The contagion of disinformation

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By Ezinwa Awogu – BA philosophy graduate, GDL Law student at UWE Bristol and aspiring solicitor 

More connected than ever, information spreads instantaneously, and amongst that information, none seems to spread quite as viciously as disinformation. To be distinguished from misinformation, disinformation, as defined in 1952 by the great soviet encyclopaedia, is information deliberately designed to spread falsehoods for the deception of the public, usually with an underlining agenda for political, social, or economic gain. Disinformation is often more entertaining, and attention-grabbing than reality, and there it finds its strength over real news. Between the COVID-19 health crisis and the highly influential USA presidential election, we have seen myths, conspiracy theories, and disinformation erupt like wildfires. As the global pandemic has forced increased digitization, a higher rate of IT reliance, and an increased online presence, people are liking, sharing, re-tweeting, and subscribing more and more. The conditions are prime for the contagion of disinformation to spread within the algorithm networks of our social media and news provider outlets.

Battling disinformation in democratic countries is a delicate task, often fraught with debate and controversy. The right of freedom of expression under the common law was incorporated into domestic law in 1998 from the European convention, and the right to freedom of expression (subject to certain formalities, conditions, restrictions, and penalties) was ratified by Article 10 of the Human rights act (1998). Many of these restrictions, however, are intentionally broad and appear to have a high degree of subjectivity making them difficult to apply strictly. This broadness can make it hard to police media content, which on one hand rightly protects freedom of expression but on the other makes it more difficult to identify and combat disinformation. Section 127 of the communications Act (2003) criminalizes the use of an electronic communications network to put out messaging that is ‘grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing character’. However, in practice, enforcement is largely absent, as we all know, offensive and obscene content has flooded electronic communication networks for a long time with few criminal actions brought forward.

COVID-19 conspiracy theories, such as the idea that the virus is part of an elaborate government plan to increase observations and curtail rights, started around January and has culminated in mass no-mask protests with many swearing that the pandemic is fake. Whilst true that the response to the virus has been confusing and unclear on many accounts, the deliberate efforts of some to persist in the spread of conspiracy disinformation works to distract from the reality of the inequalities that the virus had illuminated. Realities such as the disproportionate effect on BAME communities and the worldwide devastating disparities in social welfare and healthcare that the virus has exacerbated are therefore pushed to the wayside with attention-grabbing disinformation headlines taking the spotlight.

The efforts in the summer months by the outgoing Trump administration, amongst other world leaders, to spread disinformation, hailing hydroxychloroquine as a ‘miracle cure’ based on insufficient evidence and inadequate testing, served the political ulterior motive to use hope and optimism as a distraction from criticisms of poor handling of the pandemic. We can see similar attempts to capitalize on the pandemic when we observe the Russian disinformation campaign labelling the Oxford vaccine as the ‘monkey vaccine’ in favour of the Russian vaccine, conspicuously named Sputnik. Most recently, the current saga of electoral fraud claims during the recent USA elections attempts to delegitimize the incoming Biden presidency and stoke the fire for social and political upheaval.

In England and Wales, Law aiding the efficient battle of disinformation is scarce. Ofcom, established under the Communications Act (2003) is a regulatory body set up to enforce certain content standards across TV and radio broadcasting, ensuring accuracy and impartiality, but there is currently no regulatory body set up for social media and online content in the same way, which has become a major source of information communication. There have been proposals to change this, and introduce more regulation and accountability in online platforms, namely in the 2019 Cairncross Review report. Nothing concrete has amounted from this as of yet. Social media outlets have recently been taking it upon themselves, in response to public pressure, to internally implement regulations on the content published on their sights. During the ongoing voter election disinformation campaign, Twitter has been flagging up tweets from outgoing president Donald Trump as misleading. Other popular social media sights such as Facebook and Instagram have displayed instances of some resistance to disinformation, but this has been limited and certainly not widespread enough to effectively battle the contagion of disinformation.

A strong argument can be made in favour of social media giants exercising more of their social responsibility and offering more content regulation. However, constitutional protection of freedom of expression limits the allowance for online content restriction, and admittedly, the more content policing happens, the less freedom is available. Finding the delicate line between personal liberty and public interest is an age-old dilemma that has not appeared to be solved as of yet, so it would seem for the moment that the responsibility lies largely with us the audience. In an age where information is so easily weaponized, it is important to be conscientious consumers with regards to the plethora of information flooding our screens. More than ever, active engagement, independent research, and a degree of critical analysis must be essential activity when choosing which information to accept and which sources to trust. We can no longer afford to be passive recipients of information that may harbor active ulterior agendas.

Useful Reference links

  1. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/technology/donald-trump-twitter.html
  2. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russians-spread-fake-news-over-oxford-coronavirus-vaccine-2nzpk8vrq
  3. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/social-media-disinformation/uk.php
  4. https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zyt282p/revision/2
  5. https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/15/fda-revokes-hydroxychloroquine/
  6. https://www.kcl.ac.uk/investigating-the-most-convincing-covid-19-conspiracy-theories
  7. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/section/127

Is there light at the end of the tunnel?

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Blog by Demelza Hall and Professor Nicholas Ryder

Financial crime is synonymous with the seminal work of Professor Edwin Sutherland who famously and somewhat controversially used the term ‘white collar crime’ in his 1939 presidential lecture to the American Sociological Society.[1] He defined white collar crime as “a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation”.[2] Sutherland concluded that financial crime was committed by “merchant princes and captains of finance and industry” whilst working for a wide range of corporations including those involved in “railways, insurance, munitions, banking, public utilities, stock exchanges, the oil industry [and] real estate”.[3] White collar crime has also been referred to as ‘financial crime’, ‘economic crime’ and ‘illicit finance’.[4] The early interpretation offered by Sutherland has attracted a great deal of debate amongst criminologists and commentators. Some have expressed their support for the definition such as Benson and Simpson,[5] whilst a majority of others have disputed the accuracy of Sutherland’s definition including as Bookman,[6] Podgor,[7] and Freidrichs.[8] Brody and Kiehl concluded that “many scholars continue to redefine and develop a more useful and working definition of the term”.[9]

Whilst commentaries on Sutherland’s definitions have concentrated on crimes committed by individuals who are an employee, representative or agent of a corporation, very few have considered financial crime committed by corporations. Corporations are juridical persons that through the legal process of incorporation are endowed with a legal identity which distinguishes them from its creators. The common law provides that corporations are qualified to breach certain offences under the criminal law largely because of this legal procedure.[10] A number of common law rules have evolved in order to limit disproportionate abuse of power by corporations, including breaches of criminal law.[11] Corporate financial crime has been referred to as a “complex subject on many levels and efforts at strict definitional exactitude rapidly become self-defeating”.[12] The international profile of corporate financial crime has substantially increased during the last past three decades. This is due, in part, to instances of corporate financial crime in the US including ZZZZ Best Cleaners, the Savings and Loans Crisis, the collapse of several large corporations including Enron and WorldCom, the Bernard Madoff Ponzi fraud scheme and the ‘Great Wall Street Rip-Off’. Similarly, the UK has experienced wide scale corporate financial crime including Barlow Clowes International, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Barings Bank, market manipulation by financial institutions and money laundering. It is within this context that this blog comments on the approach towards corporate financial crime in the US and UK and suggests a number of reforms.

