A number of presenters and discussants were invited to this day-long workshop in order to provide an environment in which in-depth and critical discussions on a number of pressing questions in the fields of bribery, corruption and trust was created.
Presentations covered a variety of different institutional settings and countries including bribes and firm performance in Albania and Kosovo, social capital and institutional trust in Palestine, the impacts of networks, trust and motivations to bribe on life satisfaction and experimental evidence on what makes people cheat. Colleagues from the Burgundy School of Business, Cork University, Aston University, Birkbeck, University College London and within the Bristol Business School made the day a great success with presenters receiving valuable feedback on their work, and pathways to collaborative research in the near future identified.
Current world population is just over seven billion and expected to reach nine billion before 2050. Increasing affluence in the developing and transition countries where population is growing most is now resulting in a wave of “new consumers”. This is important as in the developed world the main drivers for the level and growth of environmental pressures are said to be final consumption and affluence. Technology on its own will not adequately ensure that society stays within environmental limits. Therefore there is a need for serious consideration and research into consumer, employee and entrepreneur behaviours.
In this vain, the Bristol Centre for Economics and Finance (BCEF) is hosting a one day inter-disciplinary conference, organised by Dr Peter Bradley, leader of BCEF’s Sustainability Research Cluster and an expert in sustainability research. Peter’s research explores environmental and energy challenges and governance using empirical evidence based research as well as conceptual and theory based research. The “Pro-environmental employee and consumer behaviour conference” is taking place on 29 April 2019 and registration to attend is now open. Keynote speakers include Jes Rutter from JRP solutions and Dr Mark Everard (Associate Professor of Ecosystem Services, UWE Bristol). For more information and online registration, please see our event page.
Call for papers
We invite abstracts from PhD students, researchers and practitioners across the social and natural sciences to present on topics related to ‘pro-environmental consumer and employee behaviour’. Please send a 500 word abstract about your topic and contribution to email@example.com by Wednesday 19 December 2018 to be considered for presentations.
By Sara Stevano, Susan Newman and Lotta Takala-Greenish.
On 12-14th September 2018, the 9th IIPPE Annual Conference in Political Economy took place at Juraj Dobrila University of Pula, Croatia. Keeping up with recent years’ record, UWE Economics was very well represented at the conference! The conference was organised around the overarching theme of ‘The State of Capitalism and the State of Political Economy’ and over 300 scholars and activists from across the world discussed their political economy research, touching upon various facets of capitalist transformations and pushing the frontiers of political economy. The conference organisers reported that many participants thought that this was the best IIPPE conference so far!
Among the keynote speeches were a panel shared by Professor Lena Lavinas, Professor of Welfare Economics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, and Professor Fiona Tregenna, University of Johannesburg South African Research Chair in Industrialisation stood out for their original content. Professor Lavinas highlighted the shifts in social programmes to increase financial inclusion. She commented on the contribution of social service programmes to GDP, 1.5% for developing and 2.7% of GDP for OECD countries, and connected these to the accumulation of debt among low-income households (see the excellent twitter feed by Ingrid H. Kvangraven). Professor Spread of income transfer programs across Global South have facilitated mass ‘financial inclusion’. The state and international financial institutions also play important role here. Result: Low-income households have accumulated huge amounts of debtSpread of income transfer programs across Global South have facilitated mass ‘financial inclusion’. The state and international financial institutions also play important role here. Result: Low-income households have accumulated huge amounts of debtTregenna focused on the need to unpack different forms of de-industrialisation and to explore the perspective that Marx’s analysis can offer to understanding industrialisation. In particular, her insights included an expanded focus on the heterogeneity within sectors and the inseparability of production and consumption (see also this blog post for further insights on the IIPPE2018 conference).
Spread of income transfer programs across Global South have facilitated mass ‘financial inclusion’. The state and international financial institutions also play important role here. Result: Low-income households have accumulated huge amounts of debtSpread of income transfer programs across Global South have facilitated mass ‘financial inclusion’. The state and international financial institutions also play important role here. Result: Low-income households have accumulated huge amounts of debtReflections on the state of capitalism are very relevant and timely in the context of shifting geographies of production, global relations of power and political discourse. Thus, it is all the more important to discuss how political economy research can help us understand and shape the economic, social and political transformations that mark our time. Critical political economy has an important role to play in transforming and revitalising economics, making it an inclusive and relevant area of study.
