are 850 CIRAD researchers assigned in 40 countries involved in an array of projects. Dr Karpe is currently posted in Nairobi, Kenya.

Invited by the International Law and Human Rights Unit and the Environmental Law Research Unit it was a pleasure to have Dr Karpe with us as he took part in a wide range of teaching and scholarly activities offered by the Bristol Law School whilst also pursuing his own research on indigenous people and the management of natural resources. By education Dr Karpe is a public international lawyer who studied at the universities of Nancy, Paris 10 and Strasbourg in France and holds a ‘habilitation à la direction de recherche’ (Accreditation to supervise research,) a French post-doctoral degree allowing him to supervise PhD students. Besides supervising PhD candidates at CIRAD he also teaches at the universities of Strasbourg (France) and Hokkaido (Japan). The bulk of his work however consists in planning and running projects with and for international organisations (eg United Nations Development Programme-UNDP, World Bank), NGOs (eg Rainforest Foundation Norway, Organisation des Nations Autochtones de Guyane-ONAG) and other stakeholders applying his expertise on governance and rule of law, including indigenous peoples’ rights (general and particular rights, especially land rights, forest’s and carbon’s rights, forest users’ rights, women’s rights), socio-environmental safeguards, sustainable forest management, rural and forest land tenure (including for the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance on Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security-VGGT), participative management of lands (including the use of artificial intelligence), participative mapping, institutional arrangements and stakeholder commitments (civil society, forest communities, etc.).

Dr Karpe led workshops on three modules (‘Natural Resources’, ‘Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility’ and ‘European Environmental Law and Policy’) offered on our LLM programmes. In each of these modules he shared with the students his extensive knowledge and practical expertise in the relevant fields. In particular he brought law to life by using concrete legal problems he had been confronted with in his own field work. For example in the module ‘Natural Resources’ led by Prof Jona Razzaque Dr Karpe produced real forest legal texts that were enacted by regional, national and local public authorities. The students could thus see how forests are protected (or not). This undoubtedly allowed the students to understand better the practical applicability and application of the law as well as its (sometimes unintended) consequences on local populations. In the module ‘Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility’ the students were asked to engage in a discussion on ethical aspects of activities carried out by multinational enterprises using real contracts that were agreed upon between indigenous people and organisations. Passionate discussions in this workshop run by Dr Karpe and Dr Sabine Hassler on for example the protection of traditional knowledge in India and the protection of the intellectual property rights of the indigenous peoples ensued. This inquisitive and practice-oriented type of engaging with the students was again displayed in the workshop on the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the module ‘European Environmental Law and Policy’. Together with the module leader, Christian Dadomo, Dr Karpe challenged the students to analyse the current CAP reform and its interface with the environment and, more largely, the future shape of the society. He notably discussed with the students the negative and positive connections between agriculture, the society and the environment (eg pollution, deforestation, drying up of rivers, etc) and how the reform of the CAP deals with these issues. Dr Karpe’s visit to UWE was no doubt an asset to further nurture our practice-led and student-centred teaching culture on the LLM programme at UWE.

Throughout his stay at UWE Dr Karpe also took the opportunity to attend a number of external engagement events organised by the units of the CALR such as the Brexit and Corruption talk by Dr Lorenzo Pasculli and the Brexit and Trade Relations panel discussion. As a scholar working often far away from European legal issues he particularly enjoyed this insight into one of the most commonly debated issue in the UK: the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union. In this context, he sincerely enjoyed the great variety and quality of the different UWE’s opportunities to develop and enrich the knowledge on many scientific and political vital present concerns.

Dr Karpe had the opportunity to deepen his present academic research especially on Harmony with Nature, the Commons, the indigenous peoples and the farmers by collecting many references and academic articles on the UWE’s virtual library and by daily discussions with colleagues on a variety of topics, some of them relating to research methods and methodology (eg epistemology, social-legal studies and critical legal studies). Furthermore his stay at UWE gave him the opportunity to consider some new academic concerns such as conflict, war and the humanitarian legal framework.