The United States of America

The evolution of the doctrine of corporate criminal liability by the US judiciary resulted in the Department of Justice (DoJ) initially prosecuting the employees of corporations and they then moved towards targeting prosecuting corporations. However, this approach culminated in a change of policy following the acquittal of Arthur Andersen, which resulted in the DoJ prioritising Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) as opposed to corporate prosecutions. The appropriateness of DPAs has been questioned in light of the actions of HSBC in December 2012. A DPA is placed on a corporation when it is under investigation for breaching the law for a set period of time, acting as a contractual agreement between that corporation and financial regulatory or government agency. The offending corporation is required to pay a fine, cooperate with the investigating agencies, illustrate good conduct and improve its internal corporate governance procedures.[13]When the offending corporation can demonstrate they have complied with the terms of the DPA, the charges they are under investigation for will be dropped. Whilst DPAs have been used as alternative method to indicting corporations and generated substantial financial penalties,[14] the case of HSBC is a prominent example of why it is an enforcement tool that ultimately lacks impact.

HSBC entered into its first DPA in 2012 for anti-money laundering and sanctions violations, lasting five years. The financial institution also agreed to pay $1.92 billion in financial penalties and improve its compliance procedures.[15] In 2017, the DPA against HSBC expired and all charges were deferred.[16] A main aim of DPAs is to deter corporations from committing further corporate criminal offences but, like many others, HSBC has been a repeat offender. In total HSBC has entered into three DPAs with the DOJ since 2012, the most recent in 2019 for assisting US clients to evade tax.[17] This suggests that for tackling corporate economic crime the use of DPAs as an enforcement tool is inadequate and fails to prevent future wrongdoing by offending corporations. Moreover, for corporations it appears to be no more than a tick box exercise in the normal course of business.

United Kingdom

The enforcement of corporate economic crime in the UK has been limited by the seminal, if rather restrictive decision of the House of Lords in Tesco v Nattrass.[18] Subsequent attempts to tackle corporate economic crime have focused on the introduction of failure to prevent offences under the Bribery Act 2010 and the Criminal Finances Act 2017  In January 2017, the Ministry of Justice published its Call for Evidence on Corporate Economic Crime, in which is sort views on

  • whether the need to prove the involvement of a “directing mind” in corporate offending is hindering the prosecution of companies for wrongdoing
  • alternatives to proving “directing mind” complicity in corporate criminal conduct, including:
  • a US-style ‘vicarious’ liability offence, making companies guilty through the actions of their staff, without the need to prove complicity
  • the failure to prevent model, whereby a company is liable unless it shows it has taken steps to prevent offending
  • the benefits of strengthening regulatory regimes.[19]

After receiving evidence from interested parties and key stakeholder, the Government published its response in November 2020. The government concluded:

“After careful consideration and a further evidence gathering exercise, the government has concluded that the evidence submitted was inconclusive. Further work is required before considering any change to the law and the Government has commissioned an expert review by the Law Commission”.[20]

This response by the government has been described by Susan Hawley, director of campaign group Spotlight on Corruption, as ‘a real danger that…kicks reform into the long grass, and will result in corporate impunity for large banks and companies for several more years.’[21] Further, it demonstrates that the fight to hold corporations to account lacks the political will to make a significant difference and that maybe a more appropriate course of action to take would be holding those who run corporations accountable.

Within the UK, mechanisms are already in place to hold senior individuals within corporations accountable for financial crimes committed to benefit a corporation. In 2016 the Senior Managers Certificate Regime (SMCR) was introduced to the banking sector to deter misconduct and improve culture, governance and accountability. Its overall aim is to ensure those in senior positions have more responsibility and accountability for their conduct, actions and competence. For non-compliance with the SMCR, the FCA will take enforcement actions against senior managers which are effective and proportionate.[22] However, whilst the FCA has issued financial penalties on individuals since the SMCRs introduction, the overall effectiveness and deterrent of the regime has been questioned.

A recent Freedom of Information request from financial regulation consultancy Bovill has revealed that since its inception there have been only 34 investigations with one successful enforcement action.[23] In 2018 the FCA together with the PRA each imposed Staley with a £458,000 financial penalty, which was combined to a total of £642,430 after a 30% discount for early settlement. This followed Staley’s two attempts in 2016 to uncover the identity of an anonymous whistleblower who had raised concerns regarding his hiring strategy.[24] The regulators found Staley had not declared his conflict of interest in the allegations, nor had he sufficiently let compliance take control of the matter.[25] By attempting to unmask a whistleblower Staley was found to have breached Individual Conduct Rule 2 (to act with due skill, care and diligence); however, he was not found to be in breach of Individual Conduct Rule 1 (to act with integrity) and had not lacked the fitness and propriety to continue in his role as CEO.[26] It is praiseworthy that a financial penalty was imposed upon Jes Staley for his actions, but it must be acknowledged that the outcome in this instance seems insufficient considering the seriousness of Staley’s actions and his position held. Further, with only one successful prosecution in four and half years, whilst a step in the right direction to tackle corporate economic crime, a more proactive stance needs to be taken by the FCA to show the SMCR can serve its purpose; an approach that can be adopted from the CMA.

Conclusion

It has now been four years since the then Justice Minister, Dominic Raab, announced the Government’s plans to reform how the UK tackles corporate economic crime. It is rather worrying that successive Governments have continued to delay tackling the problems associated corporate economic crime and it will continue to highlight the success of the Bribery At 2010 and its nine DPAs. The decision to as the Law Commission to investigate proposals for reform on corporate economic crime is to be welcomed. However, the limited action to tackle corporate economic crime in the UK following the association between the 2007/2008 financial crisis and financial crime, the revelations of the Panama Papers, the Paradise Papers and the FinCEN Papers suggest that we are a long way from introducing a new regime for corporate economic crime.


[1] E. Sutherland ‘The White Collar Criminal’ (1940) 5 American Sociological Review 1.