The three UWE Economics researchers who were in attendance this year intervened in panels on neoliberalism, the political economy of work, social reproduction and commodity studies. Dr Lotta Takala-Greenish presented her research on Exploring formal/informal work structures in South African waste collection (slides available here) in a panel that was described by the audience as one of the most interesting of the conference. This panel shared with Professor Stephanie Allais of the University of Witwatersrand, put forward important questions about the role of training and learning (both on and off the job) and the connections between education and labour markets. It also provided a forum to discuss and develop future collaborations with the South African Research Chair for Skills Development at the Centre for Researching Education and Labour. Dr Susan Newman presented her joint paper with Sam Ashman on New Patterns in Capital Flight from South Africa and discussed the preliminary findings of her joint paper with Dr Sara Stevano on The neoliberal restructuring of UK Overseas Development Assistance (slides available here), both papers were very appreciated by the audience who thought them revealing and timely. Sara Stevano presented her paper on Women’s work in Mozambique: Gender, social differentiation and social reproduction(slides available here) in a great all-women panel on social reproduction and the political economy of work.
Across several sessions, there was much discussion of the future of pluralist economics and education where UWE economics was highlighted as a leading institution. UWE Economics is now considered as an established centre for critical political economy, with possibly the largest concentration of critical political economists in a UK university. UWE’s recent recruitment of pluralist economists has been noted widely and was reflected in questions about future recruitment plans. Participation of UWE Economics in IIPPE continues to reaffirm the presence of our group in current political economy debates and generates opportunities for collaboration with colleagues in the UK and beyond. UWE Economics academics are involved with IIPPE in various capacities. Susan Newman oversees the content published on the IIPPE website and coordinates the working group on commodities studies; Sara Stevano coordinates the social reproduction working group with Hannah Bargawi (SOAS); Lotta Takala-Greenish set up and previously coordinated the working group on Minerals Energy Complex and Comparative Industrialisation.
One of the key aims of IIPPE is to provide a platform for early career researchers to interact with more established and senior scholars in political economy. The conference provided an opportunity benchmark and share information about postgraduate training in political economy. The UWE MSc in Global Political Economy was mentioned as one of only a handful degrees providing an interdisciplinary political economy approach housed within an economics department. The first intake of UWE’s MSc Global Political Economy students will be submitting their dissertations end of September and are being encouraged to submit their research to present at the next IIPPE conference in July 2019. We are also welcoming our new 2018-2019 MSc students who will no doubt contribute to the active research environment that we have here at UWE Bristol.
CENTS AND SENSIBILITY – WHAT ECONOMICS CAN LEARN FROM THE HUMANITIES, by Gary Saul Morson and Morton Schapiro, Princeton University Press: 2017, pp. 307; ISBN 978-0-691-17668-0
The title expresses the main argument of the book under review, which grew out of an interdisciplinary undergraduate course at Northwestern University dealing with the subject matter of “choice”. Its authors are professors of economics (Schapiro) and of Slavic languages and literature (Morson) who think that economics is “too narrow”, which undermines its usefulness for “policy-making”, for “understanding human behaviour”, and for “predicting the future”. The intention is explicitly not to attack economists but to help to expand its “scope and power” via a dialogue-not a fusion-between economics and the humanities. This vision is called “humanomics”, that is, an economics improved through an understanding of story-telling.
The main take-away is that great literature is a great source of wisdom for understanding human beings, which serves to help us make wiser decisions in varying situations. The argument is that great novelists are better at this understanding than social scientists.
The main concerns of the authors are near and dear to many heterodox economists: narrowness of economics and openness to insights from the humanities. Those who are particularly concerned with saving economics from science, in the sense of a mechanism, biologism, or cyborgism, find the basic argument of the book attractive. It is a missed opportunity, however, that the authors do not engage more with the existing literature on modes of intellection in economics, such as story-telling, rhetoric, poetry, metaphors, hermeneutics (the brief mentioning of works by McCloskey and Bronk is unsatisfactory). The entire literature on the role of history, philosophy, and ethics in economics is likewise absent, which is slightly worrying in a book that is concerned with these matters.