On two occasions Dr Karpe presented his work to UWE staff and students. At a first event he shared with us his practice-based research and at a second reflected upon his work as a lawyer in the field. A roundtable on ‘The Future of the Commons’ was organised on 28 February 2018 to discuss the definition of the concept of the ‘Commons’ and develop the ‘Commons Thinking’. Dr Karpe’s intervention focused on his own experience of the commons in the African context. For example he was once confronted with what appeared to be an odd situation in a village. The local population did not seem to be related or linked, the concept of society did not seem to apply either and it appeared that each person was working for him/herself. A positive, classic lawyer would have undoubtedly failed to realise that there was something beyond that and that in fact these individuals were connected by a common, shared ‘space’. Dr Karpe then questioned whether the concept of the commons was an answer to this practical/technical problem which could be turned into a political concern. He posited that current values do not conform to aspirations of justice and that contemporary laws do not help support, protect and promote the life of individuals who live in such a situation. Yet, as a lawyer, his job is to establish justice between people and to find solutions to concrete technical as well as political problems. Thus in his view the concept of the Commons appear to be the most suitable tool. However, when trying to write the law of the Commons the lawyer faces the harsh reality of having to acknowledge that law simply is not the most appropriate tool. For example, law is usually split in different areas such as contract law, family law, property law, etc and yet the Commons transcend these separations. Also the Commons are a ‘space for development’ as they create opportunities for changes and evolution. This all makes it difficult to freeze the Commons into law. Dr Karpe then argued that for him it was crucial that human rights be at the centre of all these activities. Law should be created around human rights. He also challenged the vertical relationship of law whereby constitutional law sits at the top of the hierarchy of any national legal system. Whilst he admitted that this might sound revolutionary as lawyers struggle to understand law in anything but hierarchical terms and categories he emphasised that only a horizontal understanding of the law could avoid corrupting the Commons. As he explained his support for the Commons he however warned that the concept of the Commons might in specific contexts be used as a new form of colonialism enabling State and organisations, for example to deny rights to indigenous people on the basis that under the principle of non-discrimination and shared access to resources no special rights should be given to them.

Last but certainly not least Dr Karpe gave a talk entitled ‘Has the Wandering Lawyer Reached his Destination? – The Adventures of a Lawyer Working in the Field’ which gave him the opportunity to reflect on his work. It was an enlightening talk as Dr Karpe shared with us over 25 years of research in Cameroon, the Central Republic of Africa, Madagascar, Democratic Republic in Congo, Gabon, etc. He kicked off this presentation by asking ‘What am I? What is my purpose as a lawyer?’. Looking at the type of jobs he usually carries out he acknowledged that his work tends to touch upon a range of topics (eg weddings, contracts, etc) though it does focus on forestry. Yet, as a human being he questions what his real role is. For him, he should be promoting justice and more specifically social justice. As a result he does not question the abstract internal coherence of the texts, the content of texts or their effectiveness and efficiency as such. Rather, these are only steps in this research work. The basic research question is ‘under which conditions may the lawyer contribute to improving the living conditions of the local population?’. The objective is thus to understand how law can contribute to improving the living conditions and ensure the protection of a certain idea of a community of life. For this, four assumptions – in the meantime, he challenged them –  must be made: 1) laws and rules may contribute to social change and lawyers are thus useful; 2) laws and rules have a political function; 3) there is a community of life and 4) the function of laws and rules is to guarantee social peace. Likewise Dr Karpe conceded that there were a number of challenges: 1) working with disadvantageous groups such as indigenous people, rural women, etc; 2) the status of users’ rights in developing countries and 3) the status of peasants. All these challenges relate to various aspects of vulnerability and deprivation of rights. With this in mind the lawyer must think about how he can have a positive impact on society. In Dr Karpe’s eyes the most suitable way to understand societies and to then be in a position to support them is to conduct extensive research in the field. For example this means using involved, immersed and applied research techniques so that a concrete and continuous contact with the relevant people can be established. Closer to the problem one can feel it. Dr Karpe also stressed that the nature of the field obliges all actors to adopt an interdisciplinary approach and so he works with economists, anthropologists, biologists, pharmacologists, etc, bearing in mind that each person brings his/her own views and perceptions of the situation and that all these views as well as methodologies need to be integrated into one’s work. Does that mean that the lawyer disappears? As Dr Karpe stressed he remains a positive lawyer (one that is trying to find the best solution to a problem that affects people), a humanist (there is no doubt a need for empathy and humility in these circumstances) and a ‘questionnaire’ (a person who asks questions) and thus a ‘wandering lawyer’. In his opinion this ‘wandering lawyer’ has a fundamental political and moral obligation to remember, think, defend and realise the key destiny of a lawyer: social justice. As a result he/she must revise his/her vision of the law, its essence, substance and form. Four main research themes derive from this stance towards law and the role of the lawyer: 1) the commons, the harmony between nature, humanity and values (justice); 2) the nature and the content of the law (juridicity); 3) the tools for implementing the law and 4) the methodologies of knowledge of law. Dr Karpe presented some of the results of his reflection, explaining that the law should not be in the form of specific provisions, that the new ‘Common Law’ should correspond to a right of communion, a transcendental right and that the new Common Law must correspond to an idea, that of a community of life. Under the Common Law individuals enjoy the same rights and there is no hierarchy of rights. That being established, Dr Karpe questioned the way law is created, articulating the idea that law is often crafted by a certain type of persons for a certain type of person and for a specific objective and that consequently law may not be really that ‘common’ in fact.

