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US-Israeli attack against Iran – Jurisdictional hurdles to prosecute the crime of aggression    

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By Tanvir Hashem Munim

This blog post is part of a series of posts published by the Research In Public International Law Group. 

Introduction 

The recent US-Israeli attack against the sovereign nation of Iran – which included the deadly bombing of a primary school, killing more than 150 children and wounding over 100, as well as the killing of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with several family members – presents a textbook example for the war crimes and the crime of aggression. This blog post focuses primarily on the jurisdictional hurdles involved in prosecuting the crime of aggression. It demonstrates how the proposed amendments to the jurisdictional provisions for the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute, and a Ukraine-style special tribunal, could provide some potential pathways for navigating these hurdles. It first briefly outlines how the attack constitutes both a war crime and a crime of aggression, followed by an analysis of the jurisdictional obstacles for the crime of aggression and their navigation, before placing the crime of aggression in a historical context to make a case for hope.  

The attack constituting crime of aggression and war crime 

The attack constitutes a manifest violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force. Furthermore, there appears to be no reasonable claim to the exercise of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter (Quénivet 2026). Consequently, the invasion of the sovereign state of Iran and the bombardment of its territory qualify as acts of aggression under Article 8 bis (1) and (2) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), rendering those in authority responsible for the crime of aggression. Specifically, the Head of State and Head of Government of the US and Israel – President Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu – as individuals in positions to effectively exercise control over or direct military action, bear apparent responsibility under Article 8 bis (1). 

Moreover, during this international armed conflict under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, the bombing of a primary school – a property being a civilian object protected under the Article 52 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions – may constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, as per Article 8(2)(a) of the Rome Statute. Directing attacks at undefended schools and the killing of the civilian population and senior leadership may also constitute violations of the laws and customs applicable in an international armed conflict under Article 8(2)(b). These acts may amount to war crimes, particularly as they were undertaken as part of a coordinated US-Israeli plan or policy to topple the Iranian regime.  

Aerial view from airplane showing a target

Pathways to accountability: navigating jurisdictional challenges for crime of aggression 

The primary challenge is not whether these acts constitute specific crimes – as the law would suggest they do – but rather the difficulty of ensuring accountability within the framework of international criminal law. Under Article 15 bis and 15 ter of the Rome Statute, the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression committed by the national of a state if the state is a party to the Rome Statute, if the crime of aggression occurs on the territory of a state party or if the security council refers the crime of aggression to the prosecutor of the ICC. 

Further, under Articles 15, 15 bis, and 16 of the Rome Statute, no investigation into the crime of aggression can proceed unless the UN Security Council makes a determination that an act of aggression has been committed by the state concerned. Alternatively, an investigation may proceed if the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC authorises it, provided the Security Council has not deferred the matter. Since the U.S., Israel, and Iran are non-parties, and the U.S. holds a permanent seat (and veto) on the Security Council (Article 27(3) UN Charter), a reference to the prosecution or non-deferral of investigation is unlikely, leaving the crime of aggression legally out of reach at the ICC.  

However, the ongoing amendment review initiated by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) of the ICC in July 2025 provides a potential solution to this jurisdictional hurdle, as the ASP is considering an amendment – proposed by Germany, Costa Rica, Slovenia, and several other states – to modify the conditions under which the Court may exercise jurisdiction over crimes of aggression. If implemented, the amendment would mean that if the state on whose territory the crime occurred, or the state whose national is accused of committing the crime, ratifies or accepts the amendment (provided it is already a State Party), then the ICC can exercise jurisdiction. Furthermore, if a state chooses to remain a non-State Party or not to ratify the amendment, the Court could still exercise jurisdiction if that state lodges an Article 12(3) declaration with the ICC Registrar accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 

This amendment would be highly relevant in holding Heads of State and other officials responsible for the US–Israeli attack on Iran. It would mean that Iran, even if it chooses to remain a non-State Party to the Rome Statute, could lodge an Article 12(3) declaration giving the ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory. Article 12(3) declarations can apply retrospectively, as seen in the case of Ukraine, which filed a declaration in April 2014 accepting jurisdiction for crimes committed between 21 November 2013 and 22 February 2014. 

However, whether the principle of non-retroactivity under Article 24 would preclude the retrospective effect of the amended provision – thereby preventing Iran from reaching back to the recent attacks by the US and Israel – is debatable. One could argue that while the procedural provisions would be amended, the substantive provisions (Articles 8 bis, 15 bis, and 15 ter of the Rome Statute) criminalising acts of aggression have been effective since July 2018, making the nullum crimen sine lege (no punishment without law) argument less persuasive. Nevertheless, one must wait and see, as the next ASP session will be convened in 2029 to consider the proposed amendments.  

Meanwhile, a Council of Europe–style Special Tribunal for the crime of aggression, similar to the one established for Ukraine, could be considered. The necessity of such a tribunal stems from the fact that, within the current ICC legal framework, jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is limited to States Parties to the Rome Statute – a hurdle that currently prevents the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over the US-Israeli attack on Iran. In the absence of an exact parallel to the Council of Europe in Asia, the organisations that most closely resemble it – specifically regarding the formation of a tribunal by negotiating a statute with Iran and using the Ukraine model as a blueprint – could be the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which currently represents 57 states including Iran, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is the world’s largest regional organisation in terms of geographic area and population; it focuses on Eurasia and includes Russia, China, India, Iran and Pakistan, among others, as member states. Unlike the ICC, the Ukraine model would support trials in absentia. However, a downside of such a tribunal is that it may not be able to conduct the trial of a sitting Head of State, Head of Government, or other person in an official capacity unless they leave their position or their immunity is waived (Cosneanu 2025). 

Accountability for international crimes: a challenging but hopeful case 

Ultimately, bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice will be a long and challenging battle, though at the ICC these crimes are not subject to limitation period per Article 29 of the Rome Statute, given that international criminal justice is not without political influence. One can understand the challenges the ICC may face in this regard, when they consider the fact that the US imposed sanctions on the ICC judges and prosecutors once the ICC issued arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant for the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in the situation in Palestine.  

However, setbacks in prosecuting Heads of State and other senior government officials are not novel. The victors’ attempt to prosecute the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire for the Armenian massacre never saw the daylight, as the Treaty of Sèvres negotiated in Paris was never ratified by any Turkish regime. The attempt to prosecute the German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, also could not materialise, as the ‘special tribunal’ sanctioned by the Treaty of Versailles was never actually established and as the Netherlands refused to extradite him (Schabas 2012). An even-handed prosecution for the atrocities committed in the Second World War – by way of bringing to justice those responsible from the Allied forces, such as the Russian leadership for the Katyn Massacre of Polish citizens or the US leadership for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings or the UK-US leadership for the Dresden bombings – never materialised (Labuda 2024).. Even after all these setbacks, since we have precedents of successful prosecutions of Heads of State and senior officials, such as Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), or Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević and Rwandan Prime Minister (Interim) Jean Kambanda at the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) or Liberian President Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) – there is always hope for justice to prevail in the long run.  

