Course Connect partnership with LexisNexis Risk Solutions

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The Course Connect partnership between LexisNexis Risk Solutions and the University of the West of England (UWE) is an academia-industry collaboration that aims to bring together cutting-edge academic knowledge with leading commercial practice, for the mutual benefit of students, academics, researchers and practitioners. We caught up with Professor Nic Ryder to find out more.

What’s the aim of this partnership?

It’s a platform, in essence, for information and knowledge sharing. A formal partnership like this one makes it a great deal easier to share thinking and analysis of financial crime and compliance, financial risk management and anti-money laundering regulation, between organisations, for the benefit of both sides.

How does each side benefit?

Working with industry partners allows us access to valuable resources we’d otherwise not have. From real life case studies that can be implemented into the curriculum, to offering students the opportunity to work with the latest commercial information, trends and practices, as if they were already operating in the industry. This is not only highly motivating for them, but puts them in the driving seat following graduation. With support from commercial partners, we can set students in-depth challenges that often develop into dissertation projects, student internships and placements where they gain first-hand work experience.

In return, LNRS gains access to fresh insights and a rich seam of graduate talent they can offer placements and evaluate their potential for full-time employment opportunities, in many cases making an offer after the placement ends. LNRS also benefits from first-hand access to academic expertise and cutting-edge research outputs which can develop into webinars and round table style events that marry the academia and commercial worlds and provide a platform for healthy and insightful debate of current trends and topics surrounding the financial crime and compliance industry. Students input into these debates is a great way to identify what the future experts in these fields think.

How important is industry collaboration in preparing graduates for the practical experiences they will face in industry?

UWE prides itself on providing students with the opportunity to study commercially-relevant subject areas where career paths are quite clear. We work closely with the commercial sector on embedded placements (sandwich years), consultation projects where students are set real-life industry challenges to solve, guest lectures from industry experts, and others – all opportunities for students to better understand how the theory they learn in class translates into the real world.

What does success look like for this partnership?

Success is long-term partnership resulting in a plethora of opportunities for both UWE Bristol and LNRS to work together. That can range from straightforward guest lectures, to student projects, competitions and dissertation projects, all the way through to internship opportunities that ultimately lead to graduate employment. As academics, we’re ultimately focussed on preparing these young people for their career

How many other course connect partnerships do you run?

We have 20 partnerships at present with a mix of public and private sector organisations ranging from large nationals like Lloyds Banking Group and Enterprise Rent-A-Car, to local and regional SMEs.

What do your other partners think of this process?

“We want young people to get a great start to their working life, sharing our experiences, knowledge and skills is a great way to make that happen. This approach supports our own organisational drive to ‘Help Britain Prosper.’” Lloyds Banking Group

“We are genuinely excited about the opportunity to share knowledge and learn from each other.” Nationwide

“This initiative… promises institution-wide recognition of our brand, as well as offering an opportunity to address known skills gaps in our industry.” Enterprise Rent-A Car

What does the future hold?

It’s important to see this as an evolving partnership. This first year is very much a ‘toe in the water’ for both sides, allowing us to understand what activities we are comfortable collaborating on and what won’t work for us. As time progresses, we very much hope that the relationship will develop to offer a much greater variety of activities and benefits for both sides.

Get involved. Contact us at courseconnect@uwe.ac.uk.

One Planet Development in Wales: A Sustainable Future?

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Written by Rachel Kelway-Lewis, LLM and member of the Environmental Law and Sustainability Research Group

The Institute of Public Policy Research[1] of UK has urged that ‘the historical disregard of environmental considerations in most areas of policy has been a catastrophic mistake’[2] which suggests that policy, in many instances, is failing to protect the environment. Thus, as international obligations prioritises the need for policy to promote sustainability[3] it seems necessary to begin analysing the policies which claim to do so.

One Planet Development

The Welsh Assembly Government has created the One Planet Development policy[4] (hereafter referred to as OPD) with the objective of adhering to global sustainable development targets. The OPD policy aims to encourage individuals, families and co-operatives alike to create residential developments that are either low impact, or do not significantly degrade the environment.[5] Such developments are required to meet 65% of the residents’ basic needs from the land within the first five years, including income, energy and food. The mere creation of such a policy could be deemed an achievement, however in practice, the policy appears to be facing some challenges.

OPD Challenges

The flow chart below identifies the key concerns challenging the policy’s implementation, and classifies the concerns as legal, non-legal, and procedural. The flow chart visualises the issues, the result of the issues and, the underlying constraint.

It is evident that the content of OPD policy[6] has the potential to intrinsically meet all three pillars of sustainable development (i.e., economic, social and environmental), however implementation related challenges may be restricting this. Research suggests that there is a resource deficiency within local planning authorities which is affecting the policy’s implementation from planning applications to monitoring OPD settlements’ progress. Thus, the policy cannot be successful without additional resources or a change in the policy’s specifications.[7] Despite efforts to support participants through the application process[8] as well as training being offered to planning authorities specifically for OPD developments,[9] there remains a gap which has not been addressed. Demands upon local planning authorities are likely to grow and exceed their capacity.[10] Furthermore, without addressing the challenges, the OPD is unlikely to achieve its’ objectives thus, will not promote the aims of ‘One Wales: One Planet’.[11]

Moving forward

The following reforms have been suggested to ensure that the solutions are feasible, ranging from providing mandatory online training to reducing the reporting obligations of established OPDs. Whilst these reforms are focused upon accessible improvements to the OPD policy, long-term reform is essential.

  • Community land trust

The Calon Cymru report identified the challenges associated with funding and finding suitable land due to increased prices.[12] Thus, the short-term reform suggestion to promote community land trusts is based upon a successful case in London[13] and more recently, the prospective plan to establish the first Welsh community land trusts in Solva, Pembrokeshire.[14] Furthermore, by creating community land trusts partnerships with housing associations such as Ateb[15] and ceiling prices on land for such projects, funds and prices could be more accessible. Such reform could benefit the community, promote UN Sustainable Development Goals 11,[16] the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act[17] and the ‘Improving lives and Communities, homes in Wales’ scheme[18] throughout Wales. 

  • Public Transport

The long-term regional reform of improving public transport links within rural Wales could result in additional suitable land being accessible for such projects. Such improvements could also support many of Wales’ objectives at all levels, from the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act[19] to the Paris Agreement[20] and UN Sustainable Development Goals 11.2.[21]

  • Low carbon building

Nationally, more must be done to promote accessible, low-carbon building. This could be achieved by mainstreaming environmentally conscious building methods and utilising training programmes to educate trades people. Furthermore, the establishment of ‘green mortgage’ can promote and incentivise low-carbon building for the public as seen in the Netherlands.[22]

Concluding comments

The fundamental constraint identified is a lack of resources, the impact of which is significant. Challenges associated with the resource deficiency range from inconsistent implementation[23] to failures of OPD settlements to submit reports.[24] The policy will require additional funding to meet its objectives, however in the short-term practical solutions could elevate the strain. Such reforms have been discussed to ensure that the solutions are feasible. Whilst the suggestions are focused upon accessible improvements to the OPD policy, long-term reform is essential specifically with regards to the resource deficiency.