As Dr Karpe left UWE he had made contact with many colleagues in the Bristol Law School and hoped to be able to involve these colleagues in his work. He proposed to establish an opened think-thank on the Commons, the Wandering Lawyer, Law and the Juridicity, named: “the Rainbow Team”. Discussions were also had about future collaboration notably in the form of common projects relating to the protection of the environment, biodiversity and conflict. It was with regret that we had to let Dr Karpe go back to his work as it was such a pleasure to talk to him on a variety of topics.

Guest Lecture: Dr Jane Rooney: Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights in Armed Conflict

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By Noelle Quenivet

On 14 March 2018 the Centre for Applied Legal Research welcomed Dr Jane Rooney, Lecturer at the University of Bristol, to present a paper on ‘Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights in Armed Conflict’. Dr Rooney began by explaining that she was challenging the commonly held view that human rights law and the European Convention on Human Rights more particularly subject States to a higher threshold than international humanitarian law.

To support her key argument Dr Rooney took the example of internal disturbances that are not covered by international humanitarian law as they do not reach the required levels of violence and organisation of non-State actors. In such instances Article 2 ECHR becomes of paramount importance. Under this provision force may not be used unless absolutely necessary and so the European Court of Human Rights will examine whether force has been used in a proportionate manner as well as how the operation was planned and controlled. As she explained, Article 2 ECHR contains two types of positive obligations (substantive and procedural) and negative obligations. With regard to negative obligations, Dr Rooney observed that they are never looked at in an extra-territorial context. She added that even in an internal context they are only examined in cases relating to terrorism, high levels of violence and internal disturbances but not armed conflicts. As a result a human rights paradigm is applied because the situation at hands is not one that falls within the remit of international humanitarian law. A law-enforcement perspective is thereby espoused.

Dr Rooney focused her attention on three cases against Russia: Isayeva (2005), Finogenov et al (2011) and Tagayeva et al (2017) as they provided good examples of high levels of violence yet not necessarily falling within the scope of international humanitarian law. The first case relates to the bombardment of civilians leaving the siege of Grozny, the second examines the hostage crisis in a Moscow theatre and the third looks at the hostage take-over of school in Beslan.