The authors do not provide criteria for what they consider valid narratives, while they seem to have no fundamental problems with the capitalist development model. In fact, they continuously refer to development indicators of GDP growth, development of markets, and legal property rights. The comparison between South Korea and Ghana is especially revealing as GDP-growth is taken as the main indicator for economic development. Sustainability, happiness, and inequality indicators are curiously absent from the discussion.
What is missing from the book is a discussion of the social-psychological dimension of economics that would highlight the challenges of implementing “humanomics”. The profession of economics has deep vested interests in its approach, which is thoroughly institutionalized and exhibits psychological barriers to change. (Berger 2016) The suppression of heterodox economists speaks volumes about how the economics profession handles challenges to its ontological and methodological core. (Lee 2009)
What is missing also from the discussion is a mention of those approaches to economics that are actually compatible with the humanities, which are today gathered under the umbrella of heterodox economics. The chapter on alternative foundations for economics provides a critique of behavioural economics for its lack of cultural analysis and calls for a grounding of economics in cultural and institutional inquiry as developed by Adam Smith. The introductory chapter vaguely alludes to a recent turn towards culture in development economics. (p. 9, fn. 11) Heterodox economists would ask why there is no mention of institutional and social economics, and economic anthropology which have developed this approach in detail since Adam Smith. The project of incorporating culture and institutions in economic analysis continued in the works of Karl Marx, the German Historical School, Thorstein Veblen, John M. Keynes, amongst others. Omitting these contributions and their contemporary followers is a severe limitation. Ironically, the chapter outlining the potential contribution of the humanities (ch. 6) proposes the incorporation of the history of ideas as a remedy to the narrowness of economics. (p. 237) I would have loved to see the authors make a start with an appropriate history and evaluation of the fate of those contributions to economics that were actually open to the humanities. This could have informed the readers of this book of the great wealth of existing contributions to this project of grounding economics in the humanities. (cf. Berger 2017)
By the researchers of the “Earnings gaps and inequality at work” project, Bristol Business School.
On 25 May 2018, UWE Economics hosted an expert workshop on ‘Beyond Pay Gaps: Inequality at Work’. Six experts were invited to share their reflections, based on their own research, on two questions:
1) What is the nature of inequality at work?
2) Is the pay gap an adequate indicator? If not, how can we improve our assessments of inequality at work?
The key aim was to foster a discussion on how to conceptualise and study inequality at work. In an earlier blog entry the workshop organisers’ provided a response to UWE’s reporting on the gender pay gap, which highlighted the fact that some progression on the gender pay gap is not in itself a sign of overall success. There are aspects of inequality at work that are captured by pay indicators and nonetheless merit our attention.
The morning session of the workshop focused on conceptualisations of inequality at work and featured the presentations of three distinguished scholars of labour and inequality. Dr Alessandra Mezzadri (SOAS University of London) drew on her long-standing research on the garment industry in India to highlight patterns of inequality and gender exploitation. Professor Bridget O’Laughlin (Institute of Social Studies) reflected on the concepts of Marx’s political economy framework as well as its conceptual gaps to study inequality at work. Professor Harriet Bradley (UWE Bristol) illustrated how a three-part conceptual framework based on production, reproduction and consumption can be used to conceptualise gender inequality at work.
In the afternoon session, three distinguished academics on gender, organisation and inequality presented on methodological approaches to study inequality at work. Dr Hannah Bargawi (SOAS University of London) discussed how a pyramid-shaped understanding of inequality at work can guide us through moving our focus between different levels of inequality. Dr Olivier Ratle (UWE Bristol) presented the qualitative methods used to study early career academics’ experience of work. Dr Vanda Papafilippou (UWE Bristol) described a range of methods from the field of sociology of education to study the workplace.
The presentations generated rich discussions on the conceptualisations of social reproduction, the complexity of inequality and the relations between the material and the cultural. The participants agreed that research on these themes is both timely and needed. Furthermore, a podcast series on ‘Feminism, Gender and the Economy’ featuring two interviews with workshop speakers will be launched in 2018/2019 academic year. Watch this space for the upcoming podcast series!
