Student blog post: Can the events that happened during the Maydan protests in Ukraine be qualified as crimes against humanity?

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This post (edited for publication) is contributed to our blog as part of a series of work produced by students for assessment within the module ‘Public International Law’. Following from last year’s blogging success, we decided to publish our students’ excellent work in this area again in this way. The module is an option in the second year of Bristol Law School’s LLB programme. It continues to be led by Associate Professor Dr Noelle Quenivet. Learning and teaching on the module was developed by Noelle to include the use of online portfolios within a partly student led curriculum. The posts in this series show the outstanding research and analytical abilities of students on our programmes. Views expressed in this blog post are those of the author only who consents to the publication

Guest Author: Susanna Lando 

November 2013: President Yanukovych announces that Ukraine will not be signing the European Association Agreement. Within a couple of days the situation gets out of hand. The question however is: are the acts committed enough to qualify as crimes against humanity under the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute? In my opinion, they are.

After President Yanukovych’s decision went public, peaceful protests started in the capital Kiev. The facts are briefly outlined in the diagram I have made below (Euromaidan Press for details).

© Susanna Lando

Source: here

Although not a party to the Rome Statute, Ukraine accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC by a declaration under Article 12(3).The prosecutor however chose  not to continue the investigations on the basis that neither the widespread nor the systematic requirements were present (see I Marchuk, ‘No Crimes Against Humanity During the Maydan Protests in Ukraine? Or the ICC’s Prosecutor Flawed interpretation of Crimes Against Humanity?’ (2017) 35 Boston U Int’l LJ 50-55). The concept of crimes against humanity is outlined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Its chapeau contains two elements: the acts must be widespread or systematic and directed against a civilian population (see video for details). In addition, both an actus reus and a mens rea must be identified. The actus reus consists of acts of serious violence listed under Article 7(1)(a)-(k). The mens rea requires knowledge of the attacks on the civilian population, and the awareness that the acts constitute part of the attacks (ICTY, Prosecutor v Kunarac, para 99)

Let’s first look at the chapeau and whether it is fulfilled in relation to the events that took place during the Maydan protests. A civilian population comprises any person who is not a member of the armed forces (Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions). A person ceases to be a civilian when he/she takes a direct part in the hostilities which is defined as the ‘(collective) resort by the parties to the conflict to means and methods of injuring the enemy’ (Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in the Hostilities 43). In this case, however, the Maydan protests were performed peacefully and without weapons, therefore the individuals can be classed as civilians.

As the test for widespread or systematic is a disjunctive test (ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC, para 94), I will therefore only examine the requirement for systematic attacks. This concept was defined in Prosecutor v Katanga (ICC, para 394) and Prosecutor v Gbagbo (ICC, para 223) which referred to ‘the organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence’. The acts were frequent between December 2013 and February 2014 and they followed a clear scheme; there was an escalation in the choice of the different methods of violence: the beatings, the kidnappings, restrictive anti-protest laws, and finally the use of snipers and grenades. The pattern is, I believe, clear, and the acts were premeditated and planned as mentioned in Prosecutor v Akayesu (ICTR, para 580), which shows that the mens rea for the act was also present. Furthermore, it should be noted that the fact that they might have been committed for the President’s personal ends is irrelevant (ICTY, Prosecutor v Kunarac, para 103).

The specific crime concerned in this case in my opinion is persecution (Article 7(1)(h) Rome Statute). This entails three further requirements to the ‘chapeau’ of crimes against humanity. These include: ‘severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law (Commentary Rome Statute), on the basis of political, […] religious grounds or gender, and in connection with any act referred to in article 7(1)’.

With regards to fundamental rights being violated on the basis of discriminatory grounds, I believe there was a breach of Articles 7 and 10 of the ECHR in conjunction with article 14. Article 7 states that there shall be ‘no punishment without the law’. In this case the Maydan protesters were unlawfully arrested for charges with a higher penalty than the one applicable before the anti-protest laws. Article 10 refers to people’s freedom of expression which was clearly violated as the anti-protest laws cannot be viewed as falling within any of the lawful grounds for restrictions listed in the Convention (such as territorial integrity and prevention of crime). Finally, Article 14 regards discrimination on the basis of any ground such as ‘ethnicity, religion, political or other opinions […]’. The facts clearly suggest that the Ukrainian protesters were discriminated against because of their political ideas. Therefore both the first and second requirement for persecution are satisfied.

Finally, the acts must have been committed in connection to other acts enumerated in Article 7(1) of the ICC Statute. As Zimmermann explains, ‘[e]ven isolated acts […] will, if committed in connection with widespread or systematic acts of persecution, render those acts […] crimes against humanity’ (A Zimmermann, ‘Implementing the Statute of the International Criminal Court: The German Example’ in LC Vohrah et al (eds), Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays on International law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Kluwer 2003) 977, 984). In my opinion it is therefore quite evident, based on the facts, that the beatings, kidnappings, shootings and anti-protest laws were aimed at intimidating and mistreating the population in order to force them to stop the protests.