Conclusion 

Finally, to echo Sir Thomas More, the celebrated English lawyer and Lord Chancellor, a question must be asked of us all: if the Devil were to turn around on us – if we remain silent now and passively accept this flagrant breach of international norms and a culture of impunity – where would we hide when our turn comes?  

The United States’ flawed justifications for the intervention in Iran: Anticipatory self‑defence and ad hoc collective self‑defence  

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By Noëlle Quénivet 

This blog post is part of a series of posts published by the Research In Public International Law Group. 

Introduction 

Recent US and Israeli military operations against Iran have prompted intense debates about the legality of such force under contemporary international law. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed the United States acted to support Israel as the US President “knew that there was going to be an Israeli action. We knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces”. Yet this combination of justifications does not support the actions taken. 

The US justification rests on speculative assessments about what Iran might have done, rather than demonstrable evidence of an impending attack. This conclusion is echoed forcefully in a plethora of expert commentaries on various international law blogs (see e.g. Milanovic 2026, Adil Ahmad Haque 2026). Whilst Lieblich 2026 has provided an excellent examination of the double pre-emption and imminence discussion, one element that has, however, not been elaborated upon is that the attack by the US could be considered an ad hoc form of collective self-defence. This post argues that, absent a lawful intervention by Israel, the US would not be able to claim it is acting in collective self-defence. 

This post starts by explaining the prohibition of the use of force and its exceptions, notably Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the customary rule of anticipatory self-defence. It then warns against an expansive interpretation that includes pre-emptive self-defence before providing an analysis of a flawed potential collective self-defence claim.  

Article 51 and the threshold requirement of an armed attack 

The prohibition of the use of force is a cornerstone of the United Nations Charter (ICJ DRC v Uganda 2005, para 148), anchored in its Article 2(4). Force can only be used in two specific circumstances: when the Security Council authorises the use of force (Chapter VII), and in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs (Article 51). 

Some quarters would argue that, given that Israel had already been attacked by Iran (some time ago), the right of self-defence did not extinguish simply because time had passed (see Lovitky 2025 on Israel’s attack against Iran in June 2025 following Iran’s attacks in October 2024). The law is clear: a State must prove that resort to force is necessary to repel the attack. First, it is difficult to see how the current attack fends off an attack that is over a year old. Second, necessity is also measured with due regard to whether nonforcible means could be used successfully (see Adil Ahmad Haque 2026; Schmitt, Bridgeman and Goodman 2026). Israel did not even attempt negotiating with Iran; rather, it was the US that was in discussion with Iran and, according to Oman’s Foreign Minister, “peace [was] within […] reach”. Yet, the US ended such negotiations.  A claim of necessity cannot thus be made. 

Anticipatory self-defence: A narrow and disputed doctrine 

Under customary international law, anticipatory self-defence is recognised as a lawful use of force. This narrow exception, stemming from the 1837 Caroline incident, allows force when the State can show “a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation”. The rule of thumb is that the State is simply using force “before it is too late to do so”, i.e., to enable it to mount an effective defence (see O’Meara 2022). As Schmitt 2025 puts it, this is a test of “last window of opportunity”. However, nothing suggests that Iran was on the brink of launching an attack against Israel or the US.  

Modern interpretations of this rule have focused on the imminence of the attack, each State (e.g. the US, the UK, and Australia) adopting its own standard. The lack of a common understanding both among States and scholars reflects the controversial nature of the use of force in anticipatory self-defence. Among the indicators used to determine the lawfulness of such action (see O’Meara 2022) are the probability or likelihood of the attack, the nature of the threat, the immediacy of the threat, whether the use of force is the only reasonable choice in the given circumstances, whether the response is proportionate, etc. That said, an anticipatory self-defence claim rests on actual imminent threats, not hypothetical scenarios. In practice, much of this links back to the availability of accurate intelligence information (see Bachmann and Keinan 2025). Nothing in the few days before the Israel/US attacks suggests that Iran was more likely to attack Israel than at any other point. In fact, Iran was at the time in negotiations with the US (see interview with Oman’s Foreign Minister).  

Rubio’s justification did not rely on evidence of Iranian mobilisation but on US predictions that Iran might retaliate for Israel’s own pre-planned actions. What is more, Rubio’s statement could be interpreted as inadvertently undermining the US claim by stating that the US knew that “there was going to be an Israeli action” (a claim later withdrawn). He did stress the Iranian military preparations as the catalyst for US fears. This is the opposite of imminence! This reinforces the claim that Israel lacked a basis to claim imminence. 

Pre-emptive self-defence: An even narrower and more controversial doctrine 

Since the Bush era, the concept of pre-emptive (sometimes also confusedly referred to as preventive) strikes has gained prominence, though it is highly controversial. Whilst the US seemingly acted under such a doctrine when it invaded Iraq in 2003, it argued that it did not accept such a theory (see discussion in Taft and Buchwald 2003); rather, in its view, the intervention was based on Iraq having violated a UN Security Council resolution (see Finucane 2025). The doctrine of preemptive self-defence was mainly developed in the context of the “war on terror” to enable the US to strike State and non-State actors in a “non-consenting state” (see Lederman 2016), i.e. a State unable or unwilling to put an end to that threat on its territory (see Schmitt 2025). 

There is, nonetheless, a wider reach of this doctrine, notably with the purpose of such strikes being to destroy a State’s threatening capabilities. This is more often called preventive self-defence (see Israel’s position as explained in Friedman 2026). In 1981, the US joined other States in the UN Security Council (Resolution 487 (1981)) in condemning Israel’s attack on Osirak, an Iraqi nuclear facility and rejecting similar justifications (see Finucane 2025). It pointed out the “absence of any evidence that Iraq had launched or was planning to launch an attack that could justify Israel’s use of force. … [T]he presence in a State of the military capacity to injure or even to destroy another State cannot itself be considered a sufficient basis for the defensive use of force.” (Sofaer, US Legal Adviser, as cited in Lederman 2016). Replace Iraq with Iran in the above statement, and the irony of such a statement in light of the current events is not lost on the reader. This historical consistency severely undercuts Washington’s current position. Rubio indeed stated that the US intervened “to eliminate the threat of Iran’s shortrange ballistic missiles and the threat caused by their Navy particularly to naval assets”. 

It is evident that such a (flawed) understanding of anticipatory self-defence differs significantly from the original interpretation of the Caroline incident formulation. For certain, the law evolves, but even the most contemporary interpretations of anticipatory self-defence do not authorise preventive strikes based merely on an adversary’s developing capabilities. As Schmitt 2025 emphasises, “States enjoy no right under international law […] to use force solely because another State is about to acquire a threatening capability”. 

Collective self-defence 

Under international law (both Article 51 UN Charter and customary international law (see ICJ Nicaragua 1986, para 194)), a State is allowed to seek support through collective self-defence, which denotes the situation whereby a State acts to defend an ally that has suffered an armed attack or is facing an imminent threat. Interestingly, the US support for Israel has not been couched in terms of collective self-defence. That being said, let’s entertain this claim here. For collective self-defence to be lawful, the self-defence must comply with the jus ad bellum rules (see Green 2024; Schmitt, Bridgeman and Goodman 2026).  This means that if Israel lacked a valid claim of self-defence, then the United States cannot invoke collective self-defence.  