This workshop was funded by UWE Bristol. The workshop’s organisers are grateful to all participants for their thoughtful contributions and productive discussions.
UWE Economics researcher Peter Bradley, has just published a chapter on “The Role of Social Norms in Incentivising Energy Reduction in Organisations” in collaboration with Matthew Leach and Shane Fudge. This is part of a collaboration by leading international academics to develop a research handbook on employee pro-environmental behaviour. The work stems from the UWE Economics groups sustainability related research.
The Research Handbook on Employee Pro-Environmental Behaviour brings contributions that consolidate existing research in the field as well as adding new insights from organisational psychology, human resource management and social marketing.
The whole book is available to download from Edward Elgar Publishing:
There has been a lot of interest in measuring disadvantage over the past 20 years in the UK even if this has not always been matched by government responses. The fifth iteration of the English IMD is to be reviewed over the next 12 months. Clearly disadvantage is a complex thing and can be represented in many different ways. As a geographer (or someone who periodically claims to be a geographer hiding in an Economics Department) I am particularly interested in area-based assessments of disadvantage. I know such measures are problematic but what indicators are not? I recently have had the opportunity with colleagues to review how the English Indicator of Multiple Deprivation works on behalf of Power to Change (see https://www.powertochange.org.uk/) and this is a short blog that captures some of the thinking that came out of that work (any errors or misinterpretations are all my/our fault and not necessarily shared by anyone at Power to Change).
So, the English IMD is a second-generation indicator of area-based deprivation that represents 7 ‘dimensions’ (or 10 sub-dimensions if you like) of disadvantage from worklessness to housing affordability, from health (mental and physical) to distance from your nearest post office. It is ‘second generation’ because it is not solely dependent on small area census data (as ‘first generation’ indices are/were) but is based on a range of small area administrative and census data from different sources within English government.
I am a fan. It is lovely. My colleagues in other European countries are jealous of it (the basic model is oft copied) – both because of its breadth of content but also because of our lovely regular statistically ordered lower super output areas (LSOAs) that sometimes get conflated for neighbourhoods. However, an indicator is a conceptual model of a real concept. As George Box pointed out – all models are wrong, but some [of the better ones] are useful. We and Power to Change were interested in posing the question of how useful is the IMD to Power to Change?
In particular, we were interested in how the IMD is used within a particular organisational context (Power to Change). We set up a set of dimensions to help us think about how an indicator (a statistical instrument ‘designed’ to perform a task) is constructed and deployed. We asked people in Power to Change how they used the IMD and what was their assessment of the strengths and weaknesses for what they needed to do: investing in community businesses that alleviate disadvantage in England. What struck us in these conversations was that the IMD was only being used in its top-line indicator format – what was being missed was the opportunity to use the IMD as an indicator system that can be moulded to the specific objectives of an organization.
We explored how to use the IMD as a system of indicators to shine a light on a specific objective: investing in community businesses. We compared spatial targeting at LSOA level for the top-line IMD indicator (the full 7 dimensional one) with the spatial targeting from a bespoke indictor bringing together the health and disability, education and qualifications and the geographic access to services dimensions. Power to Change has hypothesised that community businesses some of which provide local services may impact on employability (skills) and on the health of residents in the communities that community business serve. So, we constructed a focussed indicator from components of the topline IMD that focused only on geographic access to services, education and health (for details see Smith et al 2018). We compared how the focussed IMD indicator would spatially target the attention of Power to Change in comparison to the top-line IMD indicator with a particular focus on the city-region of Liverpool and the County of Suffolk as examples of areas of interest for Power to Change. We then mapped out the differences (using data and shapefiles obtained under a public licence) showing firstly the map of the top-line IMD indicator, secondly showing our ‘new’ indicator focusing on Power to Change’s priorities and thirdly what difference it makes in targeting. These maps are shown in Figures 1 (for Liverpool) and Figure 2 (for Suffolk). We have used the somewhat arbitrary threshold of 30% to indicate disadvantage (the most disadvantaged areas to be targeted) and compared the indicators.