This article is a brief summary of a document titled ‘One Planet Development: a sustainable future? A critical analysis of whether the One Planet Development Policy promotes the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 11 (Sustainable communities)’ which has been published by Lammas.


[1] Institute for public policy research, ‘This is a crisis facing up to the age of environmental breakdown’, Institute for Public Policy Research, February 2019, available at: https://www.ippr.org/files/2019-02/risk-and-environment-feb19.pdf

[2] Ibid.

[3] United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2012 (New York, 2012).

[4] Welsh Assembly Government, ‘Technical Advice note 6’ (Planning for sustainable rural communities, July 2010), available at: https://gov.wales/docs/desh/policy/100722tan6en.pdf

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] One Planet Council, ‘The One Planet Council’ (Supporting One Planet Developments, no-date), available at: http://www.oneplanetcouncil.org.uk/about-the-one-planet-council/

[9] Welsh Assembly Government, ‘Technical Advice note 6’ (Planning for sustainable rural communities, July 2010), available at: https://gov.wales/docs/desh/policy/100722tan6en.pdf

[10] BBC, ‘Put a stop to eco-homes being built, says councillor’, BBC news, 29 April 2019. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-48084556

[11] Welsh Assembly Government, ‘The Sustainable Development Scheme of the Welsh Assembly Government’ (One Wales: One Planet, May 2009), available at: http://www.wales.nhs.uk/sitesplus/documents/829/One%20Wales-%20One%20Planet%20%282009%29.pdf

[12] Calon Cymru Network, ‘Feasibility of a resilient neighbourhood at Llandovery’ (Affordable Homes and Sustainable Livelihoods in Rural Wales, 2017), available at: http://www.caloncymru.org/uploads/1/4/9/3/14932334/affordablehomessustainablelivelihoodsruralwales.pdf  

[13] Emma Howard, ‘ Could community land trusts offer a solution to the UK’s housing crisis?’ (The Guardian, 25 June 2014), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jun/25/community-land-trusts-uk-housing-crisis-east-london-mile-end

[14] Becky Hotchin, ‘Solva Community Land Trust wins Pembrokeshire County Council second home council tax grant’, The Western Telegraph, 10th October 2020.

[15] Ibid.

[16] United Nations, Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development (New York, 2015) No. A/RES/7011.

[17] Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, available at: https://www.futuregenerations.wales/about-us/future-generations-act/

[18] Gov.wales, ‘Homes in Wales’ (Improving Lives and Communities, 2010), available at: https://gweddill.gov.wales/docs/desh/publications/100421housingstrategyen.pdf  

[19] Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, available at: https://www.futuregenerations.wales/about-us/future-generations-act/

[20] The Paris Agreement (2015), available at: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement

[21] United Nations, SDG 11: Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable, available at: https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/cities/

[22] UK Committee on Climate Change, ‘UK housing: Fit for the future?’ (2019), available at: https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/uk-housing-fit-for-the-future/

[23] Louise Kulbicki, ‘Does Welsh National Planning Policy effectively address Low Impact Development in the open countryside?’ (2011) 6. Available at: http://lammas.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Does_Welsh_National_Planning_Policy_effectively_address_Low_Impact_Development_in_the_open_countryside_Louise_Kulbicki_2011.pdf

[24] BBC, ‘Put a stop to eco-homes being built, says councillor’, BBC news, 29 April 2019. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-48084556

Rights redacted – a global view

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By Ezinwa Awogu – BA philosophy graduate, current GDL Law student at UWE Bristol and aspiring solicitor 

With the UK’s announcement of approval for the Pfizer vaccine, a cautious sense of hope and optimism has been restored as the public dares to envision an end to a year rife with uncertainty and confusion. However, as technology and science leap forward in their red capes as the saviours of the day, democracy around the globe takes several staggering steps back. A combination of draconian restriction implementation, global confusion, economic downfall and, widespread fear, has created the perfect storm for abuse of power and democratic regress to take place throughout the world. Under the thick cover of chaos, oppressive legislation and disgraceful abuses of power have been able to take place largely un-reported. Due to the unrelenting dominance that COVID-19 has wielded over the news headlines this year, regressions and oppressions have been able to thrive, unchallenged by the usual scrutiny of the public eye.

According to this year’s annual global report on political rights and civil liberties from Freedom House, democracy has worsened in 80 countries so far. Particular areas of decline seem to be freedom of speech, democratic elections (especially in countries declaring a state of emergency), and freedom of religious practice. Whilst true that a lot of false and misleading information was spread about COVID-19 and how to treat it, some governments have used the excuse of limiting inaccurate information to go above and beyond to restrict journalistic rights and push political agendas by silencing anti-government voices. Democratic elections have been postponed or discarded altogether and government opposition parties have been systematically attacked under the excuse of the pandemic.

Earlier this year in Algeria, legislation aimed to reduce media and curtail freedom of expression were reportedly passed with ‘minimal discussion mechanisms’ in parliament. Further to this, the sentencing of three government critics took place in May due to their choice of social media activity. Amongst these was Yacine Mebarki, a pivotal member of the Hirak anti-government protest movement, arrested on September 30th and sentenced to 10 years in prison. An expression of concern has been published by Reporters Without Borders, over the zealous tightening on freedoms of expression in Algeria. However, no change seems imminent, as currently the scheduled Algerian 2020 constitutional referendum has been announced as ‘no longer a priority’ by President Tebboune.

Similarly, according to published interior ministry statements from Turkey, on the 25th of March over 400 people were arrested under charges of ‘provocative’ social media posts concerning the virus. A report by Human Rights Watch four months later in late July displayed evidence suggesting Turkish police involvement in torture and ill-treatment of citizens. In terms of parliamentary democracy, the revocation of status was implemented for three deputies in the opposition party on the 4th of June. All three were then arrested the very next day. Electoral law reformations that may prevent future opposition parties from entering parliament at all are currently under discussion. Should this move forward, it would mean that without opposition in parliament, the government (and legislature passed by the government) goes unchecked and unchallenged, thus, an already fragile democracy suffers another critical blow.

In Hong Kong, The pandemic has been sighted as justification to delay elections by a year, however, this decision is widely viewed as an attempt by Beijing to buy more time to solidify the eradication of certain remaining freedoms and autonomies. In Sri Lanka, the arrest of critics of the official government line of the pandemic has been authorized by Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa. In Nigeria since the start of restriction implementation and curfews, up to 18 people have been killed in the hands of security forces reportedly enforcing COVID-19 restrictions with minimal reported penalties against the individual offending security officers. Meanwhile, the Nigerian democratic by-elections for the senatorial districts in Bayelsa state, Imo state, and Plateau state have been indefinitely postponed with no new date announced. In the USA, although the scheduled presidential elections have taken place, the incumbent Trump administration consistently and embarrassingly attempts to discredit the result of the democratic election in an attempt to cling to a fading political spotlight.