Therefore, I argue that there are no doubts as to the nature of the crimes committed during the Maydan protests: they were crimes against humanity. Unfortunately, there has been a lack of interest in the application of international criminal law in this matter.

Student blog post: To which extent is it possible to include cultural genocide in the definition of genocide as stated in the ICC Statute?

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This post (edited for publication) is contributed to our blog as part of a series of work produced by students for assessment within the module ‘Public International Law’. Following from last year’s blogging success, we decided to publish our students’ excellent work in this area again in this way. The module is an option in the second year of Bristol Law School’s LLB programme. It continues to be led by Associate Professor Dr Noelle Quenivet. Learning and teaching on the module was developed by Noelle to include the use of online portfolios within a partly student led curriculum. The posts in this series show the outstanding research and analytical abilities of students on our programmes. Views expressed in this blog post are those of the author only who consents to the publication.

Guest author: Nikita Isaac

In this blog post I am addressing the highly topical issue of ‘cultural genocide’ and its potential inclusion in the definition of genocide. Whilst there is no legal definition of cultural genocide, we can still consider it as falling within the definition of genocide as stated in Article 6 of the ICC Statute. Several definitions of cultural genocide have been propounded by academics, one being a ‘purposeful weakening and ultimate destruction of cultural values and practices of feared out groups’ (pp 18-19). I believe that cultural genocide is present in many situations such as Darfur. This blog post argues that it is possible to include cultural genocide in the definition of genocide.

Signature of the Genocide Convention (Source: here.)

The work of Lemkin who coined the term genocide supports my view as in his broad definition he included cultural genocide alongside physical and biological genocide. He believed that physical genocide and cultural genocide were ‘one process that could be accomplished through a variety of means(D Short, ‘Cultural Genocide and Indigenous Peoples: A Sociological Approach’ (2010) 14 IJHR 833, 835), whether through mass killings or coordinated actions aimed at destroying essential foundations of group life.

The resulting definition in the ICC Statute is far from what Lemkin envisioned as still today cultural genocide is unrecognised legally. The travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention included a section on cultural genocide which was then excluded from the final version even though it had been deemed a serious human rights violation and thought to be a stand-alone crime. It is this version, that of the Genocide Convention, that was adopted in the ICC Statute. Political factors had played a part in the exclusion of cultural genocide as the United States were against formulating criteria relating to cultural genocide given their historical relationships with indigenous peoples (L Kingston, ‘The Destruction of Identity: Cultural Genocide and Indigenous Peoples’ (2015) 14 Journal of Human Rights 63, 65). So, ‘[t]he wording of the Convention was shaped … not to criminalize their own behaviour’ (C Powell, ‘What do Genocides Kill? A Relational Conception of Genocide’ (2007) 9 Journal of Genocide Research 527, 532).

The ICC Statute preamble states that parties to the statute are ‘[c]conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time’. Thus, if culture is a protected interest by the states that are parties to the ICC Statute why is cultural genocide not recognised?​​​​​​​

This picture shows how indigenous children were stripped of their cultural identity when forced into westernised schools. (Source: here.)

The example of what has happened to some indigenous groups in North America such as the Winnemem Wintu (see article by Kingston) substantiates my view that cultural genocide should fit within the definition of genocide. Cultural genocide affects these tribes as their culture and identity are stripped away over time and destroyed, though they may not suffer physical harm. The Winnemem Wintu are federally unrecognized (Kingston, p 70) by the US government and so are unprotected. Of the 14,000 Winnemem Wintu people only 123 remain (Kingston, p 70). They have continually lost land from the 1800s onwards (Kingston, p 70) and their cultural life as they know it is being decimated in front of their eyes. Their very means of life have been restricted through fishing bans, using plants for medicine and loss of ceremonial grounds (Kingston, p 70). The definition of genocide clearly does not safeguard indigenous people even though the loss of culture to them is just as devastating as loss of life (Kingston, p 72; see also this video). The UN Declaration of Rights for Indigenous People offers protection now, but it has taken over 60 years to reach this point and in that time indigenous people suffered detrimentally. I argue that culture can be seen as a fundamental human right. Yet, although this shows progress with regard to cultural issues, in no way does it criminalize the behaviour against indigenous people which means that there is still no international platform to criminalize cultural genocide.

This picture displays the shocking difference before and after a child was forced into school (Source: here.)