[2] E. Sutherland, White Collar Crime (Dryden: New York, 1949) 9.

[3] See Sutherland, above n. 1 at 2.

[4] For the purpose of this blog we will use the term financial crime.

[5] M. Benson and S. Simpson, S.S. White-Collar Crime: An Opportunity Perspective, (Routledge: New York, 2009).

[6] Z. Bookman ‘Convergences and omissions in reporting corporate and white collar crime’, (2008) 6 DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal 355.

[7] E. Podgor ‘White collar crime: a letter from the future’ (2007) 5 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 247.

[8] D. Freidrichs ‘Wall Street: Crime Never Sleeps’ in S. Will, S. Handelman and D. Brotherton (eds), How they got away with it – white collar criminals and the financial meltdown (Columbia University Press: New York 2013) 9.

[9] R. Brody and K. Kieh ‘From white- collar crime to red-collar crime’ (2010) 17 Journal of Financial Crime 351.

[10] Ministry of Justice Corporate Liability for Economic Crime Call for evidence (Ministry of Justice: London, 2017) at 10.  See generally Salomon v Salomon [1897] A.C. 22.

[11] See generally R. v P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 72, 83.

[12] T. Edwards House of Commons Library Briefing Paper – Corporate Economic Crime: bribery and corruption,  Number 7359, 22 March 2017, at 3.

[13] N Ryder, ‘Too scared to prosecute and too scared to jail? A critical and comparative analysis of enforcement of financial crime legislation against corporations in the USA and the UK’ (2018) The Journal of Criminal Law 1, 6.

[14] See United States Department of Justice, ‘Airbus agrees to pay $3.9 Billion in global penalties to resolve foreign bribery and IATR case’ (United States Department of Justice: 31 January 2020) < https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/airbus-agrees-pay-over-39-billion-global-penalties-resolve-foreign-bribery-and-itar-case> accessed November 2020.

[15] United States Department of Justice, ‘HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSCB Bank USA N.A> Admit to money laundering sanctions violations, forfeit $1.256bn in Deferred Prosecution Agreement’, 11 December 2012, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations> accessed 16 November 2020.

[16] HSBC, ‘HSBC Holdings plc Expiration of 2012 Deferred Prosecution Agreement’ (HSBC: 11 December 2017) <http:// www.hsbc.com/news-and-insight/media-resources/media-releases/2017/hsbc-holdings-plc-expiration-of-2012-deferred-prosecution-agreement> accessed 16 November 2020.

[17] United States Department of Justice, ‘Justice Department Announced Deferred Prosecution Agreement with HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA), (United States Justice Department: 10 December 2019)<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-deferred-prosecution-agreement-hsbc-private-bank-suisse-sa> accessed 16 November 2020.

[18] Tesco v Nattrass [1971] UKHL 1.

[19] Gov UK, ‘New crackdown on corporate economic crime’ (GovUK: 13 January 2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-crackdown-on-corporate-economic-crime> accessed 16 November 2020.

[20] Ministry of Justice, ‘ Corporate liability for economic crime: Call for evidence’ (Ministry of Justice: 3 November 2020) <https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/corporate-liability-for-economic-crime/> accessed 16 November 2020.

[21]Spotlight on Corruption, ‘Response to the Law Commission’ (Twitter, 3 November 2020) <https://twitter.com/EndCorruptionUK/status/1323591794509205504> accessed 16 November 2020.

[22] Financial Conduct Authority The Senior Managers and Certification Regime: Guide for insurers (Financial Conduct Authority: February 2019) at 16.

[23] Bovill, ‘Only 34 investigations and one enforcement action after four and a half years of SMCR’ (Bovill: 27 October 2020) <https://www.bovill.com/only-34-investigations-and-one-enforcement-action-after-four-and-a-half-years-of-smcr/> accessed 16 November 2020.

[24] Minter Ellison, ‘First case brought by the FCA and PRA under the SM&CR’ (Lexology, 18 May 2018) <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=88423b44-c1f8-4acf-94a9-7ec00c56ef0f> accessed 16 November 2020.

[25] Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA and PRA jointly fine Mr James Staley £642,430 and announce special requirements regarding whistleblowing systems and controls at Barclays.’ (2018)16 <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-and-pra-jointly-fine-mr-james-staley-announce-special-requirements> Accessed 16 November 2020.

[26] See MinsterEllison above, n 24.

Don’t worry if stores aren’t accepting cash…

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You could always suggest Pokémon cards as a form of payment – say the Bank of England – if the store is willing, of course

By Dr Monica Vessio, Associate Lecturer, FBL; Research Associate Centre for Banking Law, University of Johannesburg

Through the ages, money has taken various forms, from feathers, cowrie shells, gold and silver to cash and bank deposits. While most of the money in the UK is held electronically as deposits (96%), a small proportion (4%) is still held in physical form as cash (banknotes and coins). Despite the relatively low percentage of cash compared to bank deposits, cash continues to be important. There are over 70 billion pounds of notes in circulation.

Most recently, and because of the Covid-19 pandemic, many store holders are refusing to accept cash. The immediate question that arises is – but cash is legal tender, so are stores not obliged to accept this form of payment?

According to the Bank of England, a shop owner can choose what form of payment they are prepared to accept. If you want to pay for a pack of gum with a £50 note, it is perfectly legal for them to refuse to accept this payment type. It is, apparently, entirely, a matter of discretion. If your local corner shop decided to only accept payments in Pokémon cards, the Bank of England says that would be within their right to.

Legal tender takes on a narrow technical meaning and means that if you offer to fully pay off a debt to someone in legal tender, they cannot sue you for failing to repay.

As to what is classed as legal tender varies, depending where you are in the UK. In England and Wales, Royal Mint Coins and Bank of England notes are legal tender, while in Scotland and Northern Ireland it is only Royal Mint coins and not banknotes. There are further restrictions when using small coins. For example, 1p and 2p coins only count as legal tender for any amount up to 20p. Cheques, debit cards and contactless are not legal tender. Bank of England notes stop being legal tender, once withdrawn, but don’t worry the Bank of England will give plenty of warning before they retire any notes.

Kiyotaki & Wright (1993) tell us that the most important function of money is probably its role as a medium of exchange. While, Wicksell (1906) explained that a medium of exchange means “an object which is taken in exchange, not on its own account, . . . not to be consumed by the receiver or to be employed in technical production, but to be exchanged for something else within a longer or shorter period of time.” Thus, if you could talk a store into accepting Pokémon cards in exchange for bread and milk or other “essential” items, you would not be paying in legal tender but certainly a legal and valid transaction will have occurred. 