First, it must be noted that the US did not refer to collective self-defence in this recent attack. This contrasts to the situation in June 2025, when the US had invoked it in its letter to the UN Security Council to justify its attack on Iran by first referring to Israel responding to Iranian attacks “in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defence” and adding that “[i]n close coordination with the Government of Israel, the United States has taken necessary and proportionate action […] to defend Israel and also to protect our own security, citizens, and interests, consistent with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.” Even at the time, Finucane 2025 demonstrated that such a claim violated international law. As explained, Israel can certainly not claim to be acting in self-defence. This forecloses the possibility of a lawful “derivative” US collective self‑defence. 

Second, from a procedural perspective, the victim State must declare that it has suffered from an armed attack, and it must request military aid in response (ICJ Nicaragua 1986, paras 165, 195 and 199). Israel therefore needs to issue a declaration that it has been attacked and then an ad hoc request for the US to join them in self-defence. Green 2017, however, points out that, in practice, the declaration requirement finds no relevance. In contrast, the request for assistance is (see Green 2024). No request was made by Israel; rather, it seems that the US intervened out of fear that it would be attacked (Rubio). 

Third, and relatedly, the US rationale for its intervention appears to be also grounded in its own projection that Iran might retaliate against US assets following Israeli escalation (see Rubio). In other words, the putative attack was on the US and not Israel, which, following this logic, would make it impossible for the US to claim that it acted in collective self-defence to support Israel. 

Conclusion 

This interpretive drift regarding anticipatory self-defence has become particularly dangerous (see also Schmitt 2025). While governmental legal teams could be perceived to be bending doctrines to suit policy goals rather than grounding policy in legal constraints, it gives the impression that an increasing number of political leaders now see international law not only as a constraint but also as an utter nuisance. The US logic depends on a chain of hypothetical contingencies, reminiscent of the “Minority Report” scenario. International law categorically rejects such conjectural reasoning. In the end, the intervention reflects precisely what international law seeks to prevent: unilateral, pre-emptive uses of force dressed in the language of (collective) self-defence. 

Participating in UNCITRAL working group II: reflections from the 83rd session in New York

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By Dr Nancy Siboe

In February 2026 I had the opportunity to attend the 83rd session of UNCITRALWorking Group II (Dispute Settlement) at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. I participated as an observer at the invitation of the American Society of International Law and in my capacity as a UWE academic.

Walking into the UN conference rooms where international legal texts are negotiated was a striking experience. Around the table were State delegates from across the world, representatives of international organisations, arbitral institutions and accredited observers, all contributing to discussions that may ultimately shape the future of international dispute resolution.

Working Group II is responsible for UNCITRAL’s work on arbitration, mediation and related dispute resolution mechanisms. This session was chaired by Andrés Jana (Republic of Chile), who also serves as Vice-President of the International Court of Arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce, and supported by the UNCITRAL Secretariat. The week’s discussions focused on how international dispute settlement frameworks should adapt to rapid technological change.

Artificial intelligence and the future of dispute resolution

One of the most fascinating themes throughout the session was the growing role of digital technologies in arbitration. Delegations discussed the increasing use of electronic communications, remote and hybrid hearings and the potential use of artificial intelligence tools within arbitral proceedings.

The conversation around AI was particularly lively. Delegates considered how AI might assist with tasks such as document review, legal research, case management and procedural administration. At the same time there was clear recognition that any use of AI must be carefully designed to protect core principles of dispute resolution: due process, transparency, party autonomy and equality of arms.

What made these discussions especially interesting was their global character. Delegations from jurisdictions including the United States, Israel, Finland, Russia, Cameroon, Bahrain, France and the Philippines offered different perspectives shaped by their own legal systems and policy priorities. Watching these viewpoints converge through negotiation and compromise offered a powerful illustration of UNCITRAL’s consensus based drafting process.

Alongside the formal plenary meetings, a series of colloquium panels brought together academics, practitioners and members of the judiciary. Leading arbitral institutions from major global centres were represented, including the London Court of International Arbitration, highlighting London’s continued importance as a hub for international arbitration.

One particularly thought-provoking moment came during a discussion of an AI assisted arbitrator model currently being trialled by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The concept involves an AI system assisting an arbitrator with aspects of decision making, subject to the express consent of the parties. The idea sparked extensive debate about accountability, oversight and the limits of algorithmic decision making in legal processes.

A memorable intervention came from H.E. Judge Sapna Jhangiani KC of the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts of Appeal. She emphasised that while AI systems may be capable of mimicking legal reasoning, they do not truly reason. For that reason she argued they must remain subject to meaningful human control. Her remarks captured a broader concern echoed throughout the session: technological innovation must support rather than replace judicial responsibility.

From working group to the General Assembly: how international law is made

The Working Group also advanced work under the Dispute Resolution in the Digital Economy (DRDE) project. During the session delegates approved draft texts including recommendations on the interpretation of the New York Convention in relation to arbitral awards in electronic form, proposed amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and additions to the Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings.

At the end of the week the Working Group adopted its draft report, which will now be submitted to the UNCITRAL Commission at its 59th annual session in 2026. If approved the outcomes may ultimately inform resolutions and legislative texts considered by the United Nations General Assembly. Observing this process offered a clear reminder that international law develops through patient negotiation, drafting and consensus building among States.

Reflections for research and teaching

For me personally the experience provided valuable insight into how debates about AI governance are unfolding in international legal institutions. As someone whose research focuses on the regulation and governance of artificial intelligence, hearing how States and arbitral institutions are thinking about the responsible integration of AI into legal processes was particularly valuable.
These discussions will inform my ongoing research on regulatory oversight, human control mechanisms and accountability in AI assisted adjudication. They will also enrich my teaching by offering students a clearer picture of how international legal norms are debated and developed in practice.

Model of the United Nations Headquarters building

Leaving New York I brought back a small commemorative model of the United Nations Headquarters building, a reminder not only of the visit but also of the Law School’s growing engagement with international legal forums.

The Law School’s support in facilitating this participation is gratefully acknowledged.

Perspectives on post-conflict and post-atrocity accountability

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By Noëlle Quénivet

On 16 February 2026, the Research in Public International Law Group of the Bristol Law School organised an event on “Perspectives on Post-Conflict and Post-Atrocity Accountability”. It welcomed Dr Fabricio Guariglia for a compelling and timely keynote on “Ongoing Accountability Efforts in Ukraine”. The event drew 30 staff and students, filling the room to capacity, with students attending from across our LLB and LLM in International Law and Conflict programmes. Their engagement throughout the session underscored both the relevance of these issues to their studies and the growing interest in international accountability among the next generation of legal practitioners. Dr Guariglia, who has served as defence counsel and victim representative in Argentina, held senior roles at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court, and now directs the International Development Law Organisation Hague office, drew on decades of experience to explore the legal institutional and human challenges posed by the ongoing conflict.