In McCann et al the European Court of Human Rights scrutinised the planning of the operation as and applied an honest belief test to establish whether the principle of proportionality had been complied with. Yet, in Armani da Silva (2016) the Court applied a subjective test of proportionality. Dr Rooney argued that it seemed that increasingly the European Court of Human Rights was adopting a rather deferential attitude towards the State. For example in Finogenov it used the margin of appreciation doctrine to allow the State a certain degree of discretion. Usually, the Court sets out the test and applies it. Another exampled used by Dr Rooney was the use of poisonous gas. In Finogenov the Court deemed it proportionate whereas under international humanitarian law such weapons (ie riot control agents) are banned. Dr Rooney pinpointed that whilst political considerations were embodied in international humanitarian law this was not the case of human rights law. Was it however possible that the Court was building political considerations into its jurisprudence?

In an armed conflict paradigm, force will be used and individuals will be killed but the principles of distinction, discrimination and proportionality will set the limits to the use of force. In other words the use of force is intimately related to the designation of people in an armed conflict.  The reason for this is that international humanitarian aims to protect those who are not taking part in hostilities. The principle of proportionality under this legal regime allows for incidental loss of civilian life but only on the basis that it is proportionate to the military advantage. Thus international humanitarian law is more permissive in relation to the lethal use of force.
In Tagayeva the Court appeared to use international humanitarian law to decide on the legality of the attack carried out by the Russian forces with a view to freeing the hostages in the school. After all it did refer to Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol III to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Incendiary Weapons) in describing the relevant legal framework. However, it turns out that although the Court mentioned international humanitarian law it did not use it. In fact the Court examined whether the basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials had been complied with. Here the Court examined whether a legal framework was in place on the national level, concluding that it had failed to set the key principles of the use of force as required by the Convention. In fact the Court seemed to focus its attention on the negative obligation of Article 2 ECHR, investigating the planning and control as well as the investigation after the attack. It observed that Russia had failed to take precautionary measures although it was aware that the individuals had travelled to North Ossetia, similar attacks had been carried out and no warning was issued to the school administration. As for the investigation since no inventory of the weapons used was made, the evidence was disposed of summarily, etc it failed to comply with the principles of Article 2 ECHR. Interestingly, as the Court concentrates on issues prior and after the attack it seems that it is using these tools to deter States from using force, stressing the importance of working on prevention and investigation and the need for States to put in place appropriate measures to avoid the recurrence of such unlawful uses of force.

The European Court of Human Rights defers to the state on proportionality of use of force on the grounds that the judiciary is not equipped with the expertise or democratic legitimacy for making such a decision that is vital to national security. An evaluation of the jurisprudence indicates that adopting a human rights/law enforcement paradigm can result in a more permissive regime of use of force than under the armed conflict paradigm.  International humanitarian law should serve as a point of reference for the European Court of Human Rights in ‘internal’ disturbances, especially where the alternative is a more permissive regime of use of force on the part of the state; where politics dictates the characterisation of the violence as a domestic disturbance rather than an armed conflict; as well as its characterisation as internal or transboundary. Dr Rooney concluded by stating that there needs to be further assessment of the cross-section between counter-terrorism and armed conflict regimes in order to clarify our expectations of state behaviour in these difficult circumstances.

Workshop ‘The Future of the Commons’ with Keynote Speaker David Bollier

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Photo by Liam Pozz 

On 28 February 2018 while Dr Philippe Karpe, Visiting Scholar of the Environmental Law Research Unit (ELRU) and International Law and Human Rights Research Unit (ILHRU), stayed at UWE Elena Blanco chaired and organised a roundtable on ‘The Future of the Commons’ as one of the events during his month long stay.

Philippe Karpe’s work for CIRAD in Kenya on natural resource management and his scholarship had touched and explored this alternative, sustainable discourse of ‘The commons’ not just as a natural resource management tool but, more importantly, as a challenge to traditional law practice and a re-framing of law as an instrument of social and environmental justice.

We were extremely fortunate to have David Bollier, the main authority in ‘The Commons’ scholarship and practice, to accept our invitation and join us via (green) Video Conferencing to share his latest work on the understanding of ‘value’ and its influence and articulation in policy. David has inspired a large number of researchers and activists through with his best known work ‘Thinking Like a Commoner’ and, after his keynote, he engaged in a lively discussion with invited participants and discussants.