The GMO debate: Is law the answer to effectively regulate GM crops in India?

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This blog is by Subhashree Panda, LLM (Environmental Law and Sustainable Development)

Agriculture, the largest source of livelihoods for India, is plagued by several problems such as small and fragmented land-holdings, use of poor quality seeds, indiscriminate use of biocides causing environmental pollution, areas affected by salinity, alkalinity, water-logging due to lack of irrigation and inadequate storage facilities depriving farmers of their legitimate income.[1]

As a solution to overcome the persistent problem of food insecurity, India is promoting the use of Genetically Modified (GM) crops that offer many opportunities. These opportunities range from promoting sustainable agriculture as they may be able to reduce agriculture’s environmental footprint, reducing the use of pesticides, decreasing carbon-dioxide emissions, conserving soil moisture.[2] However, after the introduction of Bt-cotton in 2002 which is an insect-resistant transgenic crop,[3] there has been a lot of controversy in India surrounding its performance and impact on the environment and biodiversity. According to the critics, GM crops fail to reduce the need for pesticides, and mixtures of varieties being sold to farmers in the name of standardized seeds often result in uneven crop production and low yields.[4] Despite such controversy, several Indian seed companies and public sector research institutions are developing GM crops  (about 85 plant species), mainly for pest resistance, herbicide tolerance, abiotic stress tolerance (e.g. drought, salinity and soil nutrient), nutritional enhancement, and nutritional, medicinal or metabolic phenotypes.[5]

In India, even prior to joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the patentability and the scope of protection to be afforded to GM crops have been controversial.[6] Since joining the WTO, India has amended its Patents Act (in 1999, 2002 and 2005) to comply with the obligations set out in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. In addition, intellectual property rights in relation to plant varieties, including transgenic varieties, are the subject matter of protection under the provisions of the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers Rights Act, 2001. These two laws play a crucial role in regulating the patentability and the use of GM crops in India.

In addition, the Environmental Protection Act 1986, the Food Safety and Standards Act 2006, the Rules for the Manufacture/Use/Import/Export and Storage of Hazardous Micro-organisms, GE organisms or cells 1989, Drugs and Cosmetic Rule 1988, Biological Diversity Act, Plant Quarantine Order 2003 and Directorate General of Foreign Trade Notification relating to inclusion of GM trade policy in foreign trade policy (2006-2009), the Seed Order 1983, the Seed Policy 2002, the Patent Act 1970 are also applicable for activities relating to GM crops in India. However, the Environmental Protection Act, Consumer Protection Act 1986 and Food Safety and Standard Act 2006 lack coherence and fail to apply the precautionary principle.[7] There is a lack of transparency and little or no public involvement in the governance process regarding agriculture and manufacture of GM crops. In addition, labelling and traceability provisions regulating GM crops are weak. For example, the recent draft Food Safety and Standards (Labelling and Display) Regulations 2018 seeks to make labelling of GM food mandatory.[8] However, the criteria for exemption from labelling of food containing GM ingredients remain lax.[9]

India as a powerful developing country has attempted to domesticate global obligations in ways which conform to its domestic priorities.[10] There is no doubt that agricultural biotechnology must give farmers and local community adequate information and a meaningful opportunity to participate in decisions that affect their health, their livelihoods, and their natural resources. It is still possible to promote transparency and include strong labelling and traceability provisions in the 2018 Draft Regulation. Such integration of the precautionary principle in GMO laws will help to strengthen risk assessment procedure and monitoring in the biosafety regime.


[1] Puja Mondal, ’10 Major Agricultural Problems of India And Their Possible Solutions’ (Your Article Library) <http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/agriculture/10-major-agricultural-problems-of-india-and-their-possible-solutions/20988>

[2] Graham Brookes and Peter Barfoot, ‘Environmental impacts of genetically modified (GM) crop use 1996–2015: Impacts on pesticide use and carbon emissions (2017) 8 GM Crops & Food 117; David Zilberman, Tim G. Holland and Itai Trilnick, ‘Agricultural GMOs—What We Know and Where Scientists Disagree’ (2018)10 Sustainability 1514.

[3] K.S Jayaraman, ‘India Investigates Bt Cotton Claims’ (Nature, 2012) <https://www.nature.com/news/india-investigates-bt-cotton-claims-1.10015>.

[4] Suman Sahai, ‘What Is Wrong with Bt Cotton’ (Iatp.org)

<https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/What_Is_Wrong_With_Bt_Cotton.htm>

[5] ‘Agricultural Biotechnology Annual’ (Gain.fas.usda.gov,2017)

<https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20Annual_New%20Delhi_India_11-28-2017.pdf>

[6] Rajdeep Banerjee and Joyeeta Banerjee, ‘The Future of Genetically Modified Crops in India | Forbes India Blog’ (Forbes India, 2018) <http://www.forbesindia.com/blog/economy-policy/the-future-of-genetically-modified-crops-in-india/>

[7] K. K. Tripathi, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms: Concerns and biosafety issues’ (2002)15 The national medical journal of India 187.

[8] ‘FSSAI Drafts New Labelling and Display Regulations 2018 – Food Safety Helpline’ (Food Safety Helpline, 2018) <https://foodsafetyhelpline.com/2018/04/fssai-drafts-new-labelling-and-display-regulations-2018/>

[9] A. S. Bawa and K. R. Anilakumar, ‘Genetically modified foods: safety, risks and public concerns-a review’ (2013)50 Journal of Food Science and Technology 1035.

[10] Peter Newell, ‘Lost in Translation? Domesticating Global Policy on Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparing India and China’ (2008) 22 Global Society 115.

The Polluter Pays Principle: The only Principle that can limit aviation emissions (if we do it right)

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This blog was written by Mandy Beck, an LLM in Environmental Law and Sustainable Development student at UWE Bristol.