In Russia, a combination of laws implementing drastic penalties on individuals and media organizations who spread ‘knowingly false information’ was approved by President Vladimir Putin, on top of the already existing prohibition of ‘false information’. In practice, however, it would seem that said ‘false information’ happens to include anything that may highlight failings and present criticisms of the government’s handling of COVID-19. Most worryingly, this year’s referendum – originally set for April but rescheduled for the 1st of July – was approved by a 77% majority and includes provision amendments allowing President Putin to remain in power until 2036.

Restrictions on freedom of religion have been more evident this year with instances of faith-based discrimination and religious targeting in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Serbia, and India. In Pakistan COVID -19 has been renamed ‘the Shia virus’ and there have been reports of Christians forced to recite the kalima in order to access help and aid. Hindu communities in Lyari have been rejected from receiving essential rations and Muslims in India have been labelled as “super spreaders” in a bid to use the pandemic as a weapon of religious prosecution.

This is of course simply a snapshot exposing only a fraction of the hidden pandemic of global rights redaction taking place. Fragile democratic advancements – some of which took over a decade or longer to instil – have been swiftly and devastatingly destroyed by opportunistic governments all over the world, using the tragedy of this year as an advantageous edge in disgraceful power-play dynamics. Meanwhile, citizens are stripped of hard-fought rights and left more vulnerable than ever before. As an end to COVID-19 seems to become more of a reality, we must not forget that for many around the globe, things will certainly not return to ‘business as usual’. Perhaps, with the potential of COVID-19 soon no longer dominating the media platform, the scrutiny of the public eye can return to where it is desperately needed most, and assist each of the 80 countries through the steep uphill climb to the restoration of civil liberties and democratic progression.

Useful Reference links

  1. https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/democracy-under-lockdown
  2. https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-democracy-under-lockdown-impact-covid-19-global-freedom
  3. https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices//#/indices/countries-regions-profile?rsc=%5B770%5D&covid19=1
  4. https://www.economist.com/international/2020/10/17/the-pandemic-has-eroded-democracy-and-respect-for-human-rights
  5. https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/malawi-victory-democracy-after-euphoria-long-hard-work
  6. https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/turk-evacuated-sweden-coronavirus-treatment-70361281
  7. https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/10/8/algeria-sentences-activist-to-10-years-for-inciting-atheism

What role can the Ramsar Convention play in protecting Lake Urmia in Iran?

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Written by Siavash Ostovar, Doctoral Student and a member of the Environmental Law and Sustainability Research Group

Lake Urmia located in the north-western part of Iran between the two provinces of East-Azerbaijan and West-Azerbaijan was declared a wetland of international importance by the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance in 1971 and designated a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Biosphere Reserve in 1976. It is also designated as a ‘National Park’ in Iran. The Lake is drying out and it is in its worst condition ever. Over the years, the water level has been declining continuously and there are different reasons causing such degradation.

The direct drivers (i.e., climate change, highway and dam constructions around the Lake, over-exploitation of water) and indirect drivers (i.e., growth of agriculture in the region and inefficient irrigation methods and poor water management) have been considered as the causes of wetlands’ degradation. The shrinking of Lake has also led to detrimental consequences such as climate change in the region, agricultural degradation, threats to human health, migration problems, threats to the tourism industry, threats to flora, fauna and habitats.

Accordingly, my research investigated the effectiveness of the legal regulations of the ecosystem of Lake Urmia. To study the effectiveness of the legal regulation around the Lake Urmia, a complex array of international and national legal provisions which to a large extent converges around the Ramsar Convention were scrutinised. This convention was signed in 1971, in Ramsar City, Iran. The Convention focuses on ‘wetlands’ and how States should ensure their management, conservation and stewardship. Lake Urmia is indeed 722 Km (448 mi) from Ramsar City.[1] The Ramsar Convention is considered the first global agreement to address the conservation and enhancement of wetlands as a particular part of the ecosystem.[2] The Ramsar Convention is the intergovernmental treaty that provides the framework for the conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources.[3] Since 1975, almost 90% of UN member states, from all the world’s geographic regions, have acceded to become ‘Contracting Parties’.[4] UNESCO is responsible for the adoption of the Ramasar Convention and performs secretariat functions.  

In my research, the drying up of Lake Urmia is used as an example to study the weaknesses of the international and national rules and regulations aiming at protecting the environment in general and wetlands in particular. In highlighting the local effects of such a crisis, the thesis argued that there is an urgent need for global action to preserve such essential environmental assets across the world. We all depend on the natural world for our survival, so every environmental degradation becomes a concern touching us all.

In order to investigate the opportunities and challenges to implement the Ramsar Convention in Iran, my research focused on the following concepts and provisions of the Ramsar Convention:

  • Definition of the wetlands (Articles 1 and 2)
  • Listing approach (Article 2)
  • Exclusive sovereign right (Article 2)
  • Wise use (Article 3)
  • Ecological character of wetlands (Article 3)
  • Information exchange (Article 4)
  • Financial resources (Article 6)
  • NGO participation (Articles 7 and 8)

The thesis showed that a successful plan for conservation and sustainable use of Lake Urmia and their resources and for the benefit of present and future generations needs a rigorous study of the current condition of the Lake in combination with an in-depth analysis of their feasibility concerning existing legal, political, administrative constraints. Hence, in Iran, it is crucial to regularly review the national laws on/related to wetlands management, share information between involved legal bodies, designate a competent body to wetlands management, and ensure political support for effective national laws and policies on wetlands.


[1] Behrah , ‘ Ramsar route to Urmia’ ( Behrah ) < http://behrah.com/direction.php?sid=473&did=28>

[2] Sands P and Peel J, ‘Principles of International Environmental Law’ (3rd end, Cambridge University Press 2018) 492-493.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ramsar Secretariat, ‘ About the Ramsar Convention’ ( Ramsar.org 2014) < https://www.ramsar.org/about-the-ramsar-convention>

The contagion of disinformation

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By Ezinwa Awogu – BA philosophy graduate, GDL Law student at UWE Bristol and aspiring solicitor 

More connected than ever, information spreads instantaneously, and amongst that information, none seems to spread quite as viciously as disinformation. To be distinguished from misinformation, disinformation, as defined in 1952 by the great soviet encyclopaedia, is information deliberately designed to spread falsehoods for the deception of the public, usually with an underlining agenda for political, social, or economic gain. Disinformation is often more entertaining, and attention-grabbing than reality, and there it finds its strength over real news. Between the COVID-19 health crisis and the highly influential USA presidential election, we have seen myths, conspiracy theories, and disinformation erupt like wildfires. As the global pandemic has forced increased digitization, a higher rate of IT reliance, and an increased online presence, people are liking, sharing, re-tweeting, and subscribing more and more. The conditions are prime for the contagion of disinformation to spread within the algorithm networks of our social media and news provider outlets.