A system under pressure: Ukraine’s overnight transformation

A central theme of Dr Guariglia’s keynote was the extraordinary strain on Ukraine’s criminal justice system. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine already maintained a specialised war crimes unit. Yet this was nowhere near enough to cope with the explosion of violations across the country. Almost instantly, the entire judiciary pivoted into war crimes mode. Prosecutors and judges accustomed to working within structures shaped by the Soviet legacy found this model unworkable amid territorial occupation and mass displacement.

Investigators adapted quickly. Laptop-based field interviews replaced office-based procedures. Moreover, emergency laws and curfews led to a temporary collapse in ordinary crime. For a time, nearly the entire prosecutorial apparatus focused on atrocity crimes. But as refugees returned and daily life resumed, ordinary criminal caseloads surged once again, leaving legal professionals simultaneously managing conventional offences and a war crimes docket that now exceeds 200000 cases. Only a small proportion of these have progressed to trial, revealing longstanding structural gaps in prioritisation and case tracking.

International engagement and Ukraine as a “laboratory”

Recognising the scale of the challenge, Ukraine sought help from the international community. States contributed seconded personnel expert advisers and platforms for coordination. Dr Guariglia highlighted one major success. Four years on Ukrainian judges and prosecutors possess significantly greater expertise in international humanitarian and international criminal law. In many ways Ukraine has become a “laboratory” for international law, especially regarding the crime of aggression, committed on a scale and with a clarity of annexationist intent not seen in recent history.

Yet gaps remain. The International Criminal Court is unable to prosecute the crime of aggression in Ukraine due to the Court’s jurisdictional requirements, creating a stark mismatch between the gravity of the wrongdoing and the existing accountability tools.

A conflict with many harms: gendered violence, environmental damage, and the targeting of children

Dr Guariglia noted that the war’s impact extends far beyond the battlefield. Gender-based violence is prevalent during war and women often seek refuge in neighbouring countries, where some become victims of exploitation and trafficking. The environmental damage caused by the conflict will stay for generations. And among the most troubling developments are the violations against children who were separated from their families, transferred to Russia, and subjected to systemic Russification efforts.

The challenge of linking crimes to perpetrators

Dr Guariglia highlighted two challenges. First, Ukraine’s legal system does not operate on a priority basis, in the sense that there is no effective case-mapping or prioritisation process. Prioritisation is happening in an organic rather than a systemic manner. Second, there are issues in establishing linkage evidence that is the connections between crimes and those responsible. Access to military intelligence and internal documents remains severely restricted, resulting in many cases stalling before trial. The use of the universal jurisdiction principle in other countries and the creation of a joint investigative team (with ICC participation) coordinated through Eurojust offer some hope, but meaningful justice will require decades of sustained work.

Panel Reflections: Limits and Opportunities in International Criminal Justice

The post-keynote panel broadened the discussion to consider global accountability efforts.

Slow but meaningful progress

Tanvir Hashem Munim (Lecturer at UWE and ICC Counsel) emphasised the slow pace of investigations and arrest warrants in relation to the situation in Myanmar. He highlighted that progress was made in various forums. The Government of Gambia initiated a case before the International Court of Justice and a case has started in Argentina using universal jurisdiction. In contrast other initiatives, such as those in Indonesia, have been rejected. Tanvir stressed that arrest warrants themselves can be victories, offering hope and signalling that impunity will not endure.

Aggression: the core crime still evading legal capture

Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne (Professor of International Law at the University of Bristol) highlighted the structural gap around the crime of aggression. Although Ukraine has cases before the European Court of Human Rights, the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea none directly referred to aggression, leaving a critical aspect of the conflict unaddressed in formal legal terms. Also as Ukraine has largely lost these cases (except for those brought before the European Court of Human Rights) Russia has framed these outcomes as vindications, even when they do not reflect the broader context of the conflict.

The Ljubljana – the Hague Convention: a new tool with old challenges

Alison Bisset (Associate Professor at the University of Reading) presented the Ljubljana-The Hague Convention, the first global interstate treaty focused on cooperation in investigating and prosecuting international crimes. Driven by practitioner needs the Convention addresses jurisdiction extradition evidence sharing and victims’ rights. While it has the potential to reshape cooperation difficulties remain. It mirrors the UNTOC model which many states fail to use. It does not address immunities. It fails to refer to evidence gathering that is specific to international crimes (for example excavations). It provides much leeway to states to refuse cooperation on the basis of national security and it is overwhelmingly supported by European states raising questions about global uptake.

Conclusion: a generational struggle for justice

Dr Guariglia’s keynote and the subsequent panel offered a rich though realistic and sobering assessment of what justice looks like amid ongoing conflict. The work ahead is immense and will span generations. Yet legal institutions however imperfect remain essential. They document truth empower victims and gradually build pathways to accountability. For our students in the LLB and LLM programmes the event was both academically invaluable and deeply motivating illustrating the importance of their future roles in shaping global justice.

Strategic Human Rights Litigation

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By Noëlle Quénivet

On 16 February 2026, the Research in Public International Law Group welcomed Professor Helen Duffy (University of Leiden, The Netherlands) to deliver a talk on “Strategic Human Rights Litigation – and the case of Abu Zubaydah”. She shared her experience as a human rights litigator with over 30 staff and students (in person and online) on our LLB, LLM, and BTC programmes. In her presentation, she explored what “strategic human rights litigation” is, and importantly, what it is not. The discussion went far beyond a courtroom-focused view of wins and losses. Instead, it encouraged us to see litigation as one tool among many to promote social change, document history, and uphold human dignity.

What makes litigation “strategic”?

At its core, strategic human rights litigation is defined by its goal rather than the forum. It involves legal action pursued with aims that extend beyond the immediate parties and the narrow result of a single case. These goals may include clarifying the law, empowering communities, catalysing policy reforms, documenting truth or shifting public narratives.

Strategy influences how cases are constructed, the forums chosen, the timing, the parties involved, and how legal actions are integrated with advocacy, media, and community efforts. While strategic human rights litigation was once niche, it is now increasingly employed, with a growing number of claims and diverse judicial mechanisms. Yet, Professor Duffy also stressed its challenges: courts face attacks, judgments are not enforced, and the rule of law is being undermined.

Updating the lenses: time-lapse, wide-angle, high-definition

Professor Duffy, the founder of Human Rights in Practice, proposed three complementary ‘lenses’ for thinking about the impact of strategic litigation.

Time-lapse: Strategic impact can occur before, during, and long after a case concludes. Litigation processes can dignify survivors, organise communities, and shape public understanding. In Hadijatou Mani v Niger, the very act of testimony in a regional court was experienced by a former slave as empowering, making visible what had long been denied. Similarly, in Plan de Sánchez v Guatemala, a genocide case before the Inter-American Court, litigation mobilised a community around truth and reparations, even as social and everyday life needs (e.g., crops, health facilities) extended beyond what any judgment could deliver.

Wide-angle: Litigation is only one contributor to change. In Argentina, accountability for dictatorship-era crimes unfolded over years through multiple processes, from challenging amnesty laws to criminal prosecutions, all accompanied by documentation efforts, films, and social mobilisation. Law and society moved together.