Today, an airplane takes off approximately every 0.8 seconds somewhere around the globe.[1] The impact of the aviation sector on the climate is enormous. Stefan Gössling, professor for sustainable transport at Lund/Linnaeus University, Sweden, even states that ‘on an individual level, there is no other human activity that emits as much over such a short period of time as aviation’.[2] Globally, the aviation sector contributes a total of 2.5%[3] to all anthropogenic[4] CO2 emissions, making it a significant contributor to global warming. Often undiscussed, however, are the non-CO2 effects, meaning those effects resulting from e.g. particles, water vapour, and nitrogen oxides. Together with these non-CO2 effects, aviation contributes to global warming by 5%.[5]

The International Air Transport Association estimates that the demand for flights is going to double by 2037.[6] The decision-makers in the aviation sector thereby face the challenge of making aviation climate-neutral. In 2012, former European Commissioner for Climate Action in the European Commission, Connie Hedegaard stated that the ‘Polluter pays is the only principle that can limit aviation emissions’.[7]

The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) reflects an idea that is taught to us since our childhood: ‘Clean up after yourself’.[8] Due to this principle, the costs of pollution should be allocated to the actor who caused them.[9] The PPP is implemented by using market-based measures (MBMs), such as levies, emission trading (such as the EU Emission Trading System EU-ETS), and offsetting schemes. Implementing a MBM is necessary, as technical progress and operational measures alone will not be sufficient to limit climate emissions sufficiently in the aviation sector in the near future.[10]

The first international offsetting scheme for aviation, CORSIA[11], will be implemented step by step starting 2021. Doubts, however, remain as to the effectiveness of this MBM in the light of reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement.[12] Overall, the PPP could hold more potential in curbing aviation-caused climate emissions. The following improvements must, however, be made:

Inclusion of non-CO2 effects and removal of subsidies

Climate damages resulting from non-CO2 effects must be included in a MBM. Despite the major importance of non-CO2 effects, these effects are not included in CORSIA nor the EU-ETS. Secondly, the subsidies in the billions granted to airlines must be removed (e.g. grants for Etihad Airlines by Abu Dhabi; grants by the European Commission to Air Malta). Subsidies have an opposite effect than the PPP, as they falsify the costs that must be borne.[13] Also, due to subsidies, aviation has a competitive advantage over other – more sustainable – means of transport.

Full payment for all environmental costs until 2050

The polluter must fully pay for all environmental costs by 2050 to reach the 1.5°C Goal (2085 at the latest for the 2°C Goal). The price for one ton of CO2 in 2019 including all climate costs (CO2 and non-CO2 effects) is 371 Euro/ton CO2.[14] The price set under the EU-ETS today is much lower at approx. 30 Euro/ton CO2.[15]To achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, the PPP can be implemented gradually (with increasing CO2 prices over time), however, the above-mentioned full payment to the given deadlines must be reached.

Implementation of the PPP at the beginning of the value chain

Currently, all MBMs that have been implemented address the airlines. However, making the fuel suppliers pay for subsequent environmental damages, holds one significant advantage: fossil fuel suppliers would lose their competitive advantage, due to not paying for climate damage, over renewable energy providers. If all suppliers include environmental damage in their pricing, the market conditions would be equal.


[1]Statista, ‘Number of flights performed by the global airline industry from 2004 to 2020’ (2020) <www.statista.com/statistics/564769/airline-industry-number-of-flights/> accessed 24 February 2020.

[2] Arthur Sullivan, ‘To fly or not to fly? The environmental cost of air travel‘ (2020) <https://www.dw.com/en/to-fly-or-not-to-fly-the-environmental-cost-of-air-travel/a-42090155> accessed 24 June 2020.

[3] Umweltbundesamt, Umweltschonender Luftverkehr: lokal – national – international (Umweltbundesamt Publikationen, 2019), 30.

[4] man-made.

[5] Malte Niklaß, Benjamin Lührs, Robin Ghosh, ‘A Note on How to Internalize Aviation’s Climate Impact of non-CO2 Effects’ <www.researchgate.net/publication/311788948_A_Note_on_How_to_Internalize_Aviation%27s_Climate_Impact_of_non-CO2_Effects> accessed 15 Mai 2020; equal conclusion reached in Jörg Larsson, Simon Matti, Jonas Nässén, ‘Public Support for aviation policy measures in Sweden‘ (2020) <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2020.1759499> accessed 20 August 2020.

[6] IATA, ‘Annual review 2019’ (2019) <https://www.iata.org/contentassets/c81222d96c9a4e0bb4ff6ced0126f0bb/iata-annual-review-2019.pdf> accessed 11 February 2020,16.

[7] The Guardian, ‘Polluter pays’ is the only principle that can limit aviation emissions’ (2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/apr/04/polluter-pays-aviation-emissions> accessed 15 February 2020.

[8] David Boyd, ‘Clean up after yourself’ <www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/clean-up-after-yourself/article773567/> accessed 10 February 2020.

[9] Philippe Sands, Jacqueline Peel, Adriana Fabra, Ruth MacKenzie, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 240.

[10] ICAO, Environmental Report 2019 – Chapter: Climate Change Mitigation: CORSIA (ICAO Publications 2019) 236.

[11] Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation.

[12] That is holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.

[13] Stefan Gössling, Frank Fichert, Peter Forsyth, ‘Subsidies in Aviation’ (2017) 9(8) Sustainability 1295, 1295.

[14] Umweltbundesamt, Methodenkonvention 3.0 zur Ermittlung von Umweltkosten Kostensätze Stand 02/2019 (Umweltbundesamt Publikationen, 2019). UBA recommends the use of a multiplier of 2.0 for the transfer of the CO2 price to aviation emissions to include the non-CO2 effects.

[15] Michael Holder, ‘EU carbon prices surge to 14-year high’ <www.businessgreen.com/news/4017770/eu-carbon-prices-surge-14> accessed 23 July 2020.         

Cryptoassets, social media platforms and terrorism financing: a step into the regulatory unknown

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In his new article that will be published in the Journal of Business Law later this year, Professor Nicholas Ryder investigates the link between terrorism financing, cryptoassets and social media platforms.

Terrorism financing was propelled to the top of the international community’s financial crime agenda following the al Qaeda terrorist attacks in the United States of America (US) on September 11 2001 (9/11).  Until these terrorist attacks, the international community largely focused its efforts on tackling the illegal sale and distribution of narcotic substances and related money laundering.  As a result, a global anti-money laundering (AML) policy was developed by the United Nations (UN), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the European Union (EU).  Following the terrorist attacks in 2001, the international community, led by the UN, and heavily influenced by the actions of then US President George Bush, implemented the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’.  As a result of the Financial War on Terrorism, terrorism financiers were forced to modify their funding strategies. Traditionally, terrorists relied on two sources of funding: state and private sponsors. State sponsored terrorism involves government’s providing logistical and financial support to terrorists, or governments even conducting acts of terrorism against their own citizens. However, since the instigation of the Financial War on Terrorism, there has been a decline in state sponsored terrorism and it is more likely that terrorists will receive funding from private sponsors or donors. These sources used by terrorism financiers include drug trafficking, extortion, organised retail theft, fraud, misapplied charitable donations, the sale of conflict diamonds, precious metals, robbery and theft, kidnappings for ransom, counterfeit currencies, oil refining, smuggling artefacts, the abuse of natural resources, piracy, slavery and human trafficking.  The flexibility, creativity, simplicity and sophistication of the terrorism financing models represent an unprecedented threat and risk. 