The left-hand side map in both Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows neighbourhoods marked relative to the top-line IMD indicator where the deepest green areas are the most disadvantaged. In the middle map the same rule applies. The right-hand map in these Figures shows what difference it makes for these areas. In this right-hand map, the red areas are those that are marked as the most disadvantaged 30% under both indicators. The blue areas are ‘advantaged’ under both measures. However, the orange areas are marked as disadvantaged under the ‘better places’ indicator but not under the top-line IMD.
Given the greater importance given to access to services (albeit direct distance accessibility based on 2012 data), it is not surprising that Suffolk LSOAs become more disadvantaged under this measure. Thus, nearly half of Suffolk becomes ‘disadvantaged’ on this measure (30% most disadvantaged in England on this measure) than under the top-line IMD (more of Suffolk’s third map is coloured orange). Perhaps it is of greater surprise that the prioritisation of Liverpool changes little under the new formulation. Most of Liverpool’s neighbourhoods remain identified as ‘disadvantaged’ (marked as red in the third map along).
This is however, just a schema for moving resources around. It is an inevitable result of re-calculating the target IMD measure that some areas gain whilst others lose out (where resources are fixed). However, if areas in Suffolk gain whilst neighbourhoods in Liverpool do not lose out, then how would such a change modify the geography of disadvantage [under this measure] across England? Using the 30% figure as the threshold of disadvantage just under half a million fewer people would be designated as living in a ‘disadvantaged’ area. We did some cluster analysis of the ranking on the top-line IMD indicator and our suggested Power to Change indicator considering both how LSOAs clustered together (using forms of hot spot analysis) to capture how patterns of disadvantage form broad regions and secondly, we looked at the identification of outlier neighbourhoods (using the analysis of Anselin Local Moran’s I) to capture differences within these wider clusters.
On Figures 3 and 4 the LSOAs that are marked as red are ones than appear as advantaged (close to other advantaged areas). In these Figures we have a left-hand map that shows the clustering of indicator ranking in relation to Suffolk. The middle map shows the Getis-Ord clustering for England as a whole whilst the right-hand map shows the Local Moran’s I maps which show where areas are located as outliers in wider regions. Where there is red there is advantage and where there is blue there is disadvantage (from an area-based perspective). Yellow areas are mixed (any area’s ranking is not easily predicted from the ranking of its neighbours). It is also worth noting that the red and the blue areas are not necessarily all of the most disadvantaged areas – just areas that are close to others that are similarly ranked (whether high or low).
It is not surprising to see clusters or disadvantaged (blue) areas in England’s northern metropolitan areas, in the West Midland and in the extreme South West in Figure 3 that maps out the top-line IMD indicator. It is also not surprising to see the East and
North of London marked as deep blue although it is worth noting that the former Kent Coalfield areas remain marked as disadvantaged in blue. So, it is England to the south of the Wash to Severn axis as well as North Yorkshire that are marked as ‘advantaged’ regions under the top-line IMD indicator. The Anselin outlier mapping (right hand map) in Figure 3 points out the presence of disadvantaged LSOAs in advantaged clusters and of the presence of advantaged LSOAs in disadvantaged clusters.
Moving to the Power to Change indicator in Figure 4 we see a change in the geography that might be targeted (in this case by investment in community businesses). More rural areas in the East and South West of England become identified as ‘disadvantaged’. Areas in the East and North of London no longer become identified as disadvantaged in terms of the clustering on this measure’s ranking. There is a different dynamic – to be disadvantaged area in London is to be surrounded by advantaged areas. The East of England (including Suffolk) becomes identified with the cluster of disadvantage although there are clearly still advantaged area outliers in the sea of blue disadvantaged areas. Although there are disadvantaged areas in the advantaged region of London. It has to be stressed that this applies only to forms of disadvantage that flow from combinations of problematic educational, health and accessibility outcomes. There would be a case for an organisation like Power to Change to use a form of IMD that relates specifically to their core mission as a spatial guide to targeting rather than just using the top-line IMD indicator.
The aim of the exercise is not to rubbish the general top-line IMD. I am still a fan – it is still offers useful insight into the patterns of generalised area-based disadvantage across England. The English IMD is still useful to Power to Change in a general sense. However, the aim of this has been to draw to attention the fact that deploying the indicator system in the light of what is trying to be achieved makes better use of the IMD system. The East and North of London is clearly a region with many disadvantaged areas but if the aim of the exercise is to invest in community businesses that improve access to services, health and educational outcomes, there might be better areas on which to focus this specific form of investment. Whatever form of analysis we come up with to capture disadvantage there is always a set of political choices about how to share out public spending. However, the English IMD is more than just the top-line indicator and the top-line IMD was never intended to be the only way in which area-based disadvantaged was represented.