High-definition: Impact is multi-dimensional and certainly not linear. Outcomes can include cessation of violations, reparations, legal and policy reforms, institutional strengthening, and the creation of a historical record. Sometimes, the most meaningful “result” is the articulation of truth in a public forum. One Hebron resident, repeatedly litigating land issues despite adverse prospects, captured this poignantly: “If they do nothing, I have a record… and what else can I do?” That record, he suggested, is itself a form of resistance and an archive of rights-based claims.

Case study: Abu Zubaydah and the CIA rendition programme

The case of Abu Zubaydah illustrates both the promise and the limitations of strategic human rights litigation in a context sadly marked by secrecy, transnational complicity, and enduring impunity. Following 11 September 2001, the United States operated a global system of “black sites” where individuals were detained and subjected to brutal torture.

Traditional avenues, such as criminal investigations in the US, were blocked. It is telling that the first court to acknowledge what happened to Abu Zubaydah was the European Court of Human Rights, which found Poland and Lithuania responsible for their roles in his unlawful detention and ill-treatment, recognising state complicity and ordering compensation. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognised his detention as arbitrary. Various mechanisms were employed. Although each was just a piece of the puzzle, together they revealed a system intentionally designed to evade the law.

Has this litigation “succeeded”? By conventional standards, the answer is sobering. Abu Zubaydah remains in detention; no one who designed or maintained that system, or tortured him, has been prosecuted. Yet, thanks to this litigation, the programme’s secrecy has been pierced. Compensation holds both symbolic and material significance. A detailed historical record now exists to inform public memory and future policy decisions.

Professor Duffy highlighted the interplay between law and other modes of expression, such as advocacy, journalism, and “artivism”. For Abu Zubaydah, whose voice is tightly controlled, artwork has become a means of communicating with the world. It serves as another reminder that justice extends beyond the courtroom and that storytelling is powerful.

Beyond the judgment: power, protest, and perseverance

If we steer away from a binary win-or-lose vision, we can better see strategic human rights litigation as a contribution to collective agency. Communities often know that a single case will not solve entrenched problems such as poverty, discrimination, and structural violence. Litigation can nonetheless name harms and acknowledge experiences. Strategic litigation is a tool which, combined with social movements, cultural work, and policy advocacy, can reframe debates, protect space for dissent, and sustain hope in difficult times. As two survivors put it, one a Gazan applicant at the European Court of Human Rights, another a torture survivor from Argentina – litigation can be “a form of resistance”, “a form of protest”, and a source of “courage to keep fighting”.

Strategic litigation and the call for reflective, impact-focused legal practice

Strategic human rights litigation serves as a reminder that the pursuit of justice is not merely a goal to be achieved, but rather an ongoing, dynamic process. It is characterised by its iterative nature, involving continuous refinement, and reflects our inherently imperfect humanity. As I listened to Professor Duffy, I was reminded that a couple of days earlier I delivered a lecture to our Year 2 LLB students on the Student Lawyer module, urging them to engage critically with the interrelationship between law and society, not only considering the broader impact that laws exert on society but also the influence of society on the law.

College of Business and Law Research Showcase 2025

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This week, the College of Business and Law hosted a research showcase bringing colleagues together under UWE Bristol’s RISE Beacon ‘Enriching Culture, Place and Community’. In his welcome address, Professor Andrew Simpson, Interim Dean for Research and Enterprise and Dean and Head of the Bristol Business School, stressed the relevance of this Beacon to the research conducted within the College. He also pointed out that the broad range of topics reflected how much “we care about the community we live in” and the researchers’ desire to make a positive impact on the private and public sectors. 


The event featured rapid five-minute presentations across two panels. It was designed to foster collaboration and share research findings. Its intention was also to give researchers the opportunity to practice communicating projects concisely and clearly, a skill vital to making research accessible and understandable to the general public.

Panel 1: From responsibility to resilience: leadership, community and social transformation

The first panel explored leadership, responsibility and how communities navigate social transformation.

Marketing and psychology: bridging the gap between practice and academia

Dr Tom Bowden-Green opened with his work on marketing psychology and how individual differences shape people’s responses to marketing. He shared insights on social proof, his forthcoming book and the growing interest in turning this knowledge into revenue and commercial training.

Disqualification of directors and education requirements: supporting responsible directorship

Dr Neeti Shikha highlighted the pressures faced by UK company directors who have no formal training despite significant legal responsibilities. Her research uses behavioural economics to explore how targeted education could improve decision-making and reduce over-confidence, especially during periods of financial distress.

Enriching communities: leadership, liminality and liquidity

Professor Gareth Edwards drew on his book Community as Leadership to explore what we mean by community and the interaction between leadership and community. In this context, he stressed the importance of ethics, culture and place for communities. He emphasised the value of linking curiosity-driven and applied research and shared new conversations emerging from international partners.

Fostering community-led problem-solving

Dr Kay Galpin, Professor Carol Jarvis and Professor Hugo Gaggiotti presented a HEIF-funded project working with local authorities to trial new ‘design-thinking’ approaches that place residents, particularly under-represented groups, at the centre of service design. The aim is to shift power dynamics and embed empathy in decision-making despite resource pressures.

Informing justice – the Windrush scandal

Tamara Rundle, Associate Professor Rachel Wood and Professor Gerhard Kemp introduced research on the Windrush scandal. With many elder members of the Windrush community still without status and facing a difficult compensation system, the team is drawing on learning from international justice processes to inform the ongoing People’s Inquiry. Ms Rundle also reflected on the emotional weight of the work and the need for wider public storytelling.

Content creators and social media influencers’ mental health, wellbeing, and job performance

Dr Moya Lerigo-Sampson presented research on the mental health of influencers and content creators. Interviews show blurred boundaries between online and offline life and constant pressure to remain visible. The team is also exploring how digital communities can either support or strain wellbeing.

Panel 2: Justice, inclusion and lived experience: research for social change

The second panel focused on social justice and inclusion across policing, family law, higher education and public events.

Evaluating police responses to sexual violence against sex workers; reflections on multi-agency partnership working, problem solving and co-production

Associate Professor Duncan McPhee discussed a collaborative project with Gwent Police to understand police responses to violence against sex workers. Trust-building was central to the work, which included joint meetings, workshops and a major conference supported by HEIF funding.

Peace for children in our time? Why we need to increase our understanding of domestic abuse and work together

Emma Whewell highlighted the shocking statistic that one in five children experience domestic abuse, often with long-term effects on behaviour and wellbeing. She stressed that domestic abuse is frequently misunderstood, including within the judicial system. Her work has led to the creation of a new advisory group and training for judges and social workers.

The impact of hybrid working on Black women academics: productivity and visibility in post-COVID higher education

Dr Tinkuma Edafioghor shared findings from interviews with Black women academics navigating hybrid working post-Covid. Many described the pressure to hold everything together which feeds into the stereotype of ‘the strong back woman’ and managing cultural expectations and the challenges of visibility and career progression.