Cryptoassets

The link between cryptoassets and terrorism financing is evident following several terrorism financing related convictions.  For example, in August 2015, Ali Shukri Amin, was convicted and sentenced to 11 years and four months imprisonment for using the “internet to provide material support and resources” to ISIL.  Amin pleaded guilty and admitted to using his Twitter handle ‘@Amreekiwitness’ to “provide instruction [to ISIL] on how to use Bitcoin … to mask the provision of funds to ISIL.  Another example of terrorism financiers exploiting cryptoassets was Zoobia Shahnaz, who was arrested by the FBI after attempting to transfer $62,000 worth of Bitcoin to ISIL.  The Department of Justice (DoJ) stated that Shahnaz had entered into a number of financial transactions designed to circumvent the transaction reporting obligations imposed by the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act 1970.  In March 2020, Shahnaz was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment.  Clearly, then, modern forms of technology, especially social media platforms are used by terrorism financiers.  More often than not, the payments made over the internet, the Dark Web or social media platforms involve small amounts of funding which do not raise suspicion.

Social Media Platforms

The anonymity and speed provided by the Internet is an appealing tool for terrorists to solicit financial donors.  In evidence presented to the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-proliferation, and Trade Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa) the Washington Institute for Near East Policy stated that some of terrorism fundraising was carried out in plain sight on online social media platforms. The evidence referred to a video uploaded to YouTube in October 2016 by Abd Allah al-Muhaysini who “thanked Gulf donors for supporting jihadists in Syria: ‘As for the businessmen, and I will mention some of them, the ones who prepared these hundred rockets, may Allah reward them … I tell all the businessmen of the Muslims, this is your money now, fighting in the path of Allah’”. Further evidence of the association between social media platforms and terrorism financing is illustrated by the US Department of the Treasury, which in 2014 imposed sanctions on three terrorism financiers for “fundraising appeals on social media”.  Here, the US Department of the Treasury stated that, “Al-Ajmi operates regular social media campaigns seeking donations for Syrian fighters and is one of the most active Kuwaiti fundraisers for Al-Nusra Front.  In July 2014, Al-Ajmi publicly admitted that he collected money under the auspices of charity and delivered the funds in person”.  Further sanctions were imposed on Abdul MohsenAbdullah Ibrahim al-Sharikh, who “is a senior ANF leader and al-Qaida facilitator based in Syria … in this role, al-Sharikh has used social media posts to demonstrate his aspiration to target Americans and U.S. interests”.  Furthermore, in March 2019, Gregory Lepsky was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment after pleading guilty to attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organisation.  Here, law enforcement authorities were able to determine that Lepsky had used several social media platforms to plan his terrorist attack.  In September 2019, the US Department of Treasury stated that “HAMAS solicit[ed] Bitcoin donations via social media, using two Bitcoin addressed.  As of late March 2019, those two known addressed had received at least $5,000 worth of Bitcoin”.  These instances illustrate that terrorism financiers are using several social media platforms in an attempt either to solicit donations or to transfer funds to proscribed terrorist groups. 

Conclusion

Terrorism financiers have continued to vary their funding activities.  Terrorism financing has moved away from its traditional funding mechanisms towards exploiting the speed, convenience and anonymity provided by the Internet and Dark Web.  In particular, this paper has identified several examples of terrorism financiers using cryptoassets, such as Bitcoin, and a wide range of social media platforms. There is no doubt that terrorism financing via social media platforms, the ‘Dark Web’ and heavily encrypted mobile devices is an unprecedented problem. 

Twitter Bitcoin Scam

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By Henry Hillman, Lecturer in Law at UWE Bristol.

On 15 July 2020, numerous high profile Twitter users’ accounts were hijacked to display messages promising to return double the Bitcoin sent to a published Bitcoin address. Compromised accounts included Barack Obama, Elon Musk, and Kim Kardashian,[1] as well as accounts linked to high profile cryptocurrency service providers such as Coindesk and Binance.[2] The nature of the compromised accounts meant that the incident very quickly became headline news, and Twitter acknowledged the issue publicly through its CEO[3] and support pages.[4] Needless to say, nobody who sent the Bitcoins to the scam address received any Bitcoins in return. Responsibility for the attack has been claimed by ‘Cryptoforhealth’ which was registered on Instagram at the same time as the scam tweets. The account posted a statement claiming the attack was for charity and that the “money will find its way to the right place.”[5]

As further details have emerged, Twitter has revealed that 130 accounts were targeted, 45 had their passwords reset, and the account information for 8 accounts was downloaded.[6] While the identities of the compromised accounts is clear from the accounts the scam address was tweeted from, it is not known whose data has been downloaded. Twitter has stated that no ‘verified’ accounts have had their data downloaded, meaning no account with the blue tick, assigned to high profile assure the account is genuine,[7] and, understandably, Twitter will not reveal any further details on who has had their data downloaded.

The claims purporting the charitable nature of the attack cannot be corroborated, and the real identity of the perpetrators is still not known. The ‘CryptoForHealth.com’ domain name was created on 15 July,[8] the same day of the scam tweets, using a fake address and phone number.[9]  The name ‘Anthony Elias’ was used to register the website, but no genuine identity can be traced.[10]

How?

The exact methods employed by the perpetrators of the scam will likely never be known, as it is not likely an organisation would want to provide the details of how to breach its security, for fear of similar attacks. Twitter has been relatively open in recognising the security breach so quickly, and providing a public update on 18 July 2020 stating that “attackers targeted certain Twitter employees through a social engineering scheme.”[11] Social engineering is a broad term, which refers to obtaining sensitive information from an individual or group of people in possession of the information, or with access to it.[12] This could be as simple as phishing, or more complex by duping an individual using other relevant information to gain trust. Twitter state that the “attackers successfully manipulated a small number of employees and used their credentials to access Twitter’s internal systems,”[13] in order to post tweets from high profile accounts. Given the number of affected accounts, and the complexity of two-factor authentication,[14] it is likely to have been a complex operation, but it cannot be ruled out that the perpetrators were the benefactors of a slice of good fortune in obtaining their ‘all access pass’ to twitter accounts.

Analysis

While such a scam has not made headline news before, the nature of it has many similarities to previous scams, both in Bitcoin and wider internet scams. There are issues with the term hacking, the simplicity of the scam proposition, and the behaviour of the Bitcoin address in the scam being similar to that of ransomware attacks, such as Wannacry.