A case which reaffirms my opinion is Prosecutor v Krstic as it dealt with the genocide of Muslim men and boys in the safe area of Srebrenica (see video). It is interesting to note that the ICTY opened the discussion of cultural genocide stating that ‘[t]he destruction of culture may serve evidentially to confirm an intent, to be gathered from other circumstances, to destroy the group, as such (para 53). So, it is taken that cultural destruction satisfies the test of dolus specialis needed to fulfil the mens rea of genocide. Judge Shahabuddeen dissenting acknowledged, ‘it is not convincing to say that the destruction, though effectively obliterating the group, is not genocide because the obliteration was not physical or biological’ (para 50). So, referring back to the Winnemem Wintu, although they have not physically or biologically suffered, it does not mean that they have not suffered through other means. The Winnemem Wintu have suffered through losing their culture due to the construction of a dam on their historic and sacred land. This undoubtedly reinforces the claim that cultural genocide can be recognised via case-law despite not being expressly included in the statute of an international criminal tribunal.

(Source: here.)

Overall, I truly support the idea that it is possible for cultural genocide to be included in the definition of genocide as stipulated in the ICC Statute. As discussed, originally, a much broader definition of genocide was drawn up that included cultural genocide; however, this was excluded, thereby leaving indigenous people unprotected for decades. This has had a knock-on effect in the case law which, although making obvious references to cultural issues in relation to genocide, does not recognise ‘cultural genocide’ as a crime as such.

Student blog post: In light of the article by Melissa Bellitto, ‘The World Bank, Capabilities, and Human Rights: A New Vision for Girls’ Education beyond’ (2015) Florida Journal of International Law 91 discuss the role of the World Bank as a funder of education.  

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 This post (edited for publication) is contributed to our blog as part of a series of work produced by students for assessment within the module ‘Public International Law’. Following from last year’s blogging success, we decided to publish our students’ excellent work in this area again in this way. The module is an option in the second year of Bristol Law School’s LLB programme. It continues to be led by Associate Professor Dr Noelle Quenivet. Learning and teaching on the module was developed by Noelle to include the use of online portfolios within a partly student led curriculum. The posts in this series show the outstanding research and analytical abilities of students on our programmes. Views expressed in this blog post are those of the author only who consents to the publication.

Guest blog post: Daniele Tatoryte

Introduction

This blog post examines the role of the World Bank as a funder of education. Defined as an international organisation that helps emerging market countries to reduce poverty and promote prosperity, the World Bank is part of the World Bank Group, which is a family of five international organisations, and is composed of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association. The World Bank funds a variety of projects notably relating to education by providing loans in developing countries. It has been involved in education since 1962, thus being the largest international funder of education for development in low-income countries and supporting them with $3 billion a year. Overall, the World Bank has funded 2512 education projects. In this blog post I will first discuss the issue of gender inequality and then discuss education in the broader framework of human rights as I believe that the World Bank’s important role in supporting education should be more human rights focused.

 Gender Inequality

The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women is the key international legal instrument that seeks to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women. In spite of its existence, girls (M Bellitto, ‘The World Bank, Capabilities, and Human Rights: A New Vision for Girls’ Education Beyond 2015’ (2015) 27 Florida Journal of International Law 91) are the most affected by education inequality as a large majority does not have access to education owing to cultural and social barriers (M Nussbaum, ‘Women’s Education: A Global Challenge’ (2004) 29 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 332). It is submitted that if girls could access education, they would better tackle issues such as medical care and contribute to the economy of the State, which is the aim of the World Bank (Bellitto at 101). Scholars such as Nussbaum and Sen have criticised the fact that women are treated as economic commodities and that their worth is based on their ability to contribute to the formal economy (see discussion in Bellitto at 95). The best way to deal with this problem is to implement anti-discriminatory laws that eradicate discrimination, a good illustration being India that has adopted a rights based approach in primary education. The World Bank, UNESCO and the Global Partnership for Education are focused on improving gender equality and empowering girls and women through quality education. To attain these goals, projects such as The Education 2030 Framework for Action (FFA) aims to achieve greater results by 2030. Some of their goals are to train more teachers, to support gender equality and improve the quality of teaching. In this light it is argued that educational planning could be a good approach to take into account and tackle all factors affecting education.

(The first UNESCO chart below shows the number of children (according to education level and gender) who were not enrolled in education between 2000 and 2015 whilst the second   indicates that the number of children without access to education varies depending on the continent.)

 

 Human Rights and Education

So, how can this problem be tackled? First, one may argue that the World Bank is bound by human rights law. After all, it has international legal personality as it fulfils three requirements: (1) it is independent from its member states in its functioning; (2) it possesses the capacity to create international rights and obligations; (3) and it possesses the capacity to bring or defend international claims (see here at 364-365). Unfortunately many courts do not have jurisdiction over international organisations and so there is no international judicial remedy against the World Bank. That being said, the Inspection Panel of the World Bank plays an important role as a control mechanism. If the funding provided by the World Bank is not used correctly, a claim can be brought by a minimum of two individuals so that the Inspection Panel can start an investigation. For example, in Nepal a claim, later dismissed, was made that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation applied to vocational education. Another solution could be to direct the funds of the World Bank to local NGOs, rather than to central governments and education ministries (see here at 61-62), with a view to making education more effective and compliant with human rights law.        ​​​​​​​