Battling disinformation in democratic countries is a delicate task, often fraught with debate and controversy. The right of freedom of expression under the common law was incorporated into domestic law in 1998 from the European convention, and the right to freedom of expression (subject to certain formalities, conditions, restrictions, and penalties) was ratified by Article 10 of the Human rights act (1998). Many of these restrictions, however, are intentionally broad and appear to have a high degree of subjectivity making them difficult to apply strictly. This broadness can make it hard to police media content, which on one hand rightly protects freedom of expression but on the other makes it more difficult to identify and combat disinformation. Section 127 of the communications Act (2003) criminalizes the use of an electronic communications network to put out messaging that is ‘grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing character’. However, in practice, enforcement is largely absent, as we all know, offensive and obscene content has flooded electronic communication networks for a long time with few criminal actions brought forward.

COVID-19 conspiracy theories, such as the idea that the virus is part of an elaborate government plan to increase observations and curtail rights, started around January and has culminated in mass no-mask protests with many swearing that the pandemic is fake. Whilst true that the response to the virus has been confusing and unclear on many accounts, the deliberate efforts of some to persist in the spread of conspiracy disinformation works to distract from the reality of the inequalities that the virus had illuminated. Realities such as the disproportionate effect on BAME communities and the worldwide devastating disparities in social welfare and healthcare that the virus has exacerbated are therefore pushed to the wayside with attention-grabbing disinformation headlines taking the spotlight.

The efforts in the summer months by the outgoing Trump administration, amongst other world leaders, to spread disinformation, hailing hydroxychloroquine as a ‘miracle cure’ based on insufficient evidence and inadequate testing, served the political ulterior motive to use hope and optimism as a distraction from criticisms of poor handling of the pandemic. We can see similar attempts to capitalize on the pandemic when we observe the Russian disinformation campaign labelling the Oxford vaccine as the ‘monkey vaccine’ in favour of the Russian vaccine, conspicuously named Sputnik. Most recently, the current saga of electoral fraud claims during the recent USA elections attempts to delegitimize the incoming Biden presidency and stoke the fire for social and political upheaval.

In England and Wales, Law aiding the efficient battle of disinformation is scarce. Ofcom, established under the Communications Act (2003) is a regulatory body set up to enforce certain content standards across TV and radio broadcasting, ensuring accuracy and impartiality, but there is currently no regulatory body set up for social media and online content in the same way, which has become a major source of information communication. There have been proposals to change this, and introduce more regulation and accountability in online platforms, namely in the 2019 Cairncross Review report. Nothing concrete has amounted from this as of yet. Social media outlets have recently been taking it upon themselves, in response to public pressure, to internally implement regulations on the content published on their sights. During the ongoing voter election disinformation campaign, Twitter has been flagging up tweets from outgoing president Donald Trump as misleading. Other popular social media sights such as Facebook and Instagram have displayed instances of some resistance to disinformation, but this has been limited and certainly not widespread enough to effectively battle the contagion of disinformation.

A strong argument can be made in favour of social media giants exercising more of their social responsibility and offering more content regulation. However, constitutional protection of freedom of expression limits the allowance for online content restriction, and admittedly, the more content policing happens, the less freedom is available. Finding the delicate line between personal liberty and public interest is an age-old dilemma that has not appeared to be solved as of yet, so it would seem for the moment that the responsibility lies largely with us the audience. In an age where information is so easily weaponized, it is important to be conscientious consumers with regards to the plethora of information flooding our screens. More than ever, active engagement, independent research, and a degree of critical analysis must be essential activity when choosing which information to accept and which sources to trust. We can no longer afford to be passive recipients of information that may harbor active ulterior agendas.

Useful Reference links

  1. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/technology/donald-trump-twitter.html
  2. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russians-spread-fake-news-over-oxford-coronavirus-vaccine-2nzpk8vrq
  3. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/social-media-disinformation/uk.php
  4. https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zyt282p/revision/2
  5. https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/15/fda-revokes-hydroxychloroquine/
  6. https://www.kcl.ac.uk/investigating-the-most-convincing-covid-19-conspiracy-theories
  7. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/section/127

Is there light at the end of the tunnel?

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Blog by Demelza Hall and Professor Nicholas Ryder

Financial crime is synonymous with the seminal work of Professor Edwin Sutherland who famously and somewhat controversially used the term ‘white collar crime’ in his 1939 presidential lecture to the American Sociological Society.[1] He defined white collar crime as “a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation”.[2] Sutherland concluded that financial crime was committed by “merchant princes and captains of finance and industry” whilst working for a wide range of corporations including those involved in “railways, insurance, munitions, banking, public utilities, stock exchanges, the oil industry [and] real estate”.[3] White collar crime has also been referred to as ‘financial crime’, ‘economic crime’ and ‘illicit finance’.[4] The early interpretation offered by Sutherland has attracted a great deal of debate amongst criminologists and commentators. Some have expressed their support for the definition such as Benson and Simpson,[5] whilst a majority of others have disputed the accuracy of Sutherland’s definition including as Bookman,[6] Podgor,[7] and Freidrichs.[8] Brody and Kiehl concluded that “many scholars continue to redefine and develop a more useful and working definition of the term”.[9]

Whilst commentaries on Sutherland’s definitions have concentrated on crimes committed by individuals who are an employee, representative or agent of a corporation, very few have considered financial crime committed by corporations. Corporations are juridical persons that through the legal process of incorporation are endowed with a legal identity which distinguishes them from its creators. The common law provides that corporations are qualified to breach certain offences under the criminal law largely because of this legal procedure.[10] A number of common law rules have evolved in order to limit disproportionate abuse of power by corporations, including breaches of criminal law.[11] Corporate financial crime has been referred to as a “complex subject on many levels and efforts at strict definitional exactitude rapidly become self-defeating”.[12] The international profile of corporate financial crime has substantially increased during the last past three decades. This is due, in part, to instances of corporate financial crime in the US including ZZZZ Best Cleaners, the Savings and Loans Crisis, the collapse of several large corporations including Enron and WorldCom, the Bernard Madoff Ponzi fraud scheme and the ‘Great Wall Street Rip-Off’. Similarly, the UK has experienced wide scale corporate financial crime including Barlow Clowes International, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Barings Bank, market manipulation by financial institutions and money laundering. It is within this context that this blog comments on the approach towards corporate financial crime in the US and UK and suggests a number of reforms.

The United States of America

The evolution of the doctrine of corporate criminal liability by the US judiciary resulted in the Department of Justice (DoJ) initially prosecuting the employees of corporations and they then moved towards targeting prosecuting corporations. However, this approach culminated in a change of policy following the acquittal of Arthur Andersen, which resulted in the DoJ prioritising Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) as opposed to corporate prosecutions. The appropriateness of DPAs has been questioned in light of the actions of HSBC in December 2012. A DPA is placed on a corporation when it is under investigation for breaching the law for a set period of time, acting as a contractual agreement between that corporation and financial regulatory or government agency. The offending corporation is required to pay a fine, cooperate with the investigating agencies, illustrate good conduct and improve its internal corporate governance procedures.[13]When the offending corporation can demonstrate they have complied with the terms of the DPA, the charges they are under investigation for will be dropped. Whilst DPAs have been used as alternative method to indicting corporations and generated substantial financial penalties,[14] the case of HSBC is a prominent example of why it is an enforcement tool that ultimately lacks impact.