Deaf legal studies: how law understands, or fails to understand, deaf people

Dr Rob Wilks introduced his emerging field of Deaf Legal Studies, which explores how law often operates in ways that disadvantage deaf people. His work spans equality law, bilingual education and a recently launched Deaf Legal Association. He described the law as often ‘audist’ and emphasised the need for frameworks rooted in lived experience of deaf people.

Missing migrants: the psychosocial implications for their surviving families through the lens of Kübler-Ross’s five-stagemodel of grief

Dr Luke Eda presented research on families of missing migrants and how they navigate grief of their loved ones in ambiguous circumstances and with no closure. Using Kübler-Ross’s five-stage model, he explores how relatives find meaning and cope with ongoing uncertainty.

Making outdoor events more inclusive

Clare MacKay and Dr Ed Little closed the panel with research carried out on the experiences of people with dietary requirements at outdoor events. Feelings of anxiety and exclusion were common. The team’s work has influenced event organisers and attracted interest from industry press and festivals seeking to improve inclusion.

Future showcases coming up…

The showcase highlighted the breadth of applied and socially engaged research across the College. From director training to festival food, and from digital wellbeing to justice for Windrush families, the projects reflect RISE’s aim to enrich communities and support positive change.

For details of future showcases contact Sarah-Louise Weller or Noelle Quenivet.

Launch of Taxation, Human Rights and Sustainable Development: Global South Perspectives

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The Research in Public International Law Group (RIPIL) of Bristol Law School (UWE), in collaboration with the International, Environmental and Human Rights Research Cluster at the University of Derby, recently hosted a hybrid launch event for Taxation, Human Rights and Sustainable Development: Global South Perspectives (2025: Routledge). The event brought together leading scholars to discuss the themes and contributions of this new edited collection.

The session was opened by Dr Eghosa Ekhator, Associate Professor of International Environmental Law at the University of Derby, who introduced the aims and significance of the book.

This book examines how human rights can help shape fairer tax systems and support sustainable development in the Global South. Drawing lessons from countries across the Global South, the book explores how human rights ideas can guide the design of effective tax systems. It also argues for including human rights and sustainable development considerations in tax policies and laws.

Keynote speaker Professor Damilola S. Olawuyi SAN:

Professor Olawuyi delivered the keynote address, offering insights into how the book explains the links between tax systems, economic development and environmental sustainability. By focusing on the Global South, particularly Africa, the book provides a timely and necessary contribution to global debates on fairness, governance and sustainable development.

Professor Gerhard Kemp:

Professor Kemp, sustainability lead for UWE Bristol Law School, discussed how the complex issues of taxation, human rights and sustainability can be integrated into the law curriculum, noting that the book is a helpful guide and a valuable resource for research-led curriculum design. Kemp also connected the book’s central theme to current international priorities, including the G20’s theme for 2025: Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability.

Professor Chrispas Nyombi:

Professor Nyombi spoke about the book’s introduction, stating that it opens with a clear overview by the editors, who show the connection between taxation, human rights and sustainable development as a key area of study (Ekhator, Richards & Onyejekwe, p. 1). They argue that taxation is not just a way to raise money but an important tool for governments to meet their social and economic responsibilities. This perspective is especially important in the Global South, where the effects of colonialism and past economic exploitation have created inequalities that persist today.

Dr Adaeze Okoye:

Dr Okoye addressed the themes of the book, stating:

“Overall, the book presents many unique chapters that share the theme of tax and sustainable development. This book could be very helpful for teaching in these areas. Importantly, it fills a research gap by including Global South voices on tax, fiscal policy and human rights, using the language of sustainable development. Several of the themes in this book would be essential reading for government actors as they balance taxation with building infrastructure, promoting digital inclusion, responding to global organisations and meeting local needs. It serves as important reading for understanding tax and sustainable development and offers practical ideas that could help guide future policy.”

A thoughtful and inspiring discussion

Across the session, speakers explored how tax laws and policies can both shape and be shaped by human rights and why integrating human rights principles into tax governance is essential for achieving sustainable development. The conversation also highlighted the responsibilities of governments, the role of international standards and the importance of taxpayer trust and participation.

Closing reflections

Co-editor Dr Chisa Onyejekwe closed the event with her reflections on the discussions:

“We are grateful to all the editors, speakers and participants who contributed to a rich and stimulating event. The reviews and discussion highlighted the idea that human rights should play an important role in how governments raise revenue and design tax systems. For countries in the Global South, it should be an obligation to consider human rights in their tax policies and legislation, as they need a sustainable revenue source to meet their social and economic responsibilities, of which tax revenue is one.”

About the book

Taxation, Human Rights and Sustainable Development: Global South Perspectives looks at the relationship between human rights and taxation, showing how tax policies can either help or hinder human rights and what this means for sustainable development.

Using examples from countries across the Global South, the book highlights the benefits of including human rights in tax laws and governance. It covers topics such as compliance, redistribution, e-commerce, tax havens and the roles of key stakeholders in shaping fair and sustainable tax systems.

The book is recommended for researchers and practitioners working in law, human rights, taxation, governance and development.

How effective are Rights of Nature in further protecting whales?

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From the inter- and intra-generational equity perspective (current and future generations)

Auriane Boileau, LLM student 2025

Amid growing momentum for ocean conservation, the movement to recognise the Rights of Nature is expanding and whales are part of it. By recognising and respecting the Rights of Nature, one has the power to shift the direction humanity is taking the planet Earth, for both current and future generations.

Annually 300,000 whales are killed as bycatch1, with fishing gear ingestion a leading cause in the United Kingdom.2 While Japan, Norway and Iceland continue to hunt whales despite a global ban on commercial whaling. Legal experts, scientists, policy-makers and ocean advocates should rethink environmental governance, analyse international legal gaps and propose stronger compliance mechanisms.

By integrating the Rights of Nature, whale species ought to be recognised as sentient beings with legal standing. This approach means that a treaty reform to protect oceanic life as a core responsibility to future generations is required.

Are current international legal frameworks effective enough in protecting whales in the context of future generations’ rights?


The international legal framework for whale protection has undergone a remarkable transformation, shifting from sustaining commercial exploitation to prioritising conservation.3

The foundation era (1946–1970s) was established through the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), which evolved from managing whale stocks4 to implementing a comprehensive ban on commercial whaling5 through the 1982 International Whaling Commission moratorium.6

The framework’s effectiveness is strengthened by complementary regulatory instruments, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provisions for marine mammals’ protection;7 the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora listing many endangered or threatened whale species under Appendix I;8 and core regulatory mechanisms such as whale sanctuaries in the Indian and Southern Oceans and an extensive global network of Marine Protected areas.9

Nevertheless, this effectiveness remains constrained by the systematic exploitation of legal loopholes and exemptions on aboriginal subsistence and scientific whaling under Article VIII of the ICRW.10 As demonstrated by the International Court of Justice’s 2014 ruling on Japan’s JARPA II program,11 pro-whaling nations continue operations despite international prohibitions.12 Such compliance failures exacerbate the scarcity of robust enforcement mechanisms within the institutional frameworks.13

Although the international legal framework has successfully reached global consensus on whale conservation, future effectiveness resides in a revised treaty on whaling, aligned with the Rights of Nature movement, to enhance compliance and strengthen enforcement mechanisms.