Although in this delicate dance of spatial targeting, the real answer is to invest more in welfare services. Perhaps that is one normative step too far?
If you want to read more about our work with Power to Change, please download the report we wrote for them (available from September).
Smith, I, Green, E, Whittard, D. and Ritchie, F. (2018) Re-thinking the indices of multiple deprivation (for England): a review and exploration of alternative/complementary area-based indicator systems. Final Report. Bristol Centre for Economics and Finance (BCEF) in the Bristol Business School at the University of the West of England (UWE).
When a minimum wage is set, ensuring that employees do get at least that minimum is a basic requirement of regulators. Compliance with the minimum wage can vary wildly: amongst richer countries, around 1%-3% of wages appear to fall below the minimum but in developing countries non-compliance rates can be well over 50%.
As might be expected, much non-compliance exists in the ‘informal’ economy: family businesses using relatives on an ad hoc basis, cash-only payments for casual work, agricultural labouring, or simply the use of illegal workers. However, there is also non-compliance in the formal economy. This is analysed by regulators using large surveys of employers and employees which collect detailed information on hours and earnings. This analysis allows them to identify broad characteristics and the overall scale of non-compliance in the economy.
In the UK, enforcement of the minimum wage is carried out by HM Revenue and Customs, supported by the Low Pay Commission. With 30 million jobs in the UK, and 99% of them paying at or above the minimum wage, effective enforcement means knowing where to look for infringements (for example, retail and hospitality businesses tend to pay low, but compliant, wages; personal services are more likely to pay low wages below the minimum; small firms are more likely to be non-compliant than large ones, and so on). Ironically, the high rate of compliance in the UK can bring problems, as measurement becomes sensitive to the way it is calculated.
A new paper by researchers at UWE and the University of Southampton looks at how non-compliance with minimum wages can be accurately measured, particularly in high-income countries. It shows how the quantitative measurement of non-compliance can be affected by definitions, data quality, data collection methods, processing and the choice of non-compliance measure.
The paper shows that small variations in these can have disproportionate effects on estimates of the amount of non-compliance. As a case study, it analyses the earnings of UK apprentices to show, for example, that even something as simple as the number of decimal places allowed on a survey form can have a significant effect on the non-compliance rates.
The study also throws light on the wider topic of data quality. Much research is focused on marginal analyses: looking at the relative relationships between different factors. These don’t tend to be obviously sensitive to very small variations in data quality, but that is partly because it is can be harder to identify sensitive values.
In contrast, non-compliance with the minimum wage is a binary outcome: a wage is either compliant or it is not. This makes tiny variations (just above or just below the line) easier to spot, compared to marginal analysis. Whilst this study focuses on compliance with the minimum wage, it highlights how an understanding of all aspects of the data collection process, including operational factors such as limiting the number of significant digits, can help to improve confidence in results.
Dr Rob Calvert Jump and Dr Jo Michell assess public debt accounting in this article.
In a recent tweet, George Osborne celebrated the fact that the UK now has a surplus on the government’s current budget. Osborne cited an FT article noting that “… deficit reduction has come at the cost of an unprecedented squeeze in public spending. That squeeze is now showing up in higher waiting times in hospitals for emergency treatment, worse performance measures in prisons, severe cuts in many local authorities and lower satisfaction ratings for GP services.”
It is a measure of how far the debate has departed from reality that widespread degradation of essential public services can be regarded as cause for celebration.
The official objective of fiscal austerity was to put the public finances back on a sustainable path. According to this narrative, government borrowing was out of control as a result of the profligacy of the Labour government. Without a rapid change of policy, the UK faced a fiscal crisis caused by bond investors taking fright and interest rates rising to unsustainable levels.
Is this plausible? To answer, we present alternative scenarios in which actual and projected austerity is significantly reduced and examine the resulting outcomes for national debt.