Conclusion             

From my point of view, the World Bank and the State should work together to overcome social and cultural barriers affecting gender inequality in education. Undoubtedly, there has been a marked improvement in providing education and achieve gender equality. That being said, I could also argue that the approach the World Bank is adopting towards education is more economic than human rights based as primary education is supposed to be free and accessible to everyone. If access to education depends on one’s ability to pay for it then the human rights to education is violated. Moreover, it should be stressed that education is a necessity for the economic growth and development of these countries. On the one hand the World Bank provides these developing countries with funding to improve their economy but on the other, it takes away their financial independence and obliges them to violate human rights law by complying with conditions such as the privatisation of schools. Consequently, the implementation of a monitoring body independent from the World Bank is essential to improve its functioning and ensure that all its actions comply with human rights law.

A summary of this blog post in the form of a Prezi presentation is available here.

 

 

Voluntary work through UWE Bristol helps inmates in Kenya get a law degree

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Law students from Bristol Law School have helped inmates and wardens in prisons in Kenya to study for a law degree, by giving them access to course materials and providing legal tuition through a volunteer project over the summer.

Several students from UWE Bristol worked with the three biggest high-security correctional institutions in Kenya through the African Prisons Project (APP), a charity that gives inmates and prison officers the chance to study for a law degree through the University of London.

Twenty-five students (19 first years and six second and third years) first spent several months meticulously resourcing and downloading legal materials from the Westlaw and Lexis libraries, with the help of the faculty librarian.

They then sent these over to the men’s (but also some women’s) prisons to help the African students, given that most of the institutions do not have access to the internet. This provided the students with valuable reading materials they would otherwise not have been able to access, and led to them gaining higher marks in their final examinations.

Starting in July, five UWE Bristol law students then travelled to Kenya for four to 10 weeks, where they taught a foundation course for those inmates and prison officials looking to start the law degree.

Kathy Brown, who is senior lecturer in UWE Bristol’s department of law and who overseas student participation in APP, said: “Studying for a law degree has enabled the prisoners to gain a higher level of education, act as paralegals for other inmates and represent themselves in court. Many of them are given extreme sentences for relatively small crimes, such as being given death penalty for aggravated burglary, and are on remand for several years.

“Prison officers, who are badly paid, are also given the chance to learn a discipline and make a better life for themselves, as well as provide better support for the prisoners. Often this leads to them no longer seeing prison as a place of punishment but a place that must enable change for vulnerable members of society.”

In September former inmate Morris Kaberia was released from Kamiti high security prison, when his sentence was quashed after serving 13 years. Fellow inmates formed part of the legal team that prepared court documents and these helped him to defend himself successfully in court. During his second appeal, the court found that Kaberia’s rights at the original trial had been violated and ruled against both his sentence and conviction.

Although a free man, Kaberia still regularly attends Kamiti, one of the prisons UWE Bristol’s volunteers work with, to finish the final year of his law degree. Brown said: “It used to be notoriously violent and dangerous, but it isn’t anymore and I think the culture of education has made it a place of learning.

“By supporting APP to deliver legal education, our students have contributed to the likely success of hundreds of inmates being released due to the work of the inmate paralegals. Those students who undertake the LLB in prison are also more likely to be considered for presidential pardons.”

The five students who travelled to the East African country were selected based on their motivation, rather than on academic achievements so far on their law degree programme. UWE Bristol sponsored the trip by paying for expenses. “This was about giving students that would otherwise never have done these things, a chance to shine,” explained Brown.

Kelly Eastham, a second year law student who travelled to Africa as part of the scheme, said: “I never thought I would spend my summer working in three maximum security prisons in Kenya and that these would be the places that would inspire me the most. I am beyond moved by every single inmate and their motivation to achieve a law degree purely to help others with no regard for financial gain.”

Third year student George Ufumwen, who also volunteered, said: “I am very grateful for this opportunity as I would not have been able to finance this of my own accord. Integration into the project has given me new found confidence, as I was able to work closely with other students in a dynamic environment and gain a good understanding of how these skills work in a real life scenario.”

So far, through the APP scheme, which also works in Uganda, three inmates have graduated with the LLB law degree in Uganda and two in Kenya. Eight more are set to graduate in October.

Student blog post: With Reference to the Case-Law of the European Convention on Human Rights Do Prisoners Have the Right to Vote and, if yes, to which Extent?

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This post (edited for publication) is contributed to our blog as part of a series of work produced by students for assessment within the module ‘Public International Law’. Following from last year’s blogging success, we decided to publish our students’ excellent work in this area again in this way. The module is an option in the second year of Bristol Law School’s LLB programme. It continues to be led by Associate Professor Dr Noelle Quenivet. Learning and teaching on the module was developed by Noelle to include the use of online portfolios within a partly student led curriculum. The posts in this series show the outstanding research and analytical abilities of students on our programmes. Views expressed in this blog post are those of the author only who consents to the publication

Guest author: Magdalena Vakulova

Introduction

The right to vote has always been a hot topic. In fact, fights to achieve universal suffrage have been here for centuries, and still continue today. Even though the right to vote is one of the basic principles of democratic society and the strongest ‘say’ the citizen can have as well as one of the fundamental human rights encapsulated in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) there are still many ambiguities over potential restrictions to this right.