With a topic as poignant as this paradigmatic ‘Commons Thinking’ we decided that this first roundtable (we would like more events like this to follow) would be critical and conceptual while a later event (which will be organised by the ELRU in June) will engage with practical perspectives and activism. Hence, the invited discussants to this event were critical thinkers and theorists like Dr Sam Adelman (Associate Professor at the School of Law of the University of Warwick), Dr Vito de Lucia (Researcher at the KG Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea, UiT Arctic University of Norway) and Professor Anna Grear (Professor at the School of Politics and Law of the University of Cardiff) to join Dr Philippe Karpe and his very interesting practical and theoretical insights into the potential of ‘commons thinking’. The audience included members of the ILHRU, the ELRU, FET and the Bristol Business School, including our doctoral students.

The workshop began with David Bollier’s keynote speech. He pointed out that that there are a multitude of ways to approach the concept of the common. Whilst many politicians and individuals working on issues relating to economics and property rights focus on the resources aspect of the commons it should in fact be viewed as a social system with a community of values, rules and practices relating to resources. Traditionally, natural resources such as fisheries, farmland and wild game have never been considered as significant for economic purposes because there is no direct cash attached to it. Anthropologists appear to be the ones most able to understand the concept as they view the commons as a food system in a community, be it in an urban or agricultural setting. Indeed the commons can be seen as a new movement enabling ordinary people to use and more importantly share and manage resources (eg community garden, public common partnership, wifi nets, etc). Often, the key features of these communities are open design and sharing.

David Bollier stressed that there is a burgeoning world of very diverse commons initiatives, all based on shared benefit, fairness, equality and inclusive participation which are the core elements of the commons. The idea is that individuals negotiate, collaborate and come to an agreeable conclusion. As a result the commons create social bonds, a social movement that exists outside of the State and politics. However, because it is non-conventional it is often viewed as irrelevant. Yet, this discourse and vehicle of expression can be used to counterbalance the politics of market. It is a new vision and paradigm of politics and governance as it is a politics of belonging. The commons are a different philosophy of human aspiration and existence, away from the capital market and liberalisation philosophies and values. In this view radical individualism is destroying social bonds.

That being said, the commons is not only a critique that challenges the systemic limitations of the neoliberal economics and political culture but also an inspiring platform for reform. A long history of the commons allows for the concept to be anchored in political and legal tradition. As the concept of the commons allows for transnational collaboration it reimagines the State and law more generally. It opens up spaces that are contextual. Moving forward, David Bollier suggested that the next step should be to bring together small initiatives with a view to develop horizontal relationships between the movements. This would allow the organisation of politics beyond political parties as well as be the opportunity to create a theory of values that focuses on non-monetarised elements. David Bollier concluded his keynote speech by sounding a note of caution: by ushering the commons into mainstream it should not lose its true meaning.

Several important insights arose from the event including many critical ‘cautions’ such as the danger of top-down (even if green) approaches, the need for participatory structures, the importance of formulating alternatives to development and the importance of escaping the ‘value trap’ that dominates all aspects of our lives at the moment.

The idea of ‘Legal Hacks’ was discussed at the end of the event and put forward by David as a way of transitioning to a sustainability informed, participatory approach to social, economic and environmental approaches. He also linked his work to that of his good friend George Monbiot who as a public figure regularly formulates alternatives to mainstream destructive economic approaches.

We think we speak for others when we say we left the event inspired, hopeful and determined to take this thinking and scholarship further. Elena Blanco was able to bring some of the insights of the day to the ‘Repair Acts Network’ event which took place in 13 March (see separate post).

If anyone is interested in participating in a ‘local-global’ commons inspired multidisciplinary project, please get in touch with Elena Blanco at Elena.Blanco@uwe.ac.uk .

Elena Blanco (Associate Professor on International Economic Law, Acting Head ELRU) and Noelle Quenivet (Associate Professor in International Law, Head ILHRU)

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