Throughout modern history, revolutions in transport have not just altered mobility or the geography of places; they have been absolutely necessary for the economic, political and historical development of whole countries. Railways, for example, due to its ability to connect remote areas rapidly, succeeded in speeding up not only the commercial and migration flows of Western countries on the 19th Century; they also speeded up the collapse of pre-capitalist social formations, fostering modern national cohesion and helping in dismantling ancient administrative boundaries. Furthermore, railways revolutionised time itself: prior to the development of railways, time varied from town to town, as this entirely depended upon each town’s solar time. In 1840, the Great Western Railway standardised the time in all the stations.
However, what standardised time were not just some series of connected carriages known as “trains”. It was rather the skyrocketing of commuting journeys and migrations within the development of new capitalist and economic relations in England what was a radically new phenomenon – and which, at the same time, was only possible thanks to railways.
Wars were also important driving forces behind railway construction. During the American Civil War, “the North” saw necessary to build a modern railway network to assure a more efficient way to supply its army. They also enabled a sort of modern mobility in wars, making logistic chains faster and dependent upon railways. Such a modern technology contributed to a widespread fear among European governments, that were worried about the rapid military mobilisation capacities of other countries.
If trains were the paradigmatic means of transport in the 19th Century, the 20th Century would be the witness of another important revolution in transport: the private car. John Urry described the car as the quintessential commodity of the 20th Century.
Shortly, the secret of the success of the private car in the post-war era lied in the fact that these were massively produced by workers who received a relatively high wage and that had more stable working conditions than nowadays.
Massively produced cars were sold because workers had a high enough purchasing power. This was coherently accompanied by a massive investment in the construction of suburbs – which are connected to cities by means of the car – and highways. In conclusion, this system known as Fordism fulfilled certain requirements for a stable functioning of capitalism: it assured that produced commodities could be afterwards sold in the market – thus avoiding overproduction crises – and pushed forward the development of important industries such as oil refining, roadbuilding, retail parks… achieving high rates of employment and economic growth.
Though so-called Fordism collapsed as a consequence of 1973 oil crisis, automobility has remained dominant, and cars – and carmakers – still play a fundamental role in mobility, economy and society. The economic growth in the post-war era was not just an era of economic growth. It entailed massive changes in the built landscape, in geographies, in mobility and in economic relations that have remained deeply rooted in the everyday life of modern countries.
That is why phasing-out cars is such a difficult task, especially in countries with a high suburban population like the US.
The difference between railways and private cars’ historical role lies in its relation to the economic and social agenda of their time; whereas railways contributed to the dismantling of the Ancient Regime and to the emergence of new capitalist relations, private cars arise in a time of a global crisis of capitalism itself – heralded by two World Wars and by the Crash of 29 – to provide a solution to the problems that accumulation had encountered in the previous decades.
The power of private cars in reshaping economy, geography and society seems magical. There is indeed a wide fetishism around the car manifested at different levels: by those users who think freedom consists in having the chance to drive a car and by those policymakers and scholars who do not envisage a world without cars. Even a critical sociologist like Urry defined automobility as autopoietic. This means that automobility would be capable of producing itself – and only itself – its own surrounding world. Far from being autopoietic, what automobility actually entails is a circular, tautological coherence, insofar as it allowed the emergence of a deeply fixed geography (expressed through a massive suburban sprawl, an endless system of highways and roads…) and economic relations in which, in a very simplified way, people just work to save money, save money to purchase a car, and purchase a car to go to work.
Last October, CTS colleagues Graham Parkhurst and William Clayton edited “Electrifying Mobility: Realising a Sustainable Future for the Car”, a book that addresses some of the multiple problems that an electric transition in a complex industry like this entails. Graham Parkhurst and Xabier Gangoiti are currently working on a paper aimed at discussing the barriers that a business-as-usual transition to electric cars faces in Europe. These problems range from the dependence to electric batteries manufactured in China to the possible unemployment issues caused by such electric transition – and the subsequent difficulties in making the electric vehicle an affordable, massively consumed commodity.
This blog was written by Xabier Gangoiti, Research Trainee at the Centre for Transport and Society, University of the West of England, Bristol.