HSBC entered into its first DPA in 2012 for anti-money laundering and sanctions violations, lasting five years. The financial institution also agreed to pay $1.92 billion in financial penalties and improve its compliance procedures.[15] In 2017, the DPA against HSBC expired and all charges were deferred.[16] A main aim of DPAs is to deter corporations from committing further corporate criminal offences but, like many others, HSBC has been a repeat offender. In total HSBC has entered into three DPAs with the DOJ since 2012, the most recent in 2019 for assisting US clients to evade tax.[17] This suggests that for tackling corporate economic crime the use of DPAs as an enforcement tool is inadequate and fails to prevent future wrongdoing by offending corporations. Moreover, for corporations it appears to be no more than a tick box exercise in the normal course of business.

United Kingdom

The enforcement of corporate economic crime in the UK has been limited by the seminal, if rather restrictive decision of the House of Lords in Tesco v Nattrass.[18] Subsequent attempts to tackle corporate economic crime have focused on the introduction of failure to prevent offences under the Bribery Act 2010 and the Criminal Finances Act 2017  In January 2017, the Ministry of Justice published its Call for Evidence on Corporate Economic Crime, in which is sort views on

  • whether the need to prove the involvement of a “directing mind” in corporate offending is hindering the prosecution of companies for wrongdoing
  • alternatives to proving “directing mind” complicity in corporate criminal conduct, including:
  • a US-style ‘vicarious’ liability offence, making companies guilty through the actions of their staff, without the need to prove complicity
  • the failure to prevent model, whereby a company is liable unless it shows it has taken steps to prevent offending
  • the benefits of strengthening regulatory regimes.[19]

After receiving evidence from interested parties and key stakeholder, the Government published its response in November 2020. The government concluded:

“After careful consideration and a further evidence gathering exercise, the government has concluded that the evidence submitted was inconclusive. Further work is required before considering any change to the law and the Government has commissioned an expert review by the Law Commission”.[20]

This response by the government has been described by Susan Hawley, director of campaign group Spotlight on Corruption, as ‘a real danger that…kicks reform into the long grass, and will result in corporate impunity for large banks and companies for several more years.’[21] Further, it demonstrates that the fight to hold corporations to account lacks the political will to make a significant difference and that maybe a more appropriate course of action to take would be holding those who run corporations accountable.

Within the UK, mechanisms are already in place to hold senior individuals within corporations accountable for financial crimes committed to benefit a corporation. In 2016 the Senior Managers Certificate Regime (SMCR) was introduced to the banking sector to deter misconduct and improve culture, governance and accountability. Its overall aim is to ensure those in senior positions have more responsibility and accountability for their conduct, actions and competence. For non-compliance with the SMCR, the FCA will take enforcement actions against senior managers which are effective and proportionate.[22] However, whilst the FCA has issued financial penalties on individuals since the SMCRs introduction, the overall effectiveness and deterrent of the regime has been questioned.

A recent Freedom of Information request from financial regulation consultancy Bovill has revealed that since its inception there have been only 34 investigations with one successful enforcement action.[23] In 2018 the FCA together with the PRA each imposed Staley with a £458,000 financial penalty, which was combined to a total of £642,430 after a 30% discount for early settlement. This followed Staley’s two attempts in 2016 to uncover the identity of an anonymous whistleblower who had raised concerns regarding his hiring strategy.[24] The regulators found Staley had not declared his conflict of interest in the allegations, nor had he sufficiently let compliance take control of the matter.[25] By attempting to unmask a whistleblower Staley was found to have breached Individual Conduct Rule 2 (to act with due skill, care and diligence); however, he was not found to be in breach of Individual Conduct Rule 1 (to act with integrity) and had not lacked the fitness and propriety to continue in his role as CEO.[26] It is praiseworthy that a financial penalty was imposed upon Jes Staley for his actions, but it must be acknowledged that the outcome in this instance seems insufficient considering the seriousness of Staley’s actions and his position held. Further, with only one successful prosecution in four and half years, whilst a step in the right direction to tackle corporate economic crime, a more proactive stance needs to be taken by the FCA to show the SMCR can serve its purpose; an approach that can be adopted from the CMA.

Conclusion

It has now been four years since the then Justice Minister, Dominic Raab, announced the Government’s plans to reform how the UK tackles corporate economic crime. It is rather worrying that successive Governments have continued to delay tackling the problems associated corporate economic crime and it will continue to highlight the success of the Bribery At 2010 and its nine DPAs. The decision to as the Law Commission to investigate proposals for reform on corporate economic crime is to be welcomed. However, the limited action to tackle corporate economic crime in the UK following the association between the 2007/2008 financial crisis and financial crime, the revelations of the Panama Papers, the Paradise Papers and the FinCEN Papers suggest that we are a long way from introducing a new regime for corporate economic crime.


[1] E. Sutherland ‘The White Collar Criminal’ (1940) 5 American Sociological Review 1.

[2] E. Sutherland, White Collar Crime (Dryden: New York, 1949) 9.

[3] See Sutherland, above n. 1 at 2.

[4] For the purpose of this blog we will use the term financial crime.

[5] M. Benson and S. Simpson, S.S. White-Collar Crime: An Opportunity Perspective, (Routledge: New York, 2009).

[6] Z. Bookman ‘Convergences and omissions in reporting corporate and white collar crime’, (2008) 6 DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal 355.

[7] E. Podgor ‘White collar crime: a letter from the future’ (2007) 5 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 247.

[8] D. Freidrichs ‘Wall Street: Crime Never Sleeps’ in S. Will, S. Handelman and D. Brotherton (eds), How they got away with it – white collar criminals and the financial meltdown (Columbia University Press: New York 2013) 9.

[9] R. Brody and K. Kieh ‘From white- collar crime to red-collar crime’ (2010) 17 Journal of Financial Crime 351.

[10] Ministry of Justice Corporate Liability for Economic Crime Call for evidence (Ministry of Justice: London, 2017) at 10.  See generally Salomon v Salomon [1897] A.C. 22.

[11] See generally R. v P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 72, 83.

[12] T. Edwards House of Commons Library Briefing Paper – Corporate Economic Crime: bribery and corruption,  Number 7359, 22 March 2017, at 3.

[13] N Ryder, ‘Too scared to prosecute and too scared to jail? A critical and comparative analysis of enforcement of financial crime legislation against corporations in the USA and the UK’ (2018) The Journal of Criminal Law 1, 6.

[14] See United States Department of Justice, ‘Airbus agrees to pay $3.9 Billion in global penalties to resolve foreign bribery and IATR case’ (United States Department of Justice: 31 January 2020) < https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/airbus-agrees-pay-over-39-billion-global-penalties-resolve-foreign-bribery-and-itar-case> accessed November 2020.

[15] United States Department of Justice, ‘HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSCB Bank USA N.A> Admit to money laundering sanctions violations, forfeit $1.256bn in Deferred Prosecution Agreement’, 11 December 2012, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations> accessed 16 November 2020.