The current law in the United Kingdom denies the right to vote to prisoners while incarcerated (People Act 1983, part 1 section 3). However, according to Hirst, a case decided by the European Court of Human Rights, the denial of right to vote for prisoners falls outside the given margin of appreciation as the automatic ‘blanket ban‘ contradicts the very essence of this right.

Referring to the relevant case law I will examine the right to vote for prisoners in the UK. I decided to focus on the UK because the judgment (Hirst v UK) was not only the first one in a long series of cases relating to universal suffrage for prisoners but was also applied in different jurisdictions across Europe. I will be arguing that even though the States were given a wide margin of appreciation to exclude prisoners from the voting process, this can only be done if it does not violate the whole essence of the right. In my opinion reasonable restrictions of this right should be allowed and approved as compatible with Article 3, 10 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

Mr Hirst’s Argument

In this video Mr Hirst, convicted of murder, argues in favour of prisoners’ right to vote as a basic human right. 

The Right to Vote as the Basis of Democract

First, we must understand that the right to vote is not only a basic aspect of citizenship but also viewed as the ‘core principle’ (L Beckman ‘The Right to Democracy and the Human Right to Vote: The Instrumental Argument Rejected’ (2014) 13 Journal of Human Rights 381) of the democratic system (Watch this video which explains why a voting right for everyone is so important in a democratic society.) In order to ensure effective democracy within the State the basic human rights of every citizen (Scoppola v Italy, para 51) must be preserved and this without discrimination or unreasonable restrictions incompatible with the terms of the ECHR (Hirst v UK (paras 27 and 41)). Moreover, everyone’s right to participate in voting is implied in Article 21 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and more explicitly outlined in Article 25 of the ICCPR where the right to vote is established as a binding norm of international law. Further Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR states that the right to vote is not only the key aspect of effective political democracy but also an important element of the Convention system (Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, para 47). Therefore the exclusion of prisoners from the right to vote must be reconcilable with the purposes of Article 3 of Protocol 1 (Hirst v UK (No. 2), para 62). However, in my opinion, the UK has departed from this fundamental norm as it has prevented prisoners from exercising this basic right and so has fully blocked their access to the democratic system.

The Margin of Appreciation and UK Arguments 

In the case of Hirst v UK it was held that a blanket ban on prisoners’ right to vote under s. 3(1) of the 1983 Act is not compatible with Article 3 of Protocol 1. Even though the States are endowed with a wide margin of appreciation and the rights under Article 3 are not absolute, the automatic ban falls outside these margins (Hirst No 2, para 82) as it is not proportionate (Scoppola, paras 93-102; Hirst No 2, paras 76-85) (see also Sauvé v Canada (Supreme Court of Canada), paras 37 and 54-62).

The first  argument that the UK submitted to the European Court of Human Rights was that as prisoners had breached a social contract, they lacked moral virtue and therefore did not deserve this right. The second ground of the government’s reasoning was that this restriction was a punishment which helped enhancing civic responsibility (Hirst No 2, para 50).

The Response of the ECtHR to the UK Arguments 

The ECHR rejected the UK arguments. Firstly, it argued that the lack of moral virtue is contradictory to the fact that the State requires prisoners to fulfill other civic duties. Moreover the ECHR emphasized that the right to vote is a right and not a privilege (see also Sauvé, paras 14, 19-24 and 37; Hirst No 2, paras 59 and 75) which you deserve through a good moral virtue.

Secondly, it was held that incarceration per se is not a reasonable justification for violating fundamental rights. Whilst the ECHR to some extent approved the idea of a voting ban being understood as a punishment (Hirst No 2, paras 74-75, see also Dikson v United Kingdom) it however stressed that any such restriction  needed to have a clear link between the punishment and the restriction (see Hirst No 2, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Lorenzen, Kovler and Jebens, para 8 and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Costa, para 3). Yet, there was no such evidence that the UK had even thought about the link to the offense (see discussion by Weston) or any other justification of the punishment. In contrast the UK applied the automatic ban to every prisoner. The UK reasoning was not objective at any point and therefore I agree that the ban contradicts the very essence of the universal suffrage (see Mathieu-Mohin, para 52).

Conclusion 

In my opinion the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in Hirst was correct as the UK’s justification for the ban was discriminatory and not legally tenable. In this light I think that the UK should carry out debates and amend the current legislation so that the restriction of the right to vote is possible to some extent at least. Furthermore I believe that enfranchisement will help prisoners in their rehabilitation.

Future Impact Webinar Series: The exploitation of money by financial criminals – do you know enough?