Whales and the Rights of Nature – toward legal recognition and protection for the benefit of current and future generations


Transitioning towards international legal frameworks on environmental conservation creates opportunities to integrate innovative juridical mechanisms that merge immediate environmental protection through the Rights of Nature movement and advocate for long-term stewardship via the intergenerational equity perspective.

As such, this convergence enables the establishment of dual guardianship systems, where ecological guardians advocate for Nature’s intrinsic rights14 and temporal guardians represent future generations’ interests. Thereby transcending traditional anthropocentric limitations.

Successful precedents include Ecuador’s constitutional commitment to make citizenship coexist with Nature and enforce its rights judicially and New Zealand’s Te Awa Tupua Act granting legal personhood to the Whanganui River through appointed guardianship representation.15 Additionally, while Indigenous Māori and Pacific leaders called for whale legal personhood before the 2023 United Nations General Assembly, the He Whakaputanga Moana Treaty recognised whales as legal persons under international and indigenous frameworks.16

Academics have proven whales’ high intelligence capacity, often qualified as ‘self-conscious beings who can plan, hope and reflect on goals’, making them of primary moral concern.17

Nevertheless, while the Rights of Nature radically shift away from human-centred interests, the movement faces structural limitations as it still operates within human-created legal systems.18

The doubted effectiveness resides within weak legal enforcement, political corruption and regulatory captures that would persist under Rights of Nature frameworks unless directly addressed through coherent legal systems and strict monitoring.19

Way Forward


An improved future requires undertaking transformative legal reforms in whale conservation frameworks. Key measures include granting legal standing to guardians to represent whales’ intrinsic rights, strengthening existing legal regimes with Rights of Nature and intergenerational principles for better enforcement and accountability. Also supporting a United Nations resolution for a permanent commercial whaling ban alongside a “Declaration for the Rights of Whales”.

Innovative governance models are needed to reflect whales’ migratory and borderless nature. This involves mechanisms for documenting whales’ rights breaches, incorporating ecosystem-based management into decision-making processes and adopting adaptive approaches that evolve with scientific understanding.

Unlike territorially grounded natural entities, whales’ migratory status challenges traditional Rights of Nature frameworks. To ensure generational equity, domestic laws should embed Rights of Nature principles with clear compliance timelines. Internationally, whale rights must align with the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Agreement,20 recognising whales as part of the global commons and deserving transboundary protection.

This blog post expands on the author’s legal research project supervised by Dr. Onita Das, submitted in 2025.21

References

[1] International Whaling Commission, ‘The Bycatch Mitigation Initiative – Bycatch’ (IWC, 2025). ↩︎

[2] BBC News, ‘Hundreds of Whales Stranded on Scottish Island’ (BBC, 3 January 2020); Seaspiracy (dir Ali Tabrizi, Netflix 2021) 01:01:15. ↩︎

[3] International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (adopted 2 December 1946, entered into force 10 November 1948) 161 UNTS 72 (Preamble); P Birnie, ‘The Role of Developing Countries in Nudging the International Whaling Commission from Regulating Whaling to Encouraging Nonconsumptive Uses of Whales’ (1985) 12 Ecology L Q 939. ↩︎

[4] Birnie (n 3) 939; M Fitzmaurice, ‘The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and International Whaling Commission – Conservation or Preservation – Can the Gordian Knot Be Cut (or Untangled)?’ (2013) 5 Yearbook of Polar Law 459-461; C Pinon Carlarne, ‘Saving the Whales in the New Millenium: International Institutions, Recent Developments and the Future of International Whaling Policies’ (2005) 24 Va Env’l L J 32-33, 41. ↩︎

[5] Fitzmaurice (n 4) 473-474. ↩︎

[6] AE Boyle, C Redgwell and PW Birnie, Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell’s International Law and the Environment (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2021) 765. ↩︎

[7] Boyle et al (n 6) 750-751, 764; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3, Articles 65, 120, 194(5). ↩︎

[8] Fitzmaurice (n 4) 472; Birnie (n 3) 947; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (adopted 3 March 1973, entered into force 1 July 1975) 993 UNTS 243, Appendix I. ↩︎

[9] Boyle et al (n 6) 765; Fitzmaurice (n 4) 476; K Grorud-Colvert K et al, ‘The MPA Guide: A Framework to Achieve Global Goals for the Ocean’ (2021) 373 Science (American Association for the Advancement of Science) 1. ↩︎

[10] Fitzmaurice (n 4) 466-467, 473-474, 477; R Wichert and MC Nussbaum, ‘Scientific Whaling? The Scientific Research Exception and the Future of the International Whaling Commission’ (2017) 18 Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 360. ↩︎

[11] Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening) (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Rep 226. ↩︎

[12] See Boyle et al (n 6) 765; Pinon Carlarne (n 4) 45-46; M Mangel, ‘Whales, Science, and Scientific Whaling in the International Court of Justice’ (2016) 113 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences – PNAS 14525; R Wichert and MC Nussbaum (n 10) 360. ↩︎

[13] Pinon Carlarne (n 4) 45-46. ↩︎

[14] M Bender and R Bustamante, ‘Reimagining Fishing in the Anthropocene Through a Rights of Nature Lens’ (2024) 15 JHRE 163. ↩︎

[15] Ibid 165. ↩︎

[16] C Rodríguez-Garavito, DF Gruber, A Nemeth and G Beguš, ‘What If We Understood What Animals Are Saying? The Legal Impact of AI-Assisted Studies of Animal Communication’ (2025) 52(1) Ecology L Q 47. ↩︎

[17] PS Elder, ‘Legal Rights for Nature – the Wrong Answer to the Right(s) Question’ (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L J 290. ↩︎

[18] J Bétaille, ‘Rights of Nature: Why It Might Not Save the Entire World’ (2019) 16 JEEPL 54, 57-58. ↩︎

[19] Ibid 63. ↩︎

[20] Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (adopted 19 June 2023, not yet in force) UN Doc A/CONF.232/2023/4. ↩︎

[21] This blog post therefore refers to the state of the law as of early September 2025. ↩︎

Nuremberg Principles and Ukraine: Contemporary Challenges to Peace, Security and Justice

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On 5 November 2025, the Bristol Law School’s Research in Public International Law (RIPIL) group hosted a hybrid workshop and roundtable discussion exploring the continuing relevance of the Nuremberg Principles in the context of the war in Ukraine and other conflicts. Professor Gerhard Kemp, group lead for RIPIL, welcomed the local and international audience and noted that it is the second RIPIL event (and book discussion) for the new academic year, with more to come.

More than 40 international law scholars and academics joined the discussion, both in person and online, representing universities and research centres from the UK, Europe, Africa, Asia and North America, highlighting the global relevance of the Nuremberg Principles today.