Public sector net debt (the headline government debt figure) in any year is equal to the debt at the end of the previous year plus the deficit plus adjustments,
where PSND is the public sector net debt at the end of financial year, PSNB is total public sector borrowing (the deficit) over the same year, and ADJ is any non-borrowing adjustment. This adjustment can be inferred from the OBR’s figures for both actual data and projections. In our simulations, we simply take the OBR adjustment figures as constants. Given an assumption about the nominal size of the deficit in each future year, we can then calculate the implied size of the debt over the projection period.
What matters is not the size of the debt in money terms, but as a share of GDP. We therefore also need to know nominal GDP for each future year in our simulations. This is less straightforward because nominal GDP is affected by government spending and taxation. Estimates of the magnitude of this effect – known as the fiscal multiplier – vary significantly. The OBR, for instance, assumes a value of 1.1 for the effect of current government spending. In order to avoid debate on the correct size of the nominal multiplier, we assume it is equal to zero. This is a very conservative estimate and, like the OBR, we believe the correct value is greater than one. The advantage of this approach is that we can use OBR projections for nominal GDP in our simulations without adjustment.
We simulate three alternative scenarios in which the pace of actual and predicted deficit reduction is slowed by a third, a half and two thirds respectively. The evolution of the public debt-to-GDP ratio in each scenario is shown below, alongside actual figures and current OBR projections based on government plans.
Despite the fact that the deficit is substantially higher in our alternative scenarios, there is little substantive variation in the implied time paths for debt-to-GDP ratios. In our scenarios, the point at which the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches a peak is delayed by around two years. If the speed of deficit reduction is halved, public debt peaks at around 97% of GDP in 2019-20, compared to the OBR’s projected peak of 86% in the current fiscal year. Given the assumption of zero nominal multipliers, these projections are almost certainly too high: relaxing austerity would have led to higher growth and lower debt-to-GDP ratios.
Now consider the difference in spending.
Halving the speed of deficit reduction would have meant around £10 billion in extra spending in 2011-12, £8 billion in 2012-13, £19 billion in 2013-14, £21 billion in 2014-15, £29 billion extra in 2015-16, and £37 billion extra in 2016-17. To put these figures into context, £37 billion is around 30% of total health expenditure in 2016-17. The bedroom tax, on the other hand, was initially estimated to save less than £500 million per year. These are large sums of money which would have made a material difference to public expenditure.
Would this extra spending have led to a fiscal crisis, as supporters of austerity argue? It is hard to see how a plausible argument can be made that a crisis is substantially more likely with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 97% than of 86%. Several comparable countries maintain higher debt ratios without any hint of funding problems: in 2017, the US figure was around 108%, the Belgian figure around 104%, and the French figure around 97%.
It is now beyond reasonable doubt that austerity led to increases in mortality rates – government cuts caused otherwise avoidable deaths. These could have been avoided without any substantial effect on the debt-to-GDP ratio. The argument that cuts were needed to avoid a fiscal crisis cannot be sustained.
 There is surprisingly little research on the size of nominal multipliers – most work focuses on real (i.e. inflation adjusted) multipliers.
 We calculate the actual (past years) or projected (future years) percentage change in the nominal deficit from the OBR figures and reduce this by a third, a half and two thirds respectively. The table below provides details of the middle projection where the pace of nominal deficit reduction is reduced by half.
Dr Sebastian Berger’s book review is published in the Heterodox Economics Newsletter
Fake news, post-truth, alternative facts, the commercialization of science, the wholesale destruction of university library collections in the name of “information access” and “digital first”; what does all this have to do with information economics? What happens to cognition, knowledge, truth, wisdom and understanding in the information economy? What are the vortices of images emerging between the natural and the social sciences that give rise to our understanding of “information”? What understanding of human beings is this based on? Who are the relevant actors, their politics and intellectual projects? Anybody concerned with such questions will benefit from reading the book under review, and these are what this review will focus on.
