by Hannah Hickman
‘There is very little pre-existing research on project implementation and the impact that a planning consent has on this stage. Our research fills an important knowledge gap and is not only of significance to the planning profession, but to those in Government currently focused on the infrastructure planning reform process, and to project promoters and their consenting and delivery teams’.1
Described as ‘the most far-reaching legislation of its kind since 1947’2, the 2008 Planning Act in England introduced a new system for the consenting of infrastructure projects deemed in the national interest – nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPS). At the time of its inception, this legislation was seen as a ‘genuine revolution’3 in the handling of consents for large scale infrastructure developments.
The so called ‘revolutionary’ aspects of the new system included: the removal of infrastructure projects over a certain threshold from local authority decision making, with decisions taken following prescribed timescales by ministers of central government following the advice of independent inspectors; the combination of most – although not all – consents, including planning permission and compulsory purchase acquisition powers into one document to enable development to proceed, known as a Development Consent Order (DCO); and, critically, the expression of need for development in sector specific National Policy Statements, such that debate about the need for infrastructure takes place during parliamentary scrutiny of NPS preparation rather than on a project basis at examination.
Certainty and speed of decision were the defining logics of the new system and there is evidence to suggest that speed of decision making has been a positive outcome of the new system for many projects. However, speed and certainty of decision making, do not necessarily result in a faster or easier delivery process (presumably the ultimate intent of the new system …) or do they?
In 2023, the National Infrastructure Planning Association published research commissioned from UWE and the University of Sheffield to explore the relationship between consent and delivery – the journey from consent, construction and through to ongoing operation – framed by the question, ‘how can the Development Consent Order process be strengthened to better support the delivery of Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects‘?
This research specifically focused on practitioner’s experiences of this post-consent delivery phase and involved detailed survey work, six in-depth case studies, and discussion with a wide range of bodies engaged in the NSIP process, including statutory environmental bodies and local authorities.
As a research team, it was fantastic to have the opportunity to talk to such a wide- range of professionals involved in the delivery of major infrastructure projects, from those in construction project management and contracting, to lawyers, environmental specialists, and of planners across both the public and private sectors. This experience left two lasting impressions on the team. Firstly, and maybe self-evident to those in the industry, the delivery of major infrastructure projects is a truly cross-sectoral endeavour. Those projects with a relatively smooth delivery phase demonstrated a clear commitment by all those involved, to understand the remit, constraints, and perspective of all the disciplines involved. Secondly, understanding the effectiveness of planning (a consent as granted) demands the insights derived from delivery: it materially effects not just the ultimate design of projects, but the delivery phase as well.
Key recommendations from the project included:
i. The importance of continuing to extend the opportunities for disseminating, sharing and reflecting on the experience of project delivery and implementation – this has been an overlooked area of practice;
ii. The need to ensure that any further reforms to the DCO process that focus on speed of decision making do not pass on problems to the delivery and implementation stage – speed of consent does not necessarily result in a smoother delivery phase;
iii. The need for a review of the further consents and licences required post consent – most infrastructure projects still require a number of additional consents before delivery can commence, causing uncertainty and delay;
iv. to consider a more supportive approach to post consent change management – the DCO post-consent change process is highly constrained and is both time-consuming and expensive;
v. The need for significant ongoing support for local authority and statutory body engagement in delivery and operation as well as examination – these organisations play significant roles at delivery yet face considerable resources constraints in doing so effectively;
vi. The need for greater consistency at project examination stage in how flexibility within consents can be justified and achieved – lack of flexibility to vary a scheme’s design, or deploy alternative construction methods, post-consent can cause delivery challenges; and
vii. The value in capacity building – across professions – to support delivery.
The project report, and detailed case studies, are available from:
https://nipa-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/NIPA_Hindsights_Final_Report.05.07.2023.pdf
NIPA Insights III Supplementary Report (Case Studies) (05.07.23) (nipa-uk.org)
- https://www.rtpi.org.uk/policy-and-research/research/planning-research-matters/infrastructure-planning/practitioner-s-experiences-of-development-consent-order-implementation/ ↩︎
- http://www.theguardian.com/society/2009/jul/15/quango-fast-tracks-controversial-projects ↩︎
- https://www.jplc.org/files/pdf/attaining%20the%20age%20of%20consents.pdf ↩︎
Feature image: Tilbury2 in construction (Courtesy of Tilbury Port)