[16] HSBC, ‘HSBC Holdings plc Expiration of 2012 Deferred Prosecution Agreement’ (HSBC: 11 December 2017) <http:// www.hsbc.com/news-and-insight/media-resources/media-releases/2017/hsbc-holdings-plc-expiration-of-2012-deferred-prosecution-agreement> accessed 16 November 2020.

[17] United States Department of Justice, ‘Justice Department Announced Deferred Prosecution Agreement with HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA), (United States Justice Department: 10 December 2019)<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-deferred-prosecution-agreement-hsbc-private-bank-suisse-sa> accessed 16 November 2020.

[18] Tesco v Nattrass [1971] UKHL 1.

[19] Gov UK, ‘New crackdown on corporate economic crime’ (GovUK: 13 January 2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-crackdown-on-corporate-economic-crime> accessed 16 November 2020.

[20] Ministry of Justice, ‘ Corporate liability for economic crime: Call for evidence’ (Ministry of Justice: 3 November 2020) <https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/corporate-liability-for-economic-crime/> accessed 16 November 2020.

[21]Spotlight on Corruption, ‘Response to the Law Commission’ (Twitter, 3 November 2020) <https://twitter.com/EndCorruptionUK/status/1323591794509205504> accessed 16 November 2020.

[22] Financial Conduct Authority The Senior Managers and Certification Regime: Guide for insurers (Financial Conduct Authority: February 2019) at 16.

[23] Bovill, ‘Only 34 investigations and one enforcement action after four and a half years of SMCR’ (Bovill: 27 October 2020) <https://www.bovill.com/only-34-investigations-and-one-enforcement-action-after-four-and-a-half-years-of-smcr/> accessed 16 November 2020.

[24] Minter Ellison, ‘First case brought by the FCA and PRA under the SM&CR’ (Lexology, 18 May 2018) <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=88423b44-c1f8-4acf-94a9-7ec00c56ef0f> accessed 16 November 2020.

[25] Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA and PRA jointly fine Mr James Staley £642,430 and announce special requirements regarding whistleblowing systems and controls at Barclays.’ (2018)16 <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-and-pra-jointly-fine-mr-james-staley-announce-special-requirements> Accessed 16 November 2020.

[26] See MinsterEllison above, n 24.

Don’t worry if stores aren’t accepting cash…

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You could always suggest Pokémon cards as a form of payment – say the Bank of England – if the store is willing, of course

By Dr Monica Vessio, Associate Lecturer, FBL; Research Associate Centre for Banking Law, University of Johannesburg

Through the ages, money has taken various forms, from feathers, cowrie shells, gold and silver to cash and bank deposits. While most of the money in the UK is held electronically as deposits (96%), a small proportion (4%) is still held in physical form as cash (banknotes and coins). Despite the relatively low percentage of cash compared to bank deposits, cash continues to be important. There are over 70 billion pounds of notes in circulation.

Most recently, and because of the Covid-19 pandemic, many store holders are refusing to accept cash. The immediate question that arises is – but cash is legal tender, so are stores not obliged to accept this form of payment?

According to the Bank of England, a shop owner can choose what form of payment they are prepared to accept. If you want to pay for a pack of gum with a £50 note, it is perfectly legal for them to refuse to accept this payment type. It is, apparently, entirely, a matter of discretion. If your local corner shop decided to only accept payments in Pokémon cards, the Bank of England says that would be within their right to.

Legal tender takes on a narrow technical meaning and means that if you offer to fully pay off a debt to someone in legal tender, they cannot sue you for failing to repay.

As to what is classed as legal tender varies, depending where you are in the UK. In England and Wales, Royal Mint Coins and Bank of England notes are legal tender, while in Scotland and Northern Ireland it is only Royal Mint coins and not banknotes. There are further restrictions when using small coins. For example, 1p and 2p coins only count as legal tender for any amount up to 20p. Cheques, debit cards and contactless are not legal tender. Bank of England notes stop being legal tender, once withdrawn, but don’t worry the Bank of England will give plenty of warning before they retire any notes.

Kiyotaki & Wright (1993) tell us that the most important function of money is probably its role as a medium of exchange. While, Wicksell (1906) explained that a medium of exchange means “an object which is taken in exchange, not on its own account, . . . not to be consumed by the receiver or to be employed in technical production, but to be exchanged for something else within a longer or shorter period of time.” Thus, if you could talk a store into accepting Pokémon cards in exchange for bread and milk or other “essential” items, you would not be paying in legal tender but certainly a legal and valid transaction will have occurred. 

The GMO debate: Is law the answer to effectively regulate GM crops in India?

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This blog is by Subhashree Panda, LLM (Environmental Law and Sustainable Development)

Agriculture, the largest source of livelihoods for India, is plagued by several problems such as small and fragmented land-holdings, use of poor quality seeds, indiscriminate use of biocides causing environmental pollution, areas affected by salinity, alkalinity, water-logging due to lack of irrigation and inadequate storage facilities depriving farmers of their legitimate income.[1]

As a solution to overcome the persistent problem of food insecurity, India is promoting the use of Genetically Modified (GM) crops that offer many opportunities. These opportunities range from promoting sustainable agriculture as they may be able to reduce agriculture’s environmental footprint, reducing the use of pesticides, decreasing carbon-dioxide emissions, conserving soil moisture.[2] However, after the introduction of Bt-cotton in 2002 which is an insect-resistant transgenic crop,[3] there has been a lot of controversy in India surrounding its performance and impact on the environment and biodiversity. According to the critics, GM crops fail to reduce the need for pesticides, and mixtures of varieties being sold to farmers in the name of standardized seeds often result in uneven crop production and low yields.[4] Despite such controversy, several Indian seed companies and public sector research institutions are developing GM crops  (about 85 plant species), mainly for pest resistance, herbicide tolerance, abiotic stress tolerance (e.g. drought, salinity and soil nutrient), nutritional enhancement, and nutritional, medicinal or metabolic phenotypes.[5]

In India, even prior to joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the patentability and the scope of protection to be afforded to GM crops have been controversial.[6] Since joining the WTO, India has amended its Patents Act (in 1999, 2002 and 2005) to comply with the obligations set out in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. In addition, intellectual property rights in relation to plant varieties, including transgenic varieties, are the subject matter of protection under the provisions of the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers Rights Act, 2001. These two laws play a crucial role in regulating the patentability and the use of GM crops in India.

In addition, the Environmental Protection Act 1986, the Food Safety and Standards Act 2006, the Rules for the Manufacture/Use/Import/Export and Storage of Hazardous Micro-organisms, GE organisms or cells 1989, Drugs and Cosmetic Rule 1988, Biological Diversity Act, Plant Quarantine Order 2003 and Directorate General of Foreign Trade Notification relating to inclusion of GM trade policy in foreign trade policy (2006-2009), the Seed Order 1983, the Seed Policy 2002, the Patent Act 1970 are also applicable for activities relating to GM crops in India. However, the Environmental Protection Act, Consumer Protection Act 1986 and Food Safety and Standard Act 2006 lack coherence and fail to apply the precautionary principle.[7] There is a lack of transparency and little or no public involvement in the governance process regarding agriculture and manufacture of GM crops. In addition, labelling and traceability provisions regulating GM crops are weak. For example, the recent draft Food Safety and Standards (Labelling and Display) Regulations 2018 seeks to make labelling of GM food mandatory.[8] However, the criteria for exemption from labelling of food containing GM ingredients remain lax.[9]

India as a powerful developing country has attempted to domesticate global obligations in ways which conform to its domestic priorities.[10] There is no doubt that agricultural biotechnology must give farmers and local community adequate information and a meaningful opportunity to participate in decisions that affect their health, their livelihoods, and their natural resources. It is still possible to promote transparency and include strong labelling and traceability provisions in the 2018 Draft Regulation. Such integration of the precautionary principle in GMO laws will help to strengthen risk assessment procedure and monitoring in the biosafety regime.