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The second webinar, taking place on the 15th November from 12pm, in the Future Impact Webinar Series will aim to illustrate the threat posed by financial crime. The webinar concentrates on the current trends adopted by financial criminals towards disguising their proceeds of crime, the threat posed by terrorist financing and the problems associated with increasing levels of compliance.

Nicholas Ryder, Professor in Financial Crime, will head up a panel tackling these questions and the problems associated with increasing levels of compliance. Hosted by Dr Noordin Shehabuddeen, with guest panellists from PwC and Lexis Nexis, this webinar promises to tackle the big questions and leave you better prepared to take positive action to protect you and your business.

Nicholas is a Professor in Financial Crime who has authored four monographs: The Financial War on Terror (2015), The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime (2014), Money laundering an endless cycle (2012) and Financial Crime in the 21st Century (2011). Nicholas has also published two edited collections The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime – Legislative and Policy Responses (2017) and Fighting Financial Crime in the Global Economic Crisis: Policy, Trends and Sanctions (2014). He has also authored three text books The Law Relating to Financial Crime in the United Kingdom (2013 and 2016) and Commercial Law: Principles and Policy (2012).

The Bristol Business Engagement Centre (BBEC) at Bristol Business School is proud to present our Future Impact Webinar Series. This webinar series will feature exciting new developments in technology, science and management practice and highlight their impact on the future of business and society. Thought provoking yet practical, you will develop a better appreciation of what these advances will mean for you, your business and community.

Register for your free place here.

Bristol Law School launch inaugural UWE Bristol Student Law Review (UWESLR)

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This week the Bristol Law School proudly launched the inaugural issue of the UWE Bristol Student Law Review (UWESLR), edited by Dr Tom Smith, which showcases undergraduate student law research at UWE Bristol.

The future of legal research is, like the legal profession, dependent on our current students. We believe it is essential to both encourage the efforts of our students and to assist in the development of their research and writing skills.

This publication intends to do so by showcasing outstanding examples of research by undergraduate Law students at UWE. This fulfills twin objectives: to reward their endeavours by sharing their work with a wider audience, and to demonstrate to both their peers and others the quality of the research produced by our future academics and lawyers.

This issue includes three articles; these are based on the submissions of undergraduate students as part of the final year Dissertations module for the Law and Joint Awards programmes.

Annie Livermore writes about the use of surgical and chemical castration in the treatment of sex offenders; Amber Rush writes about the regulation, reintegration and rehabilitation of child sex offenders; and Georja Boag writes about the identification, protection, support and treatment of victims of human trafficking. All have produced excellent and engaging pieces of research, and should be congratulated for their efforts.

The Review represents part of an ongoing effort to make students a part of the academic research community within the Department of Law at UWE Bristol. The research culture of any university should reach beyond the individual and collective activity of professional researchers; students should feel part of the scholarly environment in which they are learning.

It is hoped that the Review will help to create an unbroken chain between academic and undergraduate research. In doing so, researchers can pass on their expertise and experience to the next generation of scholars, and students can better develop their skills.

We hope you enjoy reading it! The full  UWE Bristol Student Law Review (UWESLR) is available to read and download here.

Student blog post: On the basis of the Article ‘Port of Rotterdam Reveals Scale of Brexit Challenge’ discuss the legal issues relating to non-tariff barriers and trading standards imposed on imported goods.

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This post (edited for publication) is contributed to our blog as part of a series of work produced by students for assessment within the module ‘Public International Law’. Following from last year’s blogging success, we decided to publish our students’ excellent work in this area again in this way. The module is an option in the second year of Bristol Law School’s LLB programme. It continues to be led by Associate Professor Dr Noelle Quenivet. Learning and teaching on the module was developed by Noelle to include the use of online portfolios within a partly student led curriculum. The posts in this series show the outstanding research and analytical abilities of students on our programmes. Views expressed in this blog post are those of the author only who consents to the publication.

Guest author: Victoria Meller

One of the most discussed phenomena of recent times is the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, i.e. Brexit. While the exact implications of Brexit will only become apparent once the UK officially leaves in 2019, the departure will undoubtedly have consequences on the economic relations of the UK with the EU as well as with the rest of the world.

The focus of this blog post is on the effect of Brexit on trading standards, i.e. tariffs and non-tariff barriers on imported and exported goods. I will examine the challenges that UK businesses and consumers might face.

Tariff and Non-tariff Barriers

Tariffs are external taxes paid on imported and exported goods as they cross the border whereas non-tariff barriers are trading requirements on goods, such as certain quality certificates which need to be shown at the border, or quantitative measures such as quotas. States usually prefer to pay tariffs to abiding by non-tariff barriers as the latter can limit or prevent a certain type of product from entering a State.