While a technical point, it should be acknowledged that this is not a hack, Twitter’s security infrastructure was not breached due to a weakness exploited by the attackers. The reason the attackers were able to post tweets from compromised accounts was due to human error, if Twitter’s statements are to be believed.

The scam was a very simple one, which relied upon the fame of the account holders, and the influence they may have on their followers, to provide veracity to the address and encourage victims to send Bitcoins. If the aim was to make money then the tactics used once the attackers had access appear unsophisticated. The premise should not cause many to believe they will get their sent Bitcoins doubled, and only 12.8652 Bitcoins were sent to the address, equating to around £94,000 based on the value of Bitcoin around the time of the attack. The simplicity of the tweets may be why only 44 incoming transactions can be seen for the Bitcoin address published.[15] The second way in which the attack was crude was in the victim twitter accounts chosen, and the tweets being posted in short order. By selecting high profile victims, and tweeting from all of their accounts on the same day, the attackers were always going to be detected quickly. The attackers would have been naïve in the extreme not to realise their attack would be detected very quickly, this has led to the attack being described as a “smash and grab” exercise.[16] The crudeness of the tactics suggest acquiring Bitcoins could have been a secondary aim for the attack, with publicity being the main goal.

The behaviour of the Bitcoin address published in the tweets follows a predictable path. The Bitcoins received were not kept in the address for very long, quickly being moved to various addresses, which in turn moved the Bitcoins on again. With patience the Bitcoins can be traced, as distributed ledger technology means all transactions are published on the blockchain, but the owners of the addresses remain unknown. These practices are similar to those employed by ransomware attackers once the ransoms are paid to their respective addresses. The biggest weakness from publishing a criminal Bitcoin address is that investigators have a starting point from which to follow transactions. This issue can be addressed by using ‘mixer’ services. These services allow users to disguise which addresses Bitcoins are being sent to by completing the transaction as part of a group of transactions. Bitcoin transactions can have numerous input address and numerous output addresses, a mixer service will gather large numbers of inputs and send them all in one transaction to the outputs, but it will not be possible for investigators to know which senders correlate to which recipients.

Conclusions

This incident will fade out of the public consciousness very quickly, and it is unlikely the full details of how the attack was conducted will ever be made public. It is also unlikely that any Bitcoins sent to the scam address will be retrieved, and equally unlikely that the attack was a charitable one. For investigators, it provides an opportunity to view the behaviour of the attackers and it also serves as a very public lesson in basic financial intelligence; do not send your money to random locations on the internet, and if a deal sounds too good to be true, in invariably is.


[1] BBC News, ‘Major US Twitter accounts hacked in Bitcoin scam’ (16 July 2020) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-53425822> accessed 20 July 2020.

[2] Cameron Winklevoss, ‘Twitter Status’ (Twitter, 21:18 BST 15 July 2020) <https://twitter.com/winklevoss/status/1283493640287989760?s=20> accessed 20 July 2020.

[3] Jack Dorsey, ‘Thread’ (Twitter, 02:18 BST 16 July 2020) <https://twitter.com/jack/status/1283571658339397632?s=20> accessed 20 July 2020.

[4] Twitter Support, ‘Thread’ (22:45 15 July 2020) <https://twitter.com/TwitterSupport/status/1283518038445223936?s=20> accessed 20 July 2020.

[5] BBC News, ‘Twitter hack: FBI investigates major Twitter attack’ (17 July 2020) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-53439585> accessed 21 July 2020.

[6] Twitter, ‘An update on our security incident’ (18 July 2020) <https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/an-update-on-our-security-incident.html> accessed 20 July 2020.

[7] Twitter, ‘About verified accounts’ <https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/about-twitter-verified-accounts> accessed 20 July 2020.

[8] Whois Domain Tools, ‘Whois Record for CryptoForHealth.com’ (created 15 July 2020, last updated 21 July 2020) <https://whois.domaintools.com/cryptoforhealth.com> accessed 21 July 2020.

[9] Samuel Haig, ‘Who Owns the ‘CryptoForHealth’ Domain Behind the Twitter Hacks?’ (CoinTelegraph, 16 July 2020) <https://cointelegraph.com/news/who-owns-the-cryptoforhealth-domain-behind-the-twitter-hacks> accessed 21 July 2020

[10] BBC News, ‘Twitter hack: FBI investigates major Twitter attack’ (17 July 2020) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-53439585> accessed 21 July 2020.

[11] Twitter, ‘An update on our security incident’ (18 July 2020) <https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/an-update-on-our-security-incident.html> accessed 20 July 2020.

[12] F. Mouton, L. Leenen, and H.S. Venter, ‘Social engineering attack examples, templates and scenarios’ (2016) 59 Computers & Security 186 at p187.

[13] Twitter, ‘An update on our security incident’ (18 July 2020) <https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/an-update-on-our-security-incident.html> accessed 20 July 2020.

[14] Twitter, ‘How to use two-factor authentication’ <https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/two-factor-authentication> accessed 20 July 2020.

[15] BitInfoCharts, ‘Bitcoin Address bc1qxy2kgdygjrsqtzq2n0yrf2493p83kkfjhx0wlh’  <https://bitinfocharts.com/bitcoin/address/bc1qxy2kgdygjrsqtzq2n0yrf2493p83kkfjhx0wlh> accessed 21 July 2020.

[16] Joe Tidy, ‘Major US Twitter accounts hacked in Bitcoin scam’ (BBC News, 16July 2020) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-53425822> accessed 21 July 2020.

Surprised? You shouldn’t be.

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By Professor Nicholas Ryder, Head of Research, Global Crime, Justice and Security Research Group

In its 2018 Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) of the United Kingdom’s (UK) level of compliance with its Recommendations, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) concluded that the UK’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regimes were “effective”. In order to implement the FATF Recommendations and achieve this unprecedented endorsement, the UK has adopted an aggressive and, at times, holistic strategy towards tackling financial crime. For example, the UK Government has published two National Risk Assessments (NRA), one in 2015 and the second in 2017. These were followed by the publication of the Economic Crime Plan, which outlined seven strategic priorities and 52 action points. Collectively, these measures have gone some way to address the shortfalls identified in the FATF 2007-2008 MER and they have contributed towards the highest rating ever provided by the FATF. 