[1] Puja Mondal, ’10 Major Agricultural Problems of India And Their Possible Solutions’ (Your Article Library) <http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/agriculture/10-major-agricultural-problems-of-india-and-their-possible-solutions/20988>

[2] Graham Brookes and Peter Barfoot, ‘Environmental impacts of genetically modified (GM) crop use 1996–2015: Impacts on pesticide use and carbon emissions (2017) 8 GM Crops & Food 117; David Zilberman, Tim G. Holland and Itai Trilnick, ‘Agricultural GMOs—What We Know and Where Scientists Disagree’ (2018)10 Sustainability 1514.

[3] K.S Jayaraman, ‘India Investigates Bt Cotton Claims’ (Nature, 2012) <https://www.nature.com/news/india-investigates-bt-cotton-claims-1.10015>.

[4] Suman Sahai, ‘What Is Wrong with Bt Cotton’ (Iatp.org)

<https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/What_Is_Wrong_With_Bt_Cotton.htm>

[5] ‘Agricultural Biotechnology Annual’ (Gain.fas.usda.gov,2017)

<https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20Annual_New%20Delhi_India_11-28-2017.pdf>

[6] Rajdeep Banerjee and Joyeeta Banerjee, ‘The Future of Genetically Modified Crops in India | Forbes India Blog’ (Forbes India, 2018) <http://www.forbesindia.com/blog/economy-policy/the-future-of-genetically-modified-crops-in-india/>

[7] K. K. Tripathi, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms: Concerns and biosafety issues’ (2002)15 The national medical journal of India 187.

[8] ‘FSSAI Drafts New Labelling and Display Regulations 2018 – Food Safety Helpline’ (Food Safety Helpline, 2018) <https://foodsafetyhelpline.com/2018/04/fssai-drafts-new-labelling-and-display-regulations-2018/>

[9] A. S. Bawa and K. R. Anilakumar, ‘Genetically modified foods: safety, risks and public concerns-a review’ (2013)50 Journal of Food Science and Technology 1035.

[10] Peter Newell, ‘Lost in Translation? Domesticating Global Policy on Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparing India and China’ (2008) 22 Global Society 115.

The Polluter Pays Principle: The only Principle that can limit aviation emissions (if we do it right)

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This blog was written by Mandy Beck, an LLM in Environmental Law and Sustainable Development student at UWE Bristol.

Today, an airplane takes off approximately every 0.8 seconds somewhere around the globe.[1] The impact of the aviation sector on the climate is enormous. Stefan Gössling, professor for sustainable transport at Lund/Linnaeus University, Sweden, even states that ‘on an individual level, there is no other human activity that emits as much over such a short period of time as aviation’.[2] Globally, the aviation sector contributes a total of 2.5%[3] to all anthropogenic[4] CO2 emissions, making it a significant contributor to global warming. Often undiscussed, however, are the non-CO2 effects, meaning those effects resulting from e.g. particles, water vapour, and nitrogen oxides. Together with these non-CO2 effects, aviation contributes to global warming by 5%.[5]

The International Air Transport Association estimates that the demand for flights is going to double by 2037.[6] The decision-makers in the aviation sector thereby face the challenge of making aviation climate-neutral. In 2012, former European Commissioner for Climate Action in the European Commission, Connie Hedegaard stated that the ‘Polluter pays is the only principle that can limit aviation emissions’.[7]

The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) reflects an idea that is taught to us since our childhood: ‘Clean up after yourself’.[8] Due to this principle, the costs of pollution should be allocated to the actor who caused them.[9] The PPP is implemented by using market-based measures (MBMs), such as levies, emission trading (such as the EU Emission Trading System EU-ETS), and offsetting schemes. Implementing a MBM is necessary, as technical progress and operational measures alone will not be sufficient to limit climate emissions sufficiently in the aviation sector in the near future.[10]

The first international offsetting scheme for aviation, CORSIA[11], will be implemented step by step starting 2021. Doubts, however, remain as to the effectiveness of this MBM in the light of reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement.[12] Overall, the PPP could hold more potential in curbing aviation-caused climate emissions. The following improvements must, however, be made:

Inclusion of non-CO2 effects and removal of subsidies

Climate damages resulting from non-CO2 effects must be included in a MBM. Despite the major importance of non-CO2 effects, these effects are not included in CORSIA nor the EU-ETS. Secondly, the subsidies in the billions granted to airlines must be removed (e.g. grants for Etihad Airlines by Abu Dhabi; grants by the European Commission to Air Malta). Subsidies have an opposite effect than the PPP, as they falsify the costs that must be borne.[13] Also, due to subsidies, aviation has a competitive advantage over other – more sustainable – means of transport.

Full payment for all environmental costs until 2050

The polluter must fully pay for all environmental costs by 2050 to reach the 1.5°C Goal (2085 at the latest for the 2°C Goal). The price for one ton of CO2 in 2019 including all climate costs (CO2 and non-CO2 effects) is 371 Euro/ton CO2.[14] The price set under the EU-ETS today is much lower at approx. 30 Euro/ton CO2.[15]To achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, the PPP can be implemented gradually (with increasing CO2 prices over time), however, the above-mentioned full payment to the given deadlines must be reached.

Implementation of the PPP at the beginning of the value chain

Currently, all MBMs that have been implemented address the airlines. However, making the fuel suppliers pay for subsequent environmental damages, holds one significant advantage: fossil fuel suppliers would lose their competitive advantage, due to not paying for climate damage, over renewable energy providers. If all suppliers include environmental damage in their pricing, the market conditions would be equal.


[1]Statista, ‘Number of flights performed by the global airline industry from 2004 to 2020’ (2020) <www.statista.com/statistics/564769/airline-industry-number-of-flights/> accessed 24 February 2020.

[2] Arthur Sullivan, ‘To fly or not to fly? The environmental cost of air travel‘ (2020) <https://www.dw.com/en/to-fly-or-not-to-fly-the-environmental-cost-of-air-travel/a-42090155> accessed 24 June 2020.

[3] Umweltbundesamt, Umweltschonender Luftverkehr: lokal – national – international (Umweltbundesamt Publikationen, 2019), 30.

[4] man-made.