One fundamental principle of international economic law is the principle of non-discrimination. It is imposed by the World Trade Organization on all its members and consists of two components: the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment (Article I GATT 1994) which states that each trading partner must be treated equally and the national treatment (Article III GATT 94) which stipulates that foreign goods shall be treated in the same way as national goods. Exceptions to the principle (Article XIV) include preferential treatment towards developing nations (which goes against MFN but is for the greater good of disadvantaged nations) and being part of a regional free trade agreement. The UK, as a member state of the EU, is part of the single market and customs union, which operates as a tariff-free trade zone and applies the national treatment principle within its borders though it does discriminate against non-EU goods but is allowed to do so as it is a regional trade agreement.

In light of the article by Acton (Financial Times, 28 December 2017) this blog post highlights specific issues relating to the import of agricultural goods into the UK as it is claimed that 70% of imported food comes from the EU.

Price Rises

If the UK is unable to negotiate a free trade deal with the EU, then Brexit will result in the UK adopting the universal WTO tariffs as well as having the EU common external tariff of 2.3%  being imposed on it. This may result in price rises on foods such as fruits, vegetables, and wine which cannot be produced in the UK and are primarily imported from other EU States. As demonstrated in the table below, tariffs on e.g. dairy produce might rise to 39.9% on EU exports and 39.4% on UK exports. The higher prices would be caused by not only higher tariffs being placed on imports from the EU but also international imports entering the EU before reaching the UK. As the article explains, the latter situation is likely to happen since the UK does not have sufficiently large ports in comparison to EU ports such as Rotterdam.

 

Source: J Protts, ‘Potential Post-Brexit Tariff Costs for EU-UK Trade’, Civitas, October 2016, available here.

Double Control

Goods imported from outside the EU will go through a double border control which will inevitably cause delays. This will have the greatest impact on goods which rely on the just-in-time production system, such as food manufacturers (e.g. Kellogg’s). The just-in-time inventory system relies on manufacturers producing enough to meet demand, and only storing a limited amount of excess goods in inventory. Hence quick delivery onto shelves is essential. Double border control will mean double tariffs and non-tariff barriers such as certifications. This will affect the time they reach consumers and thus create costs for businesses.

As for non-tariff barriers, these will have huge implications on agricultural goods, as they are subject to stricter regulations and sanitary standards because of their public health consequences and fragile nature.

Non-tariffs 

Non-tariff barriers are believed to be 2-3 times the cost of tariffs on goods. With that in mind, sanitary standards and rules of origin (see Article IX GATT) of exported goods should remain strict for the UK post-Brexit. This will be to prevent the UK from acting as a ‘back door route for goods into Europe’. Since the UK will no longer be an EU member it may decide to relax trading standards, e.g. allow imports of chlorinated chicken which is banned across the EU. However, I think that the UK will nonetheless uphold most of the EU trading regulations and replicate them into its domestic law. This is because the majority of those regulations were voluntarily upheld by EU member states, as opposed to being imposed on them. In addition, as aforementioned, the UK does not possess sufficient ports for trading and so will likely continue to rely on EU ports. 

Source: Michael Acton ‘Port of Rotterdam Reveals Scale of Brexit Challenge’, Financial Times, 28 December 2017, available here.

Uncertain Future

Regardless of the many challenges that may initially arise due to Brexit, I think the UK could possibly benefit in the long run from withdrawing from the EU as it will no longer be restrained by the EU in terms of product standards and consequently be able to negotiate free trade deals on its own terms with any State and freely decide which tariffs and trading requirements to impose. I believe the UK will learn to adapt to this new set of circumstances, but only time will tell.

Student blog post: On the basis of the article ‘Can the ICC Probe End Duterte’s Deadly War on Drugs?’ (by Richard Javad Heydarian in Al Jazeera, 14 February 2018) critically discuss the legal issues relating to the involvement of the International Criminal Court in the Philippines.

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This post (edited for publication) is contributed to our blog as part of a series of work produced by students for assessment within the module ‘Public International Law’. Following from last year’s blogging success, we decided to publish our students’ excellent work in this area again in this way. The module is an option in the second year of Bristol Law School’s LLB programme. It continues to be led by Associate Professor Dr Noelle Quenivet. Learning and teaching on the module was developed by Noelle to include the use of online portfolios within a partly student led curriculum. The posts in this series show the outstanding research and analytical abilities of students on our programmes. Views expressed in this blog post are those of the author only who consents to the publication.

Guest blog by: Baharan Shabani

Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’ is a controversial issue that has been going on and is still happening in the Philippines. According to Human Rights Watch (see relevant section on the Philippines in World Report 2017) it has brought the country to its worst human rights crisis since the dictatorship in the 1970s under Ferdinand Marcos. Phelim Kine describes the situation in this article. Since June 2016, under Duterte’s presidency, more than 7,000 deaths were caused in suspicious ways; masked, civilian-clothed men or even the police took alleged drug takers into detention and then reported of their deaths in an inaccurate way by stating that the individuals had been killed in self-defence (see here). Although responsibility was accepted for 2,615 of these killings, there seems to be great reluctance to admit responsibility for the other killings.