Mirowski and Nik-Khah present the comprehensive results of their fascinating research on information economics that began as far back as Mirowski’s work on cyborg economics and Nik-Khah’s dissertation and his Kapp Award-winning article on auction design. Their book is intended as a contribution to the recent history of economic thought, written in the style of a spy novel that tries to reconstruct who got us to where we are today and how this could happen. Theirs is a grand story of the Great Transformation of the economics profession into market engineers via modern information economics or market design theory. Spying as a method for historians of economic thought is meant to demonstrate these developments and to provide an alternative to performativity theory, which is deemed too vague to be able to account for the details of the interplay of material and intellectual factors. The book is structured into 17 chapters, some of which are as concise as six pages. The first two chapters set the scene and illustrate that there is something rotten about our understanding of the history and state of information economics. The core chapters deal with the roles of natural science, the Nobels and Neoliberals, the Socialist Calculation Debate, Hayek’s economics, Market Socialists at the Cowles Commission, the three schools of market design, two recent case studies, and a concluding chapter on artificial ignorance.
K. William Kapp once expressed his fundamental view that the dehumanization of economic theory and social reality are related and spring from an erroneous understanding of human beings. (Kapp 1985) So, what concept and understanding of human beings are at the base of information economics? (Though not FBI agents, information economists conventionally refer to human beings as “agents” which seems suitable to a spy novel.) The authors convincingly demonstrate, in particular in chapter 9, that information economists basically assume the irrelevancy of cognition and preferences of agents for the desired market outcome they are paid to design. This essentially means that information economists adopt a self-image of being smarter than people and being able to design mechanisms that extract the information from the agents that they are unaware of possessing. It seems that the quicksand of double truths inherent in this assumption remains hidden from their purview. They seem to have no trouble assuming that somehow all the limitations that apply to the agents of their models do not apply to themselves.
This goes back to similar double truths in the works of the intellectual behind the foundational ideas of information economics, i.e. Friedrich von Hayek, who denied people the ability to reason about society as a whole, while he reserved this right and ability to himself. Several chapters describe how the mature Hayek believed that people’s cognition can be disregarded as it does not matter for the operation of the market, which is conceived as an information processor (cyborg, machine, computer) more powerful than any human being. Furthermore, according to Hayek the market arguably expands into the realm of non-knowledge, i.e. the unknown unknown, that is subject to evolutionary forces and not within human conscious control. Success and failure in the market thus depend on ones inheritance of unknown unknowns. The best one can hope for is that the market sheds light onto one’s own total darkness in a way that it becomes marketable. In this tradition, market designers claim to be able to design markets that extract information from people’s unknown unknown, that is, to get agents to give up information they hold. Mirowski and Nik-Khah conclude that in this information economy the market no longer gives people what they want but people have to give the market what it wants (cf. the final chapter). While this seems to suggest that the inside of human beings somehow matters for the establishment of Truth, this is secondary to the overriding claim that the Market is the seat and arbiter of Truth. Truth is thus turned into a function of the unequal and arbitrary distribution of the ability to pay (what prevents the top 1% from buying Truth?).
Mirowski and Nik-Khah judge the essence of these views as pure Social Darwinism with a strong dose of predestination. (p. 69) Along with the authors I think that the mature Hayek’s grave error was to deny human beings to be the seat of the kind of Truth that is revealed as a gift from introspection, that is, self-knowledge that enables self-cultivation. Hayek’s highly problematic understanding of human beings is compounded by a problematic that Tony Lawson has recently pointed to in an interview (Lawson 2018). That is, Hayek denied the existence of bio-physical human needs that are objectifiable, such that their satisfaction can be planned in a social provisioning process. Otto von Neurath, Max Weber, K.W. Kapp and K. Polanyi called this material or substantive rationality.
This clash of views goes back to the Socialist Calculation Debate, which Mirowski and Nik-Kah identify as the birthplace of information economics (chapter 5). It is the great achievement of this book to have pointed out the seminal importance of this debate for understanding economics today. Unfortunately, the book does not mention the “lost” Neurath-wing of the Socialist Calculation Debate and only focuses on the Cowles men’s enthusiasm for a cybernetic socialism. According to the present book it was the market socialists following Otto Lange’s argument that developed information economics at the Cowles Commission. The authors support their main thesis with plenty of evidence that the market socialists “lost track of their political argument and deep motivations” and were haunted by Hayek to end up as neoliberals who sell themselves as experts in market design. This raises the question as to the reasons for the odyssey of Walrasian market socialists following Otto Lange’s intellectual project.