[5] Malte Niklaß, Benjamin Lührs, Robin Ghosh, ‘A Note on How to Internalize Aviation’s Climate Impact of non-CO2 Effects’ <www.researchgate.net/publication/311788948_A_Note_on_How_to_Internalize_Aviation%27s_Climate_Impact_of_non-CO2_Effects> accessed 15 Mai 2020; equal conclusion reached in Jörg Larsson, Simon Matti, Jonas Nässén, ‘Public Support for aviation policy measures in Sweden‘ (2020) <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2020.1759499> accessed 20 August 2020.

[6] IATA, ‘Annual review 2019’ (2019) <https://www.iata.org/contentassets/c81222d96c9a4e0bb4ff6ced0126f0bb/iata-annual-review-2019.pdf> accessed 11 February 2020,16.

[7] The Guardian, ‘Polluter pays’ is the only principle that can limit aviation emissions’ (2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/apr/04/polluter-pays-aviation-emissions> accessed 15 February 2020.

[8] David Boyd, ‘Clean up after yourself’ <www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/clean-up-after-yourself/article773567/> accessed 10 February 2020.

[9] Philippe Sands, Jacqueline Peel, Adriana Fabra, Ruth MacKenzie, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 240.

[10] ICAO, Environmental Report 2019 – Chapter: Climate Change Mitigation: CORSIA (ICAO Publications 2019) 236.

[11] Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation.

[12] That is holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.

[13] Stefan Gössling, Frank Fichert, Peter Forsyth, ‘Subsidies in Aviation’ (2017) 9(8) Sustainability 1295, 1295.

[14] Umweltbundesamt, Methodenkonvention 3.0 zur Ermittlung von Umweltkosten Kostensätze Stand 02/2019 (Umweltbundesamt Publikationen, 2019). UBA recommends the use of a multiplier of 2.0 for the transfer of the CO2 price to aviation emissions to include the non-CO2 effects.

[15] Michael Holder, ‘EU carbon prices surge to 14-year high’ <www.businessgreen.com/news/4017770/eu-carbon-prices-surge-14> accessed 23 July 2020.         

Cryptoassets, social media platforms and terrorism financing: a step into the regulatory unknown

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In his new article that will be published in the Journal of Business Law later this year, Professor Nicholas Ryder investigates the link between terrorism financing, cryptoassets and social media platforms.

Terrorism financing was propelled to the top of the international community’s financial crime agenda following the al Qaeda terrorist attacks in the United States of America (US) on September 11 2001 (9/11).  Until these terrorist attacks, the international community largely focused its efforts on tackling the illegal sale and distribution of narcotic substances and related money laundering.  As a result, a global anti-money laundering (AML) policy was developed by the United Nations (UN), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the European Union (EU).  Following the terrorist attacks in 2001, the international community, led by the UN, and heavily influenced by the actions of then US President George Bush, implemented the ‘Financial War on Terrorism’.  As a result of the Financial War on Terrorism, terrorism financiers were forced to modify their funding strategies. Traditionally, terrorists relied on two sources of funding: state and private sponsors. State sponsored terrorism involves government’s providing logistical and financial support to terrorists, or governments even conducting acts of terrorism against their own citizens. However, since the instigation of the Financial War on Terrorism, there has been a decline in state sponsored terrorism and it is more likely that terrorists will receive funding from private sponsors or donors. These sources used by terrorism financiers include drug trafficking, extortion, organised retail theft, fraud, misapplied charitable donations, the sale of conflict diamonds, precious metals, robbery and theft, kidnappings for ransom, counterfeit currencies, oil refining, smuggling artefacts, the abuse of natural resources, piracy, slavery and human trafficking.  The flexibility, creativity, simplicity and sophistication of the terrorism financing models represent an unprecedented threat and risk. 

Cryptoassets

The link between cryptoassets and terrorism financing is evident following several terrorism financing related convictions.  For example, in August 2015, Ali Shukri Amin, was convicted and sentenced to 11 years and four months imprisonment for using the “internet to provide material support and resources” to ISIL.  Amin pleaded guilty and admitted to using his Twitter handle ‘@Amreekiwitness’ to “provide instruction [to ISIL] on how to use Bitcoin … to mask the provision of funds to ISIL.  Another example of terrorism financiers exploiting cryptoassets was Zoobia Shahnaz, who was arrested by the FBI after attempting to transfer $62,000 worth of Bitcoin to ISIL.  The Department of Justice (DoJ) stated that Shahnaz had entered into a number of financial transactions designed to circumvent the transaction reporting obligations imposed by the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act 1970.  In March 2020, Shahnaz was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment.  Clearly, then, modern forms of technology, especially social media platforms are used by terrorism financiers.  More often than not, the payments made over the internet, the Dark Web or social media platforms involve small amounts of funding which do not raise suspicion.

Social Media Platforms

The anonymity and speed provided by the Internet is an appealing tool for terrorists to solicit financial donors.  In evidence presented to the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-proliferation, and Trade Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa) the Washington Institute for Near East Policy stated that some of terrorism fundraising was carried out in plain sight on online social media platforms. The evidence referred to a video uploaded to YouTube in October 2016 by Abd Allah al-Muhaysini who “thanked Gulf donors for supporting jihadists in Syria: ‘As for the businessmen, and I will mention some of them, the ones who prepared these hundred rockets, may Allah reward them … I tell all the businessmen of the Muslims, this is your money now, fighting in the path of Allah’”. Further evidence of the association between social media platforms and terrorism financing is illustrated by the US Department of the Treasury, which in 2014 imposed sanctions on three terrorism financiers for “fundraising appeals on social media”.  Here, the US Department of the Treasury stated that, “Al-Ajmi operates regular social media campaigns seeking donations for Syrian fighters and is one of the most active Kuwaiti fundraisers for Al-Nusra Front.  In July 2014, Al-Ajmi publicly admitted that he collected money under the auspices of charity and delivered the funds in person”.  Further sanctions were imposed on Abdul MohsenAbdullah Ibrahim al-Sharikh, who “is a senior ANF leader and al-Qaida facilitator based in Syria … in this role, al-Sharikh has used social media posts to demonstrate his aspiration to target Americans and U.S. interests”.  Furthermore, in March 2019, Gregory Lepsky was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment after pleading guilty to attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organisation.  Here, law enforcement authorities were able to determine that Lepsky had used several social media platforms to plan his terrorist attack.  In September 2019, the US Department of Treasury stated that “HAMAS solicit[ed] Bitcoin donations via social media, using two Bitcoin addressed.  As of late March 2019, those two known addressed had received at least $5,000 worth of Bitcoin”.  These instances illustrate that terrorism financiers are using several social media platforms in an attempt either to solicit donations or to transfer funds to proscribed terrorist groups. 

Conclusion

Terrorism financiers have continued to vary their funding activities.  Terrorism financing has moved away from its traditional funding mechanisms towards exploiting the speed, convenience and anonymity provided by the Internet and Dark Web.  In particular, this paper has identified several examples of terrorism financiers using cryptoassets, such as Bitcoin, and a wide range of social media platforms. There is no doubt that terrorism financing via social media platforms, the ‘Dark Web’ and heavily encrypted mobile devices is an unprecedented problem.