Duterte is of the opinion that leaving the Rome Statute will make it impossible for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to continue its investigations into these acts. However, theoretically, this will not be the case. Indeed, even after the withdrawal, the ICC will legally be able to bring this case forward.

In his article Richard Javad Heydarian questions the ICC’s ability to end Duterte’s killings. On 17 March 2018 the Philippines withdrew from the Rome Statute as Duterte was convinced that, as a result, the ICC could in no way interfere with his political actions anymore. To determine whether this is true the ICC’s jurisdiction needs to be examined. It is based on four criteria: the person in question (ratione personae), the substance of the case (ratione materiae), the location of the crime (ratione loci) and the time of the act (ratione temporis).

Based on Article 25 (3)(b) of the Rome Statute which deals with individual criminal responsibility Duterte can be prosecuted as natural persons pursuant to this Statute are individually responsible for committing a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC by ordering, soliciting or inducing such crimes, as it is the case with Duterte. The fact, that he is a Head of State is, according to Article 27 ICC Statute, irrelevant.

The crime that he is being accused of is a ‘crime against humanity’ under Article 5(b) ICC Statute which is further explained in Article 7. All elements of Article 7 ICC Statute must be fulfilled. The act is ‘murder’ under Article 7(a) ICC Statute. It can be said with confidence that, because of Duterte, a large number of individuals have been killed. Second, the killings have been carried out in a widespread and systematic way. Third, such killings were an intended conduct as he often confidently defends his actions (Cyril Arnesto, ‘Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearance in the Philippines as Crimes against Humanity under the Rome Statute’ (2008-2011) 4 Asia-Pacific Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 305-331).

If a crime takes place on the territory of a state that is a party to the Statute (Article 12(2)(a) ICC Statute) then the ICC can carry out its investigations. At the time the investigations started, this requirement was fulfilled because the extra-judicial killings only took place in the Philippines.

That being said, the problematic issue is time. Indeed, will the ICC still be able to investigate Duterte’s crimes? Article 127 ICC Statute states that the withdrawal is effective one year after the declaration of withdrawal. For the Philippines that would be March 2019. This is certainly a spark of hope for the ICC. For example, the investigations into acts committed in Burundi, the first State that withdrew from the Statute in 2016, continued for another year. These investigations are still taking place and can be found on the ICC’s website under the current situations. The timeframe in which Burundi was part of the Statute gives the court jurisdiction over it for that particular time (Situation in the Republic of Burundi).

According to the ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, her office will investigate the crimes committed by Duterte after the start of his presidency in July 2016 and will include all the killings until March 2019. However, it should be noted that to initiate official investigations the Prosecutor will need, according to Rule 50(5) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, to seek authorisation from a pre-trial chamber.

Introducing the Trailblazer programme: Free CPD for Bristol Law School alumni

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Bristol Law School are offering our alumni a pioneering and exclusive complimentary professional development programme, relevant across disciplines, regardless of when you graduated.

Launching in September 2018, our Trailblazer Programme will blend face-to-face sessions with webinars and social events. You will be motivated to maximise personal impact, boost effectiveness and develop leadership skills.

Facilitated by experienced academics, seasoned practitioners, and inspirational speakers, this programme echoes the mantra of learning by doing what is integral to our Bristol Business School and Bristol Law School.

Who is it for?

Offered exclusively to UWE Bristol alumni on a complimentary basis, this is a chance to continue the learning that you began when you were a student. The programme enables you to take advantage of your lifelong connection to our expertise and community.

Entry requirements

There are no formal entry requirements for this programme, however places will be offered exclusively to UWE Bristol alumni from our undergraduate and postgraduate programmes.

Content

The programme incorporates four face-to-face sessions alongside online learning through webinars and two social events per a cohort.

Session 1 – Leading Self for Personal Effectiveness: Learn how to adapt your behaviour and actions when dealing with different individuals, tasks and situations. Acquire the skills to deliver exceptional performance, authentically.

Session 2 – Leading Others for Impact: Practical tips on creating high performing teams focusing on; healthy team dynamics, influencing and communicating.

Session 3 – Coaching and Mentoring: Transform your personal management style in this practical session by developing your coaching and mentoring skills to enhance performance and encourage self-exploration.

Session 4 – Design Thinking: Experience the creative process of finding new and transformative solutions to problems whilst also generating innovative ideas and opportunities.

Webinars: Webinar topics will be decided at the start of the programme to ensure these are relevant to the current business environment.They will be available live or pre-recorded.

Graduation: Graduation event for the year’s cohorts.

Professional accreditation

We are seeking to get this programme approved by the CPD Certification Service, meaning you will receive a certificate to demonstrate your CPD hours through completion of this programme*.

The growing network of participants will benefit from lasting relationships with likeminded professionals.

*subject to approval being granted.

Places for the course are limited to 40 participants per cohort. For more information and to apply for your free place, please see here.