In particular, the MER praised the aggressive stance towards investigating and prosecuting money laundering cases, the adoption of Unexplained Wealth Orders, how the UK disrupts terrorism financing, preventing the misuse of companies and trusts and how it works with its international partners. John Glen, Economic Secretary to the Treasury and City Minister said, “I am incredibly proud that today’s report confirms that the UK has one of the strongest regimes in the world for deterring these criminals”. Ben Wallace, Minister for Security and Economic Crime said, “I’m delighted with today’s report which shows our efforts are being recognised, and sends a strong message to criminals that we will come for them, their assets and their money”. However, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) stated that “in PR terms at least, the government’s efforts [to tackle financial crime] seem to have paid off, with the UK receiving the highest aggregate scorings under the revised FATF evaluation methodology to date”.  RUSI added that “the UK has achieved top-of-the-class marks from the FATF – government officials will be both surprised and relieved.  However, the fact that the UK remains central to global money laundering schemes brings into question the relevance of this evaluation”. 

These sixth leaked published by the ICIJ since 2012/2013 (Offshore leaks; Luxembourg, Swiss, Panama Papers and the Paradise Papers), alleges that HSBC, JP Morgan, Barclays, Deutsche Bank and Standard Chartered were involved in a variety of related transactions. The FinCEN leaked reports suggest several of the world’s largest banks allowed criminals to move approximately $2tn via illegal financial transactions. The report also suggests that the UK is a ‘higher risk jurisdiction’ and compared to Cyprus. This is due to the number of UK registered companies (over 3,000 according to the BBC) that appears in the suspicious activity reports submitted to FinCEN. If the leaked reports are accurate, they represent a significant blow to the UK’s efforts to tackle financial crime, especially since the ‘glowing’ end of term report from the FATF. The leaked report tells us that despite the rhetoric from the UK government that very little has changed in how the global financial operates.

In the short-term, ‘profound apologies’ will follow, there will be condemnation, the accused financial institutions will receive the customary bad media coverage and share prices will be affected. Financial regulatory agencies will insist that the financial sector improves its levels of compliance, and fines could follow. Prosecutions? Unlikely if previous efforts are anything to go by. In the long term, nothing will change, it never changes.

Superfast Scout software could put more cyber criminals into jail

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Experts at the University of the West of England (UWE Bristol) are working with a technology company to develop software that is set to drastically reduce the amount of time it takes to identify financial crime. The two-year project, which is co-funded by the UK’s Innovation agency, Innovate UK, could help tackle money laundering and financing of criminal activities, as well as potentially lead to more convictions.

UWE Bristol’s Professor Nicholas Ryder, an expert in financial crime, Dr Phil Legg, who specialises in cybersecurity, and Henry Hillman (cryptocurrency) are working with the team at Synalogik, an SME based in Tewkesbury that develops systems that automate intelligence-gathering and investigation.

Together they are developing Scout™, a system that can detect suspicious online money transfer activity extremely fast and therefore potentially save hours of laborious police work. The program locates financial activity that could be fraudulent, scores it in terms of risk, and does all this in minutes rather than the hours or even days it could take police analysts to sift through data.

The subsequent effect is creating an environment where investigators or analysts have more capacity to conduct immediate lines of enquiries and are significantly more productive than when operating previous obsolete criminal investigation procedures manually.

Professor Ryder said: “This is an exciting project to be involved in and is ground breaking when it comes to tackling activist financing as it will massively speed things up and will therefore save valuable time in tracking down criminals or activists. It has never been done before in this way and the quicker the intelligence comes through, the better.”

He explained that previously it was compulsory for financial institutions to provide data around potentially fraudulent activity to the National Crime Agency (NCA) and this could cause delay in identifying cyber criminals because, in many cases, these were false leads.

“One of the major problems of reporting allegations of financial crime has been that financial institutions have been obligated to report it. That system is flawed because people feel they have to report allegations of money laundering, even when there is no evidence. This has led to too much reporting that’s not necessarily accurate,” said Professor Ryder.

Scott Coughtrie, who is Head of Strategic Operations at Synalogik, said: “Our innovative software is disruptive because the operational capabilities and applications in the differing investigative sectors in which Scout is deployed provide real time investigation and live analysis opportunities which never existed until very recently.”

“The expertise provided by UWE Bristol’s Research and Global Crime, Justice and Security Research Group is essential to understanding criminal methodology, processes, operational practices and patterns of behaviour to enable a complete insight into the risk associated with criminal activity and how we predict, identify, prevent and, in the cases of prosecution, evidence all material and actions.”

Innovate UK drives productivity and economic growth by supporting businesses to develop and realise the potential of new ideas. Innovate UK is part of UK Research and Innovation. For more information visit www.innovateuk.ukri.org

Case study: UWE Bristol Law Alumni

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My name is Miriam C Nkomalago, a UWE Bristol alumni from the graduate year of 2018. I transferred to UWE Bristol in my last year of LLB from HELP University, Malaysia, through the UK Law Degree Transfer Program offered at HELP University.

Moving and studying at UWE Bristol was very life changing for me. I enjoyed the hospitality shown to me by my flat mates at the Hollies, where a lot of good memories were created with them.  The career fairs hosted by the University enabled me to network with individuals creating great impact in their communities and helped me get a volunteer opportunity at Nilaari Agency.

Nilaari was home to me. Everyone was keen to help me learn about their work and participate in their decision meetings and events. Through Nilaari, I was able to learn a lot about their efforts in dealing with mental health in Bristol and the whole of UK. I was able to understand the harsh living conditions and the impact it has on the mental health of the immigrants and people in BAME communities. My time at UWE gave me the chance to explore a leadership position as the Vice President of the East African Society. This position taught me about the different personalities and characters we associate with and how to communicate and cooperate with one another positively.

Another thing that made my time at UWE worthwhile was the 24 hour access to the library facilities at Frenchay campus. I never liked studying or working in the library because I preferred my own space; but when I moved to UWE, a lot of my work was done in the library because of the options like the ‘silent floor’ which was rarely fully occupied and there were no distractions when working.

Once I returned back home, I founded a legal database for law students and lawyers in Tanzania, Lex Scripta. The platform provides vital legal resources to legal scholars and practitioners in Tanzania. It currently provides access to cases, Acts and student written articles for free. Moreover, I work closely with law students by teaching them ways to navigate through law school and other practical skills they need in order to catch up with the changes of the legal field.

I am a strong believer that an individual’s personal development and career growth can be positively enhanced through the accessibility and affordability of the right studying and working resources. With this platform, I get to work closely with law students and lawyers in my country by enhancing their research and practical skills through short online sessions and workshops.  In the short period of working with them, students have reached out to me with positive feedback that Lex Scripta has been of help in their studies by being able to research and access case laws, having ease in attempting and answering exam questions because they now understand what answers to give the examiner and more. So far, I already see myself creating the difference I envisioned for Lex Scripta and I am looking forward to reaching out and helping more law students and lawyers.

To stay in touch with UWE Bristol and access news and benefits for alumni, visit our Stay Connected web page.