As the Russian invasion continues to raise urgent questions of justice and accountability, the principles established at Nuremberg 80 years ago remain a cornerstone of international law. This workshop centred on the recently published volume Nuremberg Principles and Ukraine: The Contemporary Challenges to Peace, Security and Justice (Bloomsbury 2025), edited by Marshall J. Breger and Herbert R. Reginbogin. The book brings together leading international law scholars to examine themes including accountability for the crime of aggression, genocide, the abduction of Ukrainian children, the destruction of cultural heritage and the ongoing evolution of international criminal justice.

Keynote reflections

The keynote was delivered by Professor Herbert R. Reginbogin, Collegiate Law Fellow at The Catholic University of America and co-editor of Nuremberg Principles and Ukraine: The Contemporary Challenges to Peace, Security and Justice. He opened by paying tribute to a late colleague and co-editor of the book whose dedication to justice continues to inspire current efforts in international law.

Professor Reginbogin spoke about the determination of Ukrainian lawyers and researchers working tirelessly to uphold the rule of law prevails and ensure that accountability mechanisms are (set up) and used. He emphasised that the Nuremberg Principles, rejecting impunity for international crimes and immunity for officials,  remain as relevant today as ever, particularly as a new mechanism for prosecuting aggression is being developed in The Hague. He also reminded us of the importance of maintaining the credibility of international courts and of ensuring that they continue to operate in a transparent manner. He also addressed the challenges of corruption and governance within Ukraine, framing the pursuit of accountability as “a commitment to the future” and a necessary step in confronting the difficult questions that accompany war and occupation.

Panel discussion

  • Dr Viviane Dittrich (Deputy Director, International Nuremberg Principles Academy, Germany) reflected on the lasting legacy of the Nuremberg Trials and their ongoing relevance in international law. She emphasised the importance of holding instigators of war accountable, citing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a reminder of the need for justice. She closed by paying tribute to Benjamin B. Ferencz, whose motto “Law not War” continues to inspire new generations of legal scholars and practitioners.
  • Professor Stefanie Bock (Philipps University of Marburg, Germany) reflected on the ongoing importance of holding perpetrators of war crimes to account. After emphasising that the Nuremberg Principles have been fully embraced by the German Code of Crimes against International Law, she explained that Germany is currently undertaking structural investigations into international crimes committed in the conflict in Ukraine but has yet to charge anyone..
  • Dr Saeed Bagheri (University of Reading) examined the often-overlooked ‘ecocide’ and environmental dimensions of armed conflict, highlighting the severe ecological damage caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine – from polluted rivers and destroyed soil to the collapse of critical infrastructure. He argued that such harm raises urgent questions about how international law defines and prosecutes environmental crimes in wartime.
  • Professor Noëlle Quénivet (UWE Bristol) explored the Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, highlighting the rigorous legal thinking underpinning its development and addressing misconceptions about its structure and purpose. In particular, she discussed some of the most controversial elements, i.e. its legitimacy, especially as it is set in a European context, and selectivity as well as the immunity given to some officials.
  • Dr Caleb Wheeler (Cardiff University) discussed the complexities of the right to a fair trial when the accused is absent. He noted that while defendants can voluntarily waive their presence, holding a trial entirely in their absence is controversial. Drawing on Nuremberg precedents, he emphasised the need for proper notice and legal representation, warning that without these safeguards, trials risk producing further injustices.

Discussion and closing remarks

The workshop concluded with a roundtable that brought together these diverse perspectives, highlighting the complexities of accountability, justice and human rights in times of conflict. Speakers examined the design and rigour of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, the environmental dimensions of war, and the safeguards required to ensure fair trials.

Reflecting on the challenges discussed, Professor Herbert Reginbogin remarked:

“What happens to human rights when war begins? This is the question we, as academics and practitioners, must confront.”

The discussion underscored the ongoing relevance of the Nuremberg Principles and the vital role of scholarship in navigating the evolving landscape of international law. Dr Luke Eda, Senior Lecturer in Law at UWE Bristol, closed the workshop by thanking participants for their contributions to a timely and engaging dialogue. The event demonstrated RIPIL’s commitment to fostering informed debate and research on the legal and moral challenges of contemporary conflict.

To learn more about research and future events, visit Research in Public International Law (RIPIL).

UWE Academics Analyse televised sentencing of criminal courts

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Tom Smith, Marcus Keppel-Palmer (both Law), Sally Reardon and Bernhard Gross (both Journalism) recently published their initial analysis of the first 12 months of televised sentencing of criminal courts in England and Wales. Since July 2022, sentencing remarks by judges in Crown Court criminal trials have been filmed and broadcast; yet, despite Government comments lauding this major shift in access to courts, there has yet to be any official evaluation of the benefits, which have been assumed without question. As such, the UWE research team sought to analyse the first year of broadcasting (covering the period July 2022 to July 2022), assessing the types of cases televised and their media usage, with the aim of exploring whether this has in fact contributed to the principle of open justice in a meaningful way.

Overall, they concluded that – notwithstanding any theoretical benefits – the broadcasts offer a unique but limited view of the workings of criminal courts, falling short of the advancements claimed by some officials. Only 33 cases were filmed and uploaded to the ‘Sky News – Courts’ YouTube channel (the public repository for broadcasts), a small fraction of the total number of eligible cases in the first year. Moreover, this low number wasn’t due to refusals to allow filming; broadcast media made only 34 requests to broadcast, with one rejection by a court, indicating a highly selective approach to reporting (akin to the traditional visibility of physical courts through media reporting).

Broadcast cases generally involved extremely serious violence, with two-thirds being homicides, and victims mainly young or elderly. The researchers argue that this significantly skews the potential of broadcasting towards traditional news values (which focus on extreme and sensational crime); and failing to reflect the reality of most criminality, with implications for public understanding and awareness. Additionally, the argument that the public’s understanding of the actual processes of justice would be improved by broadcasting is questionable; only sentencing remarks were filmed, omitting most aspects of criminal justice processes (such as the trial itself) and excluding Magistrates’ Courts – where most crime is dealt with.

Overall, the researchers suggest that broadcasting hasn’t significantly expanded open justice. The portrayal of crime and sentencing remains focused on severe cases and lifelong imprisonment, ignoring common crimes like intimate partner violence, theft, assault, white-collar crimes, and drug offences. Of the 33 cases filmed, over half were not used in TV news bulletins, and only eight appeared in this key conduit for public awareness of current events. Usage of filmed footage by broadcast media was generally minimal, with excerpts often being short clips that failed to provide context, despite often lengthy sentencing remarks by judges. The media have therefore maintained a traditional approach to reporting on criminal courts, using brief clips with graphic descriptions and emotive language. YouTube views were modest, with only two videos surpassing 100,000 views, questioning the true expansion of open justice.

While broadcasts theoretically reveal previously unseen processes and are publicly accessible, their limited and selective nature restricts their impact. Cases selected for broadcast were similar to those covered using traditional methods, arguably doing little to enhance public understanding and engage interest in criminal proceedings in a realistic and representative manner. The researchers therefore concluded that future expansion in broadcasting – which seems inevitable – must go beyond merely changing the medium, and meaningfully extend open justice to truly reflect the reality of crime and justice